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Abstract
This thesis uses advanced methods from statistical physics to investigate collec-
tive effects in game theoretical models with a large number of players. Specifi-
cally, I study the strategy distributions in a large game that models how agents
choose among double auction markets. I provide a classification of the possible
mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where
an agent population can split into subpopulations adopting different strate-
gies. I compare this classification with the results of Experience-Weighted
Attraction (EWA) learning, which in the long run leads to Nash equilibria in
the appropriate limits of large intensity of choice, low noise (long agent mem-
ory) and perfect imputation of missing scores (fictitious play). Non-trivially,
depending on how the relevant limits are taken, more than one type of equi-
librium can be selected. These include the standard homogeneous mixed and
heterogeneous pure states, but also heterogeneous mixed states in which dif-
ferent agents play different strategies that are not all pure. I also investigate
the influence of heterogeneity in traders’ behaviour on the emergence of segre-
gation described previously. The theoretical machinery is then extended from
the study of systems with two markets, to the analysis of multi-agent systems
where traders can choose between multiple markets.
The last part of the thesis focuses on how the interaction among players in a
repeated game can be represented as an evolutionary process in a “population
of ideas”. I propose the interpretation of reinforcement learning as a stochastic
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Abstract
process in a finite population of this type. The resulting birth-death dynamics
has absorbing states and allows for the extinction of ideas, which marks a key
difference with mutation-selection processes. I characterise the outcome of evo-
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1.1 A really brief introduction to game theory
Game theory aims at the “study of mathematical models of conflicts and coop-
eration between intelligent, rational decision-makers”[105]. Given such a broad
definition, it is not surprising that game theory has many different fields of ap-
plication. These range from the design of efficient market mechanisms [64]
to biology where it is used to model population dynamics [61, 50, 34] and
even the development of efficient policies [62] and the design of multi-agent
systems [107].
To give a brief introduction to Game theory and to the concept of Nash equi-
librium, let us consider the well-known prisoners’ dilemma where two bandits
– called players in game theory – are arrested and suspected of having com-
mitted a crime. They are placed in two distinct interrogation rooms, cannot
communicate and are faced with two choices: betraying their fellow or remain-
ing silent. If they both remain silent, they will both be imprisoned for one
year, and if they betray each other, they will both go to prison for five years.
However, if one of them betrays the other while his fellow remains silent, the
18
1 Introduction
prisoner who has betrayed will not be convicted, and the silent prisoner will
be sentenced to ten years in prison. We can summarise this situation by the
payoff matrix shown in Tab. 1.1. One question that arises is what strategies
players are likely to play.
One possible approach to answering this question is to look for strategies cor-
responding to an “equilibrium”. We could, for example, consider the Nash
equilibrium [68] which generalises the notion of equilibrium – that is common
in physics – to games such as the prisoners’ dilemma. Its definition is: a strat-
egy profile (i.e. the list of probabilities for picking each of the available actions
for each player) is said to be a Nash equilibrium if none of the players (here the
bandits) can increase his payoff (here minus the number of years to be spent in
jail) by changing strategy unilaterally. One can also see the Nash equilibrium
as the long run outcome of a game repeatedly played when each player plays
the best response to the former strategy profile (this is the best response dy-
namics). For example in our game, as shown in the Tab. 1.1, a silent bandit
will always decrease his jail sentence if he betrays. As a consequence, the only
possible Nash equilibrium for the prisoners’ dilemma is when both bandits
betray. The notion of a Nash equilibrium is one possibility among many to de-
fine the equilibrium of rational players in games. (Un)fortunately, in practice,
humans are not rational. They might be subject to biases [54, 103, 92], might
not be capable of calculating their best strategy and end up not converging
to their Nash equilibrium [70]. Thankfully, modeling bounded rationality is
an active area of research of which we want to give a brief taste in the next
paragraph.
One possible way to take into account bounded rationality is to consider play-
ers who do not follow best-response dynamics. For an extensive review of
learning dynamics in games, we refer to [40]. Among the existing learning dy-
namics in games, belief-based learning where traders learn their beliefs about





Table 1.1: Payoff matrix of the prisoners’ dilemma game where each line corre-
sponds to one strategy available for the first bandit and each column to
one strategy available to the second bandit. The entries of the matrix
are of the form (payoff of bandit 1, payoff of bandit 2) where the payoff
of a bandit is minus the number of years he will spend in jail. The
arrows (red for bandit one and black for bandit 2) show how a bandit
would change his strategy under the best response dynamics. We see
that the Nash equilibrium (Betray, Betray) is the only strategy profile
that is stable under the best response dynamics.
where players reinforce their strategies based on the payoff they provide are
some of the most interesting. In this thesis, we focus specifically in Experience-
Weighted Attraction(EWA) learning, which is an interpolation between belief
based learning and reinforcement based learning [19].
Another direction to go beyond the full rationality assumption is to consider
evolutionary games, which model Darwinian selection. In evolutionary games,
one no longer studies players who learn to play against each other, but instead
populations of individuals that reproduce proportionally to how well-suited
they are to the environment. The approach is rooted in the seminal paper of
Maynard-Smith et al. [61] “The logic of animal conflict”. We refer the interested
reader to an extensive review of evolutionary game theory in the textbook of




In brief, the aim of this thesis is to study the long run outcome of different
learning dynamics in games using tools coming from statistical physics as well
as large deviation methods. Such an approach makes it possible to obtain
the long run outcome of EWA learning dynamic in limiting cases (players
with large memory) and to calculate finite size quantities such as first passage
times. More specifically we investigate rare events in learning dynamics and
their impact on the shape of the distribution of strategies among players. Our
particular motivation is to study segregation, a phenomenon whereby players
spontaneously split into groups adopting different strategies. We pursue this
question in the context of players choosing between multiple double auction
markets, a setup that we model as an aggregative game [29] with a large number
of players. Aggregative game here designates a game where the payoff of
players only depends on their own strategy and some mean field quantities.
These summarise the behaviour of the other players and are called aggregates.
For example, in this thesis where we study segregation among several markets,
the aggregates are the number of buyers and the number of sellers in each
market. Another famous example of an aggregative game is the Cournot model
of oligopoly [30]. This model is concerned with several firms who compete on
the amount of a good they produce. In this model, the payoff of firm i is
qiP (q¯) − C(qi) where C(qi) is the cost of production of qi units of good and
P (q¯) is the price of a single unit of good. The price of a single unit of good
depends on the total quantity of a good produced q¯ =
∑
i qi which is the
aggregate we mentioned earlier. Since the payoff of the agents depends only
on the aggregates of the agents, there can be many distributions of strategies
among the players of an aggregative game that are Nash-equilibria. There is
a vast literature on the dynamics of aggregates when players learn to play an
aggregative game [55, 39]. However, to assess the existence of groups, one
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needs to know the structure of the distribution of strategies in the population
of traders and not only the aggregates quantities. There are no previous studies
of this structure in large aggregative games we are aware of. The aim of this
thesis is twofold: (i) to investigate the structure of the steady state of some
learning dynamics as well as the finite size effects such as first passage times,
(ii) to apply those results to help understand the spontaneous emergence of
segregation of traders across double auction markets.
Having stated the motivation for this thesis, we give an overview of the methods
– mostly coming from statistical physics – that we will use in this thesis. The
application of methods from physics to game theory proved to be successful
in the past as attested by a substantial body of literature. For example, a
number of papers [7, 3, 100, 4] are concerned with finite size effects in birth-
death processes in evolutionary game theory. Other studies [86, 88, 87, 42, 76]
are concerned with learning dynamics in games. One can also mention [31]
where Dall’Asta et al. study the “Collaborative Nash equilibria”, of public
good games on networks. The generalization to random graphs of their model
is performed with the well-known cavity method [63]. On top of these works,
some recent contributions to mean field game theory originated from statistical
physicist [96, 95].
The minority game [28, 24] is also an active area of research in the physics
community. As its name suggests, it is a model where players compete to be
in the minority. An example of a minority game is “which road to choose to
avoid the traffic jam on the way home, knowing that all your colleagues will
face the same choice”. This means choosing the road the minority of your
colleagues choose to use. It originates from the El-Farol Bar problem [5] and
has received attention from physicists because of its formal relation to spin
glasses models. For a non-exhaustive literature review on minority games, we
refer to the articles collected in the second part of [24]. Two papers [51, 53]
are relevant here as they are concerned with segregation in minority games.
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In [51] agents who play a multi-resources minority game are distributed on a
graph and only observe their neighbour, whose winning strategy they copy. In
such models Huang et al. observe a strategy grouping behaviour. The major
difference between the model of Huang et al. and our model is that the locality
of information they assume, which fairly directly leads to segregation, is not a
feature of model of segregation in double auction markets. The authors of [53]
study evolutionary minority games. In such a game, agents have a common
memory of the output of previous sessions of the minority game and choose
to play either according to it with probability p or against it with probability
1−p. The agents learn the strategy p and in the long run, a strategy grouping
is observed.
In this thesis we will frequently use the Kramers-Moyal expansion [104],
Kramers’ reaction rate theory [104, 46], mean field theory and also the Freidlin-
Wentzell theory. Freidlin-Wentzell generallises Kramers’ rate theory to non
conservative dynamics [11, 38]. The main book about Freidlin-Wentzell the-
ory being hardly readable for a physicist, we suggest to the interested reader
the paper of Bouchet et al. [11], which has a very clear introduction to Freidlin-
Wentzell theory. The most challenging problem we encountered when using
the Freidlin-Wentzell theory is to calculate transition rates between two stable
points of a dynamics. This requires finding the minimal action path between
those two points. There is a variety of algorithms for this task, two of which
are explained in [14, 48]. The ultimate goal of the Freidlin-Wentzell theory is
to provide a picture of the behaviour of complex systems in the low noise limit.
Such a low noise limit is a recurring theme all along this thesis either because
the noise comes from the large size of the system (see Chap. 5) or from the
large memory of traders in EWA learning dynamics (see Chap. 2, 3 and 4).
As usual in statistical physics in the low noise limit, the problem structure is
simplified and often allows for an analytical solution. In the next subsection,
we describe the structure of the thesis.
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1.3 Organisation of the thesis
In this PhD thesis, we study different learning dynamics in the low noise
limit. The connection between the chapters is shown graphically in Fig. 1.1.
In Chap. 2 we study the learning dynamics of traders choosing among dou-
ble auction markets. We first look at the equilibrium of this game in the
“Nash sense”. Then we compare this Nash equilibrium to the steady state of
Experience-Weighted Attraction learning dynamics with fictitious play. We
find that in the limit of full fictitious play, large memory and large intensity of
choice, the steady states of the learning dynamics do correspond to Nash equi-
libria. One of the surprising outcomes of our research is that depending on how
the relevant limit of Experience-Weighted Attraction learning is approached,
the learning dynamics has qualitatively different long-run outcomes. Each cor-
responds to a Nash equilibrium, and some have groups of players playing with
mixed strategies, a scenario not considered before.
In Chap. 2 we focus for simplicity on traders choosing between only two mar-
kets. Chap. 3 extends our study to the case of three markets. This connects
to a preliminary simulation study of this setting by Alorić [1] and puts the
results on a firmer theoretical footing thanks to the minimal action path for-
malism developed in Chap. 2. This enables us to investigate the existence of
strong segregation, where “strong” refers to segregation that persists in the
large memory limit.
In real markets, traders have different objectives, depending for example on
whether they are speculators or investors. They can have different risk aver-
sion, want to make a profit on different timescales (days, months) etc. To
take into account such heterogeneity we study in Chap. 4 a model where the
population of traders has heterogeneity in both their memory length and their
intensity of choice. In our model, the forgetting rate of traders r represents
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the inverse time scale over which agents aim to make a profit. We consider the
existence of segregation or otherwise in a population where some traders have
an inverse memory r = 1 while the rest has a small inverse memory r  1.
We also study additional heterogeneity in the decision strength β, which is
the extent to which traders act on preferences learnt from previously received
payoffs.
In Chap. 5 we give an interpretation of reinforcement learning as a pairwise
matching process in populations of ideas. This analogy is, on the one hand,
motivated by existing work [88, 86, 101, 102, 56] linking reinforcement learn-
ing to the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory, with a modified
fitness that includes an entropic term. The resulting equation is known as
the Sato-Crutchfield equation. On the other hand, there is a large litter-
ature [99, 100, 99, 67] that investigates how one can interpret the original
replicator equation as the large size limit of a pairwise matching process and
what properties – including e.g. fixation times – this process has for finite pop-
ulation size. Keeping this fact in mind, we show that also the Sato-Crutchfield
equation can be written as a pairwise matching process, where the fitness of
agents strategies contain an entropic term that accounts for the willingness
of players to randomise their strategies, i.e. how they set their exploration-
exploitation trade-off [94]. We describe birth-death processes in a population
of ideas in the limit of a large population as a sequence of simple events (relax-
ation which last a time of order 1, activation which takes a time exponential in
the size of the population N , ...) which provides a useful intuitive framework
for understanding the dynamics of ideas in the large size limit.
Finally, in Chap. 6 we summarise the results of our work and discuss some
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Figure 1.1: Roadmap through the thesis: Chap. 2 is self-contained and
describes, among other things, the large deviation formalism used
throughout this thesis. Chaps. 3 and 4 rely on the methods developed
in Chap. 2 and deal with two extensions of the model of segregation
in double auction markets. Chap. 5 is a self-contained study of rare




Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria
using Experience Weighted Attraction
Learning
2.1 Introduction
Agent based models describe the dynamics of co-learning and interacting in-
dividuals and can be applied in many fields including sociology – with the
Schelling model of segregation [89, 84] a famous example – and economics,
where the individuals are economic agents. In recent decades, there has been
growing interest in the application of agent based models to the study of fi-
nancial markets; for extensive reviews of such applications we refer to [23, 85].
Among existing models of double auction markets, one can cite the work of Iori
et al. [25] and the CAT game [16]. The latter is a market design tournament
in which participants were asked to supply automated markets that would
perform as well as possible in an economic system populated with automated
traders. Spontaneous emergence of preferences for different markets emerged
within the population of traders. Unfortunately, the complexity of the CAT
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game tournament made it impossible to study this so-called segregation phe-
nomenon by analytical methods, emphasizing the need for a simpler model to
understand the phenomenon of segregation. Alorić et al. designed such a mini-
mal version of the CAT game, where traders learn to choose among two double
auction markets [2]. Also there segregation was observed, as the outcome of
the learning dynamics. Whether this result has an interpretation as a game
theoretical equilibrium was not addressed, however. This will be one of the
two main questions of this chapter: we ask to what extent segregation shows
up in the Nash equilibria of the game corresponding to the model of Alorić
et al.. One of the properties of this game are that the payoff agents earn by
trading at the different markets depends only on the ratio of the number of
buyers and sellers at this market. The game therefore belongs to the class of
aggregative games, where payoffs depend on a finite number of macroscopic
quantities, called aggregates.
Bearing in mind the above broader context, we consider in this chapter the
double auction game of [2] as a paradigmatic example of an aggregative game
with an infinitely large number of players. While it is known that finding Nash
equilibria in games with a large but finite number of players is computationally
hard [32], taking the number of players to infinity can lead to drastic simplifi-
cations that make the problem analytically tractable. This is because the limit
eliminates some features such as the market impact of the action of a single
player [35]. For aggregative games the limit also has convenient mathemati-
cal properties: Nash equilibria of infinite games can be characterised as the
large size limit of equilibria in games with a finite number of players [21]. An
introduction to games with a large number of players would not be complete
without mentioning mean field game theory [59, 20, 96, 95], which studies
stochastic differential games with an infinite number of players. The underly-
ing formalism here is rather different from the one we use in the rest of this
article, however.
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Nash equilibria of aggregative game are characterised by the values of the ag-
gregates on which the payoff of any given action depends. To each of these
there generally correspond infinitely many different distributions of strategies
among the players. In this chapter, the second question we therefore ask is
whether and how this degeneracy in the strategy distribution is resolved by
the learning dynamics of the corresponding agent based model. This issue
of how a Nash equilibrium is selected dynamically has been studied theoret-
ically for games of small size [40] and using numerical simulation for larger
games [55, 39, 22], providing results on the speed of convergence and efficiency
of certain types of learning dynamics. While these previous studies focused on
the value of macroscopic quantities such as the ratio of number of buyers to
number of sellers once the learning dynamics has converged, we are interested
in going further and investigating the distribution of strategies, which is crucial
in order to establish whether there is segregation or not. The specific learn-
ing rule we study is Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning, which
is well known to reproduce quite accurately the behaviour of human subjects
learning to play repeated normal form games [19]. Strategies are encoded by
so-called preferences in EWA learning, and the comparison of the preference
distributions that result from EWA learning dynamics with the properties of
the underlying Nash equilibria is one of our main contributions; this is a novel
approach that has not to our knowledge been pursued in the existing litera-
ture.
Methodically, we argue that in the game we analyse, correspondence with Nash
equilibria requires a long memory limit. The EWA dynamics of the agents is
then described by a Fokker-Planck equation, and it is the steady states of
this that we study. We deploy large deviation methods to detect segregation,
where agents split into sub-populations that each play a different strategy. We
combine this approach with numerical simulations in order to shed light on the
several, qualitatively different, types of preference distribution that can emerge
in the steady state of the learning dynamics. These include the two scenar-
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ios that are conventionally considered: homogeneous mixed equilibria, where
all agents play the same mixed strategy, and heterogeneous pure equilibria,
where different agents play different pure strategies [15, 90, 79]. Surprisingly,
however, we also find heterogeneous mixed solutions, where the agents play
different strategies and these strategies themselves include mixed strategies.
This chapter is organised as follow: in Sec. 2.2 we summarise the minimal
model of traders choosing between double auction markets to be studied in
the rest of this chapter, as well as the EWA learning dynamics. In Sec. 2.3
we study the Nash equilibria of the aggregative game corresponding to this
model, in the limit of a large number of players. In Sec. 2.4 we present a
study of the steady states of the learning dynamics in the model of Sec. 2.2
and argue that in the limit of fictitious play, best response dynamics and large
memory, these steady states are Nash equilibria. We show that depending on
how these multiple limits are approached, the dynamics selects several distinct
Nash equilibria, including ones of heterogeneous mixed type. In Sec. 2.5 we
present separately the large deviation methods that we use in our study of the
steady states of EWA learning in the large memory limit. Sec. 2.6 summarises
our results and lays out some avenues for future research. Technical details
are relegated to the appendixes.
2.2 Model: Choosing between Double Auction
Markets
In this section, we summarise the model of double auction markets of Alorić et
al. [2]. In this model, a population of co-evolving traders competes to trade by
choosing between two double auction markets. This can lead to segregation,
where agents spontaneously split into groups with different preferences for the
two markets. The model contains three ingredients: (i) the market mechanism
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by which the double auction markets process orders to buy and sell, (ii) the way
traders set their order prices (this is assumed fixed and not affected by learning)
and calculate their payoff, and (iii) the learning procedure that traders use to
learn their trading strategy, i.e. their preference for each market. We describe
these three ingredients in turn.
Market mechanism
The model assumes that each market processes orders in discrete trading
rounds rather than continuously. In each round each trader places at one
of the markets an order to buy or sell one unit of the underlying good. An
order is denoted (τ, “price”) where τ ∈ {a, b} designates the type of order, with
a an order to sell (also known as an ask) and b an order to buy (a bid); “price”
is the price at which the trader proposes to buy or sell. For example (b, 20) is
an order to buy one unit of good at a price of 20. Once all the traders have
sent their orders (see Dynamics of traders), the clearing process begins. The
trading price is set by each market using the formula
pim = (1− θm)〈b〉+ θm〈a〉 (2.1)
where 〈b〉, 〈a〉 are the average prices of bids and asks received by the market
and θm is the bias of market m towards buyers. All the orders on the wrong
side of the trading price (i.e. an order to buy lower than the trading price
or an order to sell higher than the trading price) are rejected. The remaining
valid orders are executed at the trading price by randomly forming pairs of
one buyer and one seller until no more pairs can be formed. As the number of
valid bids and asks will differ in general, some traders will remain unmatched;
they are unable to trade and their orders are not executed.
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Order pricing and payoff calculation
As explained above, it is assumed that traders always send an order to buy or
sell exactly one unit of good to only one single market. This is done to keep
the model as simple as possible. Following the work of Gode and Sunders [44],
traders set the price of their orders with zero intelligence: the price of each
order to buy (resp. sell) sent by each trader is an independent Gaussian random
variable with mean µb (resp. µa) and standard deviation σb = σa = 1. While
this assumption may appear drastic at first sight, Gode and Sunders found that
traders sending orders to double auction markets with zero intelligence was a
good substitute for individual rationality [44]. The model also assumes that
each agent chooses randomly whether to buy or sell, with a fixed probability
pb that can be different for different agents.
At the end of a trading round, each trader receives as feedback from the market
to which they sent their order whether it was executed and if so at which price.
From this each trader computes the score of his order S as either zero, if the
order was not executed, or otherwise as the profit of the order. In the model,
payoff associated with the order is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between order price and trading price. This payoff is random and is affected
by: (i) the submitted order price, (ii) the trading price, and (iii) whether the
order is executed, which in turn depends on the ratio of number of buyers and
sellers in the market where the offer was sent. (We discuss in Sec. 2.3 how the
average payoff over these sources of randomness can be calculated in the limit
of a large system.)
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Dynamics of traders
The remaining part of the behaviour of the traders that the model needs to pre-
scribe is how they learn their respective preferences for the two markets. The
assumption is that agents use experience-weighted attraction reinforcement
learning (EWA) [19]. They have attractions Am to each market m ∈ {1, 2},
which they update after each trading round n according to
Am(n+ 1) =
 (1− r)Am(n) + rS(n) if market m chosen in round n(1− αr)Am(n) otherwise
(2.2)
Here S(n) is the payoff for the order placed at time-step n, α is a fictitious
play parameter which describes how fast traders decrease the attraction to
actions they do not play, and r is the inverse of the agents’ memory, defined
as the period of time over which they typically remember past payoffs. Based
on those attractions A = (A1, A2), traders then randomly choose a market for
trade according to the inverse logit or “softmax” function σβ(·),
P(trade at market 1 | A) = σβ(A1 − A2) = 1
1 + exp(−β(A1 − A2)) (2.3)
where β is the intensity of choice that regulates how strongly the agents use the
attractions to bias their preferences. A possible extension of this setup, which
we do not pursue here, is to allow the traders to learn also their preference for
buying and selling, instead of keeping this fixed [2]. In that case there would
be four attractions to be learned, for buying and selling at each of the two
markets.
We shall use “EWA learning” as a shorthand to designate the above dynam-
ics where traders learn at which market to trade – note that because of this
learning process the traders are somewhat more intelligent than the strictly
zero-intelligence traders described by Gode and Sunders [44], who in our sce-
nario would choose randomly also where to trade.
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In the following we focus largely on a symmetric setup [2], explained in more
detail in Sec. 2.3.2 below. There are two classes of agents in this scenario but
their distributions of attractions are related by swapping A1 and A2 so it is
enough to focus on one class. Numerical simulation and theoretical analysis
of EWA learning, for α = 1, then show that when the intensity of choice β is
above a threshold βc the distribution of the traders’ attractions can become
bi-modal [2]: the model produces emergent segregation. By way of orienta-
tion, example simulation results for β both below and above the segregation
threshold are shown in Fig. 2.1.






















Figure 2.1: Results of a multi-agent simulation of the model of [2] after 5 · 104
rounds of trading among 2·104 agents. Parameters for the two markets
are θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3, buying preferences for the two classes of agents
are p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.2, forgetting rate r = 0.01 and α = 1 (no
fictitious play). Shown is the distribution of attraction differences
A1−A2 across the first group of agents. This is unimodal for intensity
of choice β below the segregation threshold as in (a) , but becomes
bimodal for larger β: the system shows emergent segregation.
34
2 Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria
Incomplete versus complete information
One possible cause of heterogeneity in agents’ preferences that has been identi-
fied in previous studies is incomplete or imperfect information [60]. An obvious
question is whether this explains the observation of segregation in the double
auction market model described above. Indeed, the agents in this model do
have incomplete information about the markets they are trading in: they only
receive the stochastic payoffs but do not have access to global information
such as the number of buyers and sellers at each market, which they would
need in order to estimate their average payoff. As a consequence, traders face
the exploration/exploitation dilemma that is common in reinforcement learn-
ing [94]. They need to explore the whole strategy space (both high and low
payoff strategies) to have accurate payoff estimates for their strategies, while at
the same time exploiting the most profitable strategy by playing it frequently.
In the model we consider the trade-off between exploration and exploitation is
set by the intensity of choice β [42], with higher values favoring exploitation by
making agents choose predominantly the market with the larger attraction.
To address the question of whether segregation is possible also with perfect
information, we develop in the next section an appropriate game theoretical
version of the double auction model discussed above. Once we have determined
the Nash equilibria of this game, we will come back to a comparison with
the steady state of the EWA learning dynamics, to see how this resolves an
indeterminacy in the Nash equilibria.
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2.3 Mean field Nash equilibria
We now rephrase the double auction market choice model of Sec. 2.2 in game
theoretical language. This will allow us to determine and classify its Nash
equilibria in the mean field limit of an infinite number of players. Our aim
will be to determine whether in this perfect information context there are still
signatures of the segregation phenomenon previously found for EWA learning
with imperfect information. In Sec. 2.4 we will then see that, in the appropriate
limit, the steady states of the EWA learning dynamics are consistent with the
Nash equilibria of the model described in this section.
2.3.1 Game theoretical framework
Setting
We consider a population of N traders called players (to be consistent with
standard terminology in game theory). Those players are divided into two
classes c ∈ {1, 2}, of the same size. Each player has fixed buy/sell preferences
described by the probability to buy, p(c)b , which depends on his/her class. Each
trading round is a round of the game, where each player chooses one of two
actions, viz. “send an order to market one” and “send an order to market two”;
we label these by m ∈ {1, 2}. A pure strategy is one where a player always
chooses the same action. A mixed strategy is one where the player chooses
action m = 1 with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and m = 2 otherwise. This formalism
can be linked to EWA learning as described in Sec. 2.2: there the traders learn
which mixed strategy to play, mapping the learned attractions (A1, A2) to the
probability p using the softmax function σβ(·) defined in Eq. (2.3).
36
2 Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria
Average payoff in a large game
To determine the Nash equilibria, we need to determine the average payoff of
a player for a given strategy p, given the (fixed) strategies of all other players.
While this calculation would be complicated for finite N , it simplifies in the
limit N → ∞ that we consider from now on. Firstly, the trading price at
each market becomes non-fluctuating as the average value of bids and asks
submitted becomes equal respectively to µb and µa, up to fluctuations that
vanish as O(1/√N).
Secondly, the ratio of the number of buyers and sellers at each market m,
which we denote fm, also becomes non-fluctuating. We can calculate these
ratios from the strategy distribution φ(c)(p) within each class of players, where
because of the large N -limit we can neglect the effect of the strategy chosen
















b (1− p¯(1)) + p(2)b (1− p¯(2))




dp φ(c)(p)p is the average mixed strategy parameter p in class
c. In the above formulas, Np(1)b p¯
(1) is the typical number of agents of class
1 choosing to buy and to send their buy order to market 1. The relative
fluctuations of this number again vanish for N →∞. The other terms in the
expressions for the fm have analogous interpretations, and the common factor
of N cancels.
Based on the above considerations, it becomes a simple matter to calculate
the average payoff Pτ,m(fm) of buying (τ = b) or selling (τ = a) in market m,
depending on the market conditions as encoded by fm (see Appendix 2.A). Our
game is therefore aggregative [29]: average payoffs are determined only by the
aggregate quantities f1 and f2 that can be calculated from the strategy distribu-
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tions φ(c)(p). Other games in this class include the Cournot oligopoly [33, 30];
in statistical physics language the aggregates would be called order parame-
ters.
In our setup we need to average the payoff Pτ,m(fm) further over the probability
of buying or selling, giving for a player of class c an average payoff for the action
of “going to market m” of
P(c)m (fm) = p(c)b Pb,m(fm) + (1− p(c)b )Pa,m(fm) (2.5)
Finally, for a player using a mixed strategy, the resulting payoff P(c)(p, f1, f2)
is an average of the payoff at market 1 weighted by p and the payoff at market
2 weighted by 1− p:
P(c)(p, f1, f2) = pP(c)1 (f1) + (1− p)P(c)2 (f2) (2.6)
This quantity is the key input into the calculation of the Nash equilibria of
our game.
Nash equilibria
We choose to use the following definition of a Nash equilibrium for our game in
the limit of an infinite number of players [20]. This definition takes advantage
of the fact that we exploited in the payoff calculation, namely that for N →∞
the aggregate quantities f1 and f2 remain constant if a single player changes
strategy; in other words, players do not have market impact and their payoff
depends only on their own strategy and the distribution of the strategies in
the population overall.
Definition 1 Nash equilibrium: The strategy distributions φ(1) and φ(2) consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium of the game if the two following conditions are verified:
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Support(φ(1)) ⊆ argmaxp
(P(1)(p, f1(φ(1), φ(2)), f2(φ(1), φ(2)))) (2.7a)
Support(φ(2)) ⊆ argmaxp
(P(2)(p, f1(φ(1), φ(2)), f2(φ(1), φ(2)))) (2.7b)
Here the maximization of the payoff on the right hand side is performed over
the variable p at constant φ(c); i.e. each single player maximises their payoff
with the aggregate quantities fixed.
In words, the definition means that any strategy that has nonzero probability
of being played by a player from class c (i.e. in the support of φ(c)) must
maximise the player’s payoff. We will now apply this definition to determine
the different classes of Nash equilibria that exist in the double auction market
choice game.
2.3.2 Classification of Nash equilibria
Equal payoff constraints
We will classify Nash equilibria according to two characteristics. If all agents
in a class play the same strategy p = p¯(c), the distribution φ(c)(p) is a delta-
distribution δ(p− p¯(c)) and we call the equilibrium homogeneous for that class,
otherwise—when different players in the same class use different p— we refer
to the equilibrium as heterogeneous. The second characteristic is the strategy
type: if all agents in a class play the pure strategies p = 0 or p = 1 we call the
equilibrium pure, otherwise mixed. Combining these two characteristics then
divides equilibria for each class into four possible types.
To obtain a classification of the possible overall Nash equilibria, note
that the function being maximised in Eq. (2.7a,2.7b), viz. p →
P(c)(p, f1(φ(c), φ(2)), f2(φ(1), φ(2))) is linear in p. As a consequence, if it is
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not constant, it has a single maximum on one of the boundaries of the interval
[0, 1] where it is defined. A glance at (2.6) shows that the payoff function













If (and only if) this equal payoff condition is satisfied, the strategy distribution
φ(c)(p) can be nonzero for any p ∈ [0, 1]. This can be interpreted by saying
that, if in a class there are players that go to the first and the second market,
the only way for none of them to have an incentive to move to another market
is for the payoff at the two markets to be the same.
























, φ(c)(p) = δ(p), p¯(c) = 0
(2.10)
In both cases the strategy distribution is homogeneous pure, and the entire
class of agents goes to the market with the higher payoff.
Types of Nash equilibria
We can now proceed to find the possible types of overall Nash equilibria for
our game. Because f1 and f2 are fixed once p¯(1) and p¯(2) are known, the equal
payoff condition for each class defines a line of points in the (p¯(1), p¯(2)) plane.
This line can consist of several distinct pieces as shown in the examples in
Fig. 2.2, where equal payoff lines are plotted for both class c = 1 (full lines)
and c = 2 (dashed lines).
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The discussion above can now be summarised in graphical terms as follows: a
point in the (p¯(1), p¯(2))-plane is a Nash equilibrium if for each class the point is
either on the equal payoff line, or on the boundary (specified by p¯(c) = 1 or = 0)
corresponding to the market where the class has the higher payoff. Combining
these options for the two classes, the first and for our purposes most interesting
type of Nash equilibrium that results is a point at an intersection of two equal
payoff lines, away from the boundaries. We call such a point a potentially
heterogeneous Nash equilibrium. Here both p¯(1) and p¯(2) are strictly between
0 and 1. The strategy distributions can then be either
• homogeneous mixed, with φ(c) = δ(p− p¯(c)), or
• heterogeneous pure, with φ(c) = (1− p¯(c))δ(p) + p¯(c)δ(p− 1), or
• heterogeneous mixed otherwise.
These three different cases are illustrated schematically in Fig. 2.3. The ho-
mogeneous mixed case can be viewed as the Nash equilibrium analogue of the
unimodal distribution in the stochastic simulations shown in Fig. 2.3; in the
heterogeneous mixed case the strategy distribution is arbitrary except for its
fixed mean p¯(c). The fact that the Nash equilibrium conditions here allow
both homogeneous and heterogeneous strategy distributions motivates our use
of the term “potentially heterogeneous”. It also shows that one needs dynami-
cal information to say more about the strategy distribution shapes, as explored
in detail in Sec. 2.4.
A second type of Nash equilibrium results when the equal payoff condition is
obeyed for only one class while the other class is at a boundary. We then speak
of a partially potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium, because one class of
players has a homogeneous pure strategy distribution while the other strategy
distribution is of one of the three types listed in the bullet points above.
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Finally, Nash equilibria unconstrained by either of the equal payoff conditions
must be in on of the four corners of the square (p¯(1), p¯(2)) ∈ [0, 1]2; we call them
homogeneous pure equilibria as the strategy distributions for both classes are
then of this type. These equilibria can be further subdivided depending on
whether both classes go to the same market or not. The former type always
exists as if one of the traders tries to trade in the empty market s/he will earn
a payoff of 0 which is smaller than the payoff s/he could earn in the non-empty
market. In the latter type, each market is used only by traders of one class,
who trade with each other there.
Plots in the (p¯(1), p¯(2))-plane as shown in Fig. 2.2 are a convenient graphical
tool to assess the existence of potentially heterogeneous, potentially partially
heterogeneous and homogeneous pure Nash equilibria. Potentially heteroge-
neous equilibria are found directly as interior crossing points of the equal payoff
curves for the two classes. A partially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium corre-
sponds to a point (see Fig. 2.2(b)) that is located at the intersection of the
equal payoff curve of class 1 (resp. 2) and a horizontal (resp. vertical) bound-
ary. This criterion identifies a list of (usually four) candidate equilibria. To
have an actual equilibrium the payoffs of the markets for the homogeneous
pure class need to have the correct order, e.g. for a candidate point located on
the axis p¯(2) = 1, the payoff at market 1 has to be higher for class 2 players
than the payoff at market 2. By drawing arrows indicating payoff ordering as
explained in the caption of Fig. 2.2, this can be summarised by saying that the
arrows must point towards the boundary that a candidate point for a poten-
tially partially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium lies on. In Fig. 2.2, this leaves
two equilibria of this type as marked by the red circles.
Finally, for a heterogeneous pure Nash equilibrium where the two classes of
players choose different markets, the two candidate points are the top left or
bottom right corner. These are again Nash equilibria provided they have the
correct ordering of payoffs, which requires that the arrows drawn in the figure
42
2 Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: Values of p¯(1), p¯(2) for which the equal payoff constraints are verified for
class c = 1 (blue, solid) and class c = 2 (green, dashed). The arrows
point to (s(1), s(2)) where s(c) ∈ {0, 1} indicates the profit-maximizing
strategy of traders from class c, in each distinct area of the plane. In
panel (a) where θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3, p(1)b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2, there exists a
heterogeneous equilibrium (green triangle), located at the intersection
of the two equal payoff curves. In panel (b), θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.2,
p
(1)
b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.45, and the equal payoff curves do not cross.
There is then no potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium, but the
direction of the arrows shows that a homogeneous pure equilibrium
(orange square) with the two classes going to different markets exists.
There are also two partially heterogeneous Nash equilibria (red circles,
see main text). In both (a) and (b) there exist homogeneous pure Nash
equilibria where the whole population trades at the same market (blue
hexagons). The dotted line indicates the location of the symmetric
equilibria that we mostly focus on.
point towards this corner. In Fig. 2.2(b) this is the case for the top left corner
(orange square).
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We can now look at how the existence of the different types of Nash equilibria
depends on the system parameters, which are the market biases θm and the
buying preferences p(c)b . We follow Ref. [2] in focusing on a symmetric setup
where the two markets have opposite biases in favour of buyers and sellers. As
θ = 0.5 corresponds to the absence any bias, this means θ1 + θ2 = 1. Similarly
we assume that the players fall into two symmetric groups with respect to their
buying preferences, with those in class 1 preferring to buy (p(1)b < 0.5) and the
others having the opposite preference p(2)b = 1−p(1)b . With these choices, we can
show in Fig. 2.4 the regions where the different types of Nash equilibria exist as
a function of p(1)b and θ1. It turns out that the two examples shown in Fig. 2.2
cover the two generic cases: in addition to homogeneous pure Nash equilibria
where both classes go to the same market, which always exist, one has either a
potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium as in Fig. 2.2(a), or a homogeneous
pure equilibrium with the two classes at different markets and two potentially
partially heterogeneous equilibria (Fig. 2.2(b)). These two cases are mutually
exclusive. An analytical expression for the boundary between the zones where
they exist can also be obtained as detailed in Appendix 2.B.
Returning to the broader picture, the Nash equilibrium analysis of the double
auction market choice game clearly shows that there is potential for segrega-
tion: as illustrated in Fig. 2.3, heterogeneous pure strategy distributions have
two peaks that indicate players within a class separating into two distinct sub-
populations playing opposite pure strategies. Heterogeneous mixed strategies
can similarly have two or more peaks. This emergence of segregation shows
that the observations of segregation in a previous study of EWA learning [2]
were not based on purely dynamical effects. We also find qualitatively similar
trends, e.g. the equilibria where both classes of players can be segregated (po-
tentially heterogeneous) are most prevalent in Fig. 2.4 when the two markets
are identical (θ1 = 0.5), showing that segregation is not a trivial consequence
of differences between markets.
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Figure 2.3: Schematic representation of three different types of strategy distribu-
tion φ(p) that all have the same mean p¯ (dashed line): homogeneous
mixed distribution (left panel), heterogeneous mixed (red curve, right
panel) heterogeneous pure (green curve, right panel). Peaks in the
distribution are shown broadened as they would be in EWA learning
at finite decision strength β; as Nash equilibria they would become
sharp (delta-distributions). The right panel illustrates that, when a
strategy distribution has two distinct peaks, it can represent a steady
state of the learning dynamics only when the fluxes of agents moving
from one peak to the other balance in the two directions (see Sec. 2.5).
However, the Nash equilibrium conditions only identify the means of the strat-
egy distributions φ(1) and φ(2). As we saw, this means for a potentially hetero-
geneous (or potentially partially heterogeneous) equilibrium that we cannot
decide whether the underlying strategy distribution is homogeneous (mixed)
or heterogeneous, nor do we know whether a heterogeneous mixed strategy
distribution would actually have two distinct peaks as required for the concept
of segregation to make sense. We therefore study next under what conditions
EWA learning dynamics as defined in Sec. 2.2 reaches as its steady state a
Nash equilibrium of our system. Once this connection is established, we ask
which particular Nash equilibria are selected as possible steady states of EWA
learning. Put differently, does the learning dynamics break the indeterminacy
of the Nash equilibrium conditions?
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Figure 2.4: Phase diagram for existence of different types of Nash equilibria for
a system with symmetric price setting parameters θ1 = 1 − θ2 and
buying preferences p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b . The types of equilibria in this
plot are explained in Sec. 2.3.2 and a graphical method to check their
existence is shown in Fig. 2.2. The labels (a) and (b) correspond to
the panels there. Note that the two homogeneous pure Nash equilibria
where both classes of player trade at the same market are not shown
as they exist everywhere.
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2.4 EWA learning in double auction markets
In this section, we study the steady states of the EWA learning dynamics
defined in Sec. 2.2 in a game with a large number of players. We are interested
in particular when different types of steady state strategy distributions, as
sketched in Fig. 2.3, can occur.
We argue in Sec. 2.4.1 that one expects the steady state of the EWA learning
dynamics to approach a Nash equilibrium of the model described in Sec. 2.3 in
the joint limit where the fictitious play coefficient α→ 0, the intensity of choice
β →∞ and the inverse memory length r → 0. In principle our task is thus to
find the steady state of EWA learning and then to take this joint limit. It turns
out, however, that this is far from trivial. The reason is shown by the phase
diagram in Fig. 2.5, where the limit r → 0 has already been taken. What is
notable is that there are different regions in the phase diagram where the steady
state strategy distributions are homogeneous and heterogeneous, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium limit point (α, 1/β) = (0, 0) can be approached along
paths within either of these regions, which means there will be several possible
limiting strategy distributions of EWA learning, and it is these that we will
want to identify. Note that we focus generally on system parameters where
potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibria exist (see Fig. 2.4), for which the
EWA learning phase diagram has the generic structure of Fig 2.5.
We introduce in Sec. 2.4.2 the Kramers-Moyal expansion for the EWA learning
dynamics on which the rest of the analysis is based. In particular, we study
homogeneous and heterogeneous distributions of preferences in Sec. 2.4.4 and
Sec. 2.4.5, respectively, and analyse how they approach Nash equilibria in the
relevant limit. The large deviation methods we deploy for the heterogeneous
case are described separately in Sec. 2.5.
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As before we choose to concentrate on settings with symmetric market biases
and buy/sell preferences, and within those on steady states of the EWA learn-
ing dynamics that also have symmetric aggregates p¯(1) = 1−p¯(2). This captures
the dominant steady states, simplifies the numerical analysis (see Sec. 2.5) and
also makes it easier to illustrate the concepts. In the graphical representation
of Fig. 2.2, the steady states we are considering lie on the diagonal from top
left to bottom right (dotted line).
2.4.1 Nash Equilibria as limits of EWA learning
In the game theoretical study of Sec. 2.3, we considered a large game (N →∞).
The Nash equilibria we studied assume implicitly (i) that each player is able
to evaluate his expected payoff (full information assumption), (ii) that this
evaluation averages appropriately over all stochastic effects (no fluctuation as-
sumptions) and (iii) that the players always choose the action with the highest
payoff (best response assumption). One therefore expects a learning dynamics
that verifies these same assumptions to converge to one of the Nash equilibria
we characterised in Sec. 2.3.
We now consider when the above assumptions hold for EWA learning dynam-
ics. If we want the players’ attractions to be accurate estimates of the payoffs
for the corresponding action (assumption (i)) we require α→ 0 to ensure that
the attractions to actions that are not played do not decrease over time. To
average over payoff fluctuations (assumption (ii)) we further need to work in
the large memory limit r → 0. To see this, note that in each training round
the players’ attractions are modified only by an amount of order r. For small
r, attractions therefore change substantially after ∼ 1/r training rounds. This
means the players effectively average the payoffs over many trading rounds
that take place while their attractions and hence their strategies remain fixed,
and in the limit obtain the correct expected payoffs [88]. Finally, a large inten-
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Figure 2.5: EWA learning phase diagram. The blue zone shows the region of the
(α, 1/β)-plane where the steady state strategy distribution of each of
the two classes of agents is heterogeneous. Elsewhere, including in par-
ticular on the line α = 0, the strategy distribution is homogeneous.
The blue line shows the threshold αc where the distribution switches
from homogeneous to heterogeneous mixed. As α is increased further
beyond a threshold α′c (dashed green line), the strategy distribution
becomes heterogeneous pure. The market and trader parameters for
this diagram are θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.3 and p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.2. In-
set: Threshold curves plotted with a logarithmic α-axis. The red line
shows the exponential dependence of the characteristic values of α on
β (with an arbitrary prefactor) that is expected from the theoretical
considerations in Appendix 2.D.
sity of choice (β →∞) ensures that players best respond to their attractions,
so that EWA learning in that limit also verifies assumption (iii).
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2.4.2 Kramers-Moyal expansion for r → 0
Of the three limits identified above we take first the large memory limit r → 0.
In this limit—and the large system limit N →∞, which we always assume—
the dynamics of EWA learning can be described by a (nonlinear) Fokker-Planck
equation [2]. This is derived by a Kramers-Moyal expansion truncated at the
second order; we defer the details to Appendix 2.C. Denoting by P(A(c), t) the
distribution of attractions of traders from class c, where A(c) = (A(c)1 , A
(c)
2 ) is
a vector gathering the attractions towards market 1 and 2, the Fokker-Planck
equation describing the time evolution of this distribution is




























(c), p¯(1), p¯(2))P(A(c), t)
]
(2.11)
Here time t = rn is a rescaled version of the number of trading rounds n,
while p¯(1) and p¯(2) are the average fractions of traders from class 1 (resp. class
2) choosing to go to the first market. These fractions are obtained simply
by averaging the probability of choosing market 1 as defined in (2.3) over the
relevant distribution of attractions:
p¯(c) =
∫
dA(c) P(A(c), t)σβ(A(c)1 − A(c)2 ) (2.12)
Formally, p¯(1) and p¯(2) are therefore functionals of the probability distributions
P(A(c), t) It is this dependence that makes the Fokker-Planck equation non-
linear, and couples the dynamics of the attraction distributions in class 1 and
2.
At fixed values of p¯(1) and p¯(2), the Fokker-Planck equation (2.11) describes
for each class the Langevin dynamics of the attraction vector A(c) of a single
agent, with deterministic drift vector µ(c)m and (multiplicative) white noise with
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covariance matrix rΣ(c)mm′ . The form of the drift follows directly from the




(c), p¯(1), p¯(2)) =
[




1 − A(c)2 )
− αA(c)1
[
1− σβ(A(c)1 − A(c)2 )
]
(2.13)
The first term describes the change in the attraction to market 1 (in square
brackets), weighted with the probability of the agent choosing that market.
The second term corresponds to the opposite case where the agent chooses
market 2.
The Fokker-Planck equation (2.11) is of course impossible to solve in closed
form in general. A special case is the limit r → 0, assuming the popula-
tion is initially homogeneous, i.e. a delta-distribution. Homogeneity is then
maintained over time for r = 0, where the dynamics are deterministic, and
Eq. (2.11) gives for the time evolution of the locations of the peaks of the










1 (t)− A(c)2 (t)) (2.15)
one then has a system of nonlinear differential equations that is straightforward
to solve numerically. We call this the homogeneous populations dynamics,
where the population changes over time but remains homogeneous.
For nonzero r, analysing the EWA Fokker-Planck equation becomes more dif-
ficult because the attraction distributions broadens and can indeed develop
multiple peaks. As we are primarily interested in long-time steady states, we
focus on this somewhat simpler case. The task at hand here is a self-consistency
problem: find a set of aggregates p¯(1), p¯(2) for which the steady state solution of
the Fokker-Planck equation, when inserted into (2.12), gives back the original
aggregates. If we call p˜(c)(p¯(1), p¯(2)) the aggregates calculated from the steady
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state solution, the self-consistency equations are simply p˜(c)(p¯(1), p¯(2)) = p¯(c).




















Figure 2.6: New aggregate p˜(1) calculated from steady state of single agent dy-
namics at “old” aggregate value p¯(1) (for r → 0). Steady states are
peaked around stable fixed points (solid/dotted), which are connected
by unstable fixed points (dashed). In (a) only one such peak exists for
any p¯(1). The physical steady state is found from the self-consistency
requirement p˜(1) = p¯(1) (dot-dashed line). In (b,c) there are steady
states with up to three peaks, but generically all but one have a weight
exponentially suppressed in 1/r so that p˜(1)(p¯(1)) (solid line) follows
the curve for a single fixed point. At specific aggregate values the dom-
inant peak switches and two peaks can coexist (vertical solid lines).
In (b) there are two such transitions; in (c) the middle fixed point
from (b) has disappeared and there is only one transition, between
branches of p˜(1) that are close to 0 and 1. In (b,c) the intersection
with the diagonal is at a switch, giving a heterogeneous steady state
with two peaks of comparable weight. Market and trader parameters
for this figure are as in Fig. 2.5; intensity of choice β = 1/0.1.
2.4.3 Steady state of EWA Fokker-Planck equation
The remaining challenge is now to determine, for small r, the steady state solu-
tion of the Fokker-Planck equation for given aggregates p¯(1), p¯(2). As explained
above, we can think of this as the steady state distribution for the dynamics of
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a single agent, given a fixed state of the population. In the limit r → 0 those
dynamics are almost deterministic so that the agent will spend almost all of
her/his time near the stable fixed points of the drift µ(c)m . Accordingly, P(A(c))
will be peaked near these points, with the peak width being of the order of the
standard deviation of the Langevin noise, i.e. O(
√
r).
For aggregate values where there is only one stable single agent fixed point,
P(A(c)) becomes a delta-distribution centred at that point for r → 0, so we
have a steady state with a homogeneous distribution of attractions and hence
strategies. The self-consistency condition for such a steady state is then simply
the stationarity condition for the homogeneous population dynamics (2.14)
together with (2.15). The graphical solution of this condition is illustrated in
Fig. 2.6(a).
When there are multiple stable single agent fixed points, P(A(c)) for r → 0 will
become a sum of delta-distributions at these points. The remaining task is then
to find the weight of each of these peaks. We explain how to use large deviation
methods for this purpose in Sec. 2.5. The idea is that the peak weights are
determined by the balance of fluxes of agents transitioning from one peak to
another. For small r, the dominant r-dependence of these fluxes comes from
exponential factors of the form exp(−S/r). Fluxes can then balance for r → 0
only when the “action” S, which represents an effective activation barrier, is the
same for the transition from one peak to the other as for the reverse transition.
This condition, which is represented schematically in Fig. 2.3, allows one to
determine the aggregate values where multiple peaks can coexist in P(A). At
these aggregate values the steady state solution switches between two single
peaked solutions. This switch happens within an aggregate value range of O(r)
that vanishes as r → 0, giving vertical sections in the plot of p˜(c) versus p¯(c)
as shown in Fig. 2.6(b). If the intersection with the diagonal p˜(c) = p¯(c) occurs
in one of these vertical sections, as in the example in Fig. 2.6(b), the actual
peak weights can be determined indirectly from the fact that the appropriate
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weighted combination of the p˜(c) from the single peaks must give p¯(c). Note
that one can show generally (see Appendix 2.D) that in each agent class there
can be at most three stable fixed points, so that each P(A(c)) can have at most
three peaks. By choosing an appropriate aggregate value, at most two of these
peaks can be made to have finite weight for r → 0. Obtaining three peaks with
finite weight requires one to tune α to α′c at given β, giving the dashed green
phase boundary in Fig. 2.5. Intuitively, at α′c the two transitions in Fig. 2.6(b)
have moved horizontally so that they occur at the same aggregate value.
We will next study the homogeneous steady states of EWA learning dynamics.
Given the structure of the phase diagram that we anticipated in Fig. 2.5,
the easiest way to ensure that steady states are homogeneous in the Nash
equilibrium limit is to take α = 0.
2.4.4 Homogeneous attraction distributions
Kramers-Moyal expansion for α = 0
We saw above that the dynamics of a homogeneous distributions of agents
within each class is described, for r → 0 by (2.14,2.15). In steady state the
right-hand side of (2.14) needs to vanish, hence using α = 0 in (2.13) and its
analogue for m = 2 one has
0 = [P(c)1 (f1(p¯(1), p¯(2)))− A(c)1 ]σβ(A(c)1 − A(c)2 ) (2.16)
0 = [P(c)2 (f2(p¯(1), p¯(2)))− A(c)2 ]σβ(A(c)2 − A(c)1 ) (2.17)





2 ). In (2.17), σβ(A
(c)
1 −A(c)2 ) cannot vanish at any finite β, so the condition
for a homogeneous state is simply
P(c)m (f1(p¯(1), p¯(2)))− A(c)m = 0 (2.18)
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which needs to be verified for each market m and each class c. This means
that for each player, in the steady state of the EWA learning dynamics, the
respective attraction to each market equals the expected payoff there. The
aggregates calculated from the steady state are therefore
p˜(c)(p¯(1), p¯(2)) = σβ
(
P(c)1 (f1(p¯(1), p¯(2)))− P(c)2 (f2(p¯(1), p¯(2)))
)
(2.19)
We now need to solve the self-consistency condition p˜(c) = p¯(c)as explained
in Sec. 2.4.3. This can be visualised most easily if we focus on symmetric
situations where p¯(1) = 1− p¯(2): one just has to plot the curve σβ(P(1)1 −P(1)2 )
vs p¯(1) and intersect it with the diagonal, as shown in Fig. 2.6(a).
To retrieve EWA steady states corresponding to Nash equilibria, we need to
consider the limit β → ∞ of high intensity of choice. Then σβ(P(1)1 − P(1)2 )
approaches one if the payoff at the first market P(1)1 is larger than at the
second, otherwise zero. Where the payoffs are equal, a step in the curve results,
which will always produce an intersection and hence a self-consistent solution.
Because of the payoff equality, such solutions correspond exactly to potentially
heterogeneous Nash equilibria (see Eq. (2.8) in Sec. 2.3). Here this type of Nash
equilibrium is realised in a homogeneous mixed form: all players from class 1
play the same strategy, choosing market 1 with probability p¯(1).
If the payoffs P(1)1 and P(1)2 ) are different across the entire range of p¯(1), we
have a different scenario: assuming P(1)1 > P(1)2 for definiteness, σβ(P(1)1 −P(1)2 )
tends to one for β →∞, hence the only self-consistent solution is p¯(1) = 1.
This corresponds to a homogeneous pure Nash equilibrium, with—because of
the assumed symmetry—the two classes of players trading at different mar-
kets.
To show the approach to the large β-limit, we show in Fig. 2.7 numerically de-
termined values of p¯(1), the fraction of traders from the first class going to the
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Figure 2.7: Comparison between mean field Nash equilibria (continuous lines) and
homogeneous steady states of EWA learning (symbols) for three dif-
ferent values of the intensity of choice β. The market biases are
θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.3 and the buying probabilities p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b = pb.
Shown is p¯(1), the fraction of traders from the first class going to the
first market, versus p(1)b .
first market in the steady state of EWA learning. The results for three differ-
ent β are compared to the values of p¯(1) determined from the mean field Nash
equilibrium condition, which as we saw leads to the two payoff equalities (2.8).
As expected, as β gets larger, the aggregate p¯(1) gets closer to its Nash equi-
librium value, confirming our reasoning above. Note around p(1)b = 0.45 we
transition from the situation in Fig. 2.2(a), where the Nash equilibrium and
the corresponding steady state are of homogeneous mixed type (green triangle
in the figure), to the homogeneous pure state (orange square) in Fig. 2.2(b).
So far our main conclusion is that steady states of EWA learning can give ho-
mogeneous mixed realizations of the potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibria
we had identified in Sec. 2.3: even though the equilibrium could be hetero-
geneous, the dynamics generates a homogeneous steady state with the same
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aggregates where all players use the same mixed strategy. This happens if we
consider the limit of the dynamics for β → ∞ at α = 0. One would expect
from the phase diagram in Fig. 2.5 that the same steady state is obtained if
we move the path of approach towards (α, 1/β) = (0, 0) slightly away from the
vertical axis, i.e. if α is nonzero but goes to zero sufficiently fast as β grows.
We show in Appendix 2.D that this is true if the decay of α is exponential,
αc ∼ exp(−const · β): if the constant in the exponent is large enough, the at-
traction distributions remain homogeneous and attractions again become equal
to payoffs for β →∞.
2.4.5 Heterogeneous attraction distributions
We investigate in this section steady states of EWA learning where the at-
traction distributions of traders are multimodal (heterogeneous) rather than
unimodal. As explained in Sec. 2.4.3, for r → 0 the modes become sharp
peaks so that unimodal distributions become homogeneous. We have investi-
gated the latter case so far, but heterogeneous steady states should also exist.
Indeed, it was shown in [2] using multi-agent simulations as well as theoret-
ical studies of the Kramers-Moyal expansion detailed in Sec. 2.4.2 that for
high enough intensity of choice β the distribution of attractions undergoes a
transition from homogeneous to heterogeneous. We therefore expect to find
heterogeneous steady states of EWA learning more generally for large β and α
not too small. We confirm this expectation in this section, where we also find
surprising transitions between different types of heterogeneous steady states.
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Difference between the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous
attraction distributions
In [2], Alorić et al. describe a method to obtain the critical α at which the
attraction distributions of the traders in the two classes become heterogeneous.
One assumes initially that the distributions are homogeneous and determines
a self-consistent assignment of the aggregates p¯(1), p¯(2) on this basis. One then
checks whether the single agent dynamics for these aggregate values has one
fixed point, producing a homogeneous distribution of attractions, or two or
more (stable) fixed points, giving a heterogeneous distribution with peaks at
these locations in attraction space. What this method leaves open, however,
is what the weights of these peaks are and in particular whether they remain
nonzero in the large memory limit r → 0. This is the task we tackle using
large deviation methods, as summarised in Sec. 2.4.3 above and described in
more detail in 2.5.
Transition from one to two to three stable fixed points
We next explore the different fixed point structures of the single agent dynam-
ics as a function of the fictitious play parameter α, for fixed large intensity
of choice β. In principle at each α the aggregates p¯(c)1 , p¯
(c)
2 need to be de-
termined from self-consistency but from the experience with the homogeneous
solutions we expect that as long as α is small enough and β large enough, the
self-consistent aggregate values will be close to their Nash equilibrium values.
To leading order one can therefore think of varying α at fixed aggregates. As
before we also rely on the assumption that the memory of the traders is large
(r → 0); the finite memory case will be investigated below using numerical
simulations.
When the fictitious play coefficient α is small enough, the single agent dynamics
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 2.8: (i-iii) Flow diagrams of the single agent dynamics for increasing α.
The points represent the stable (red) and unstable (blue) fixed points
of the dynamics. The potentials in the bottom row represent schemat-
ically in 1-D the arrangement of fixed points (stable = potential min-
imum, unstable = potential maximum). Attraction distributions are
peaked around stable fixed points; in the 1-D representation, the low-
est minima indicate peaks with weights of order unity as r → 0, while
higher-lying (metastable) minima correspond to peaks that become
exponentially suppressed. For α < αc , the aggregates of the single
agent dynamics are deduced by self consistency from the only stable
fixed point of the dynamics (panels (a) and (b)), while for larger α
the aggregates are chosen such that the transition rates between the
stable fixed points (A?1 and A
?
2 for αc < α < α′c, panels (c) and (d);
A?1 and A
?
3 for α > α′c, panels (e) and (f)) are of the same order.
Plots were produced with symmetric market biases θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3
and probability of buying p(1)b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2 and intensity of choice
β = 1/0.11.
has a single stable fixed point A?1 (see Appendix 2.D and Fig. 2.8(i)) and so
for r → 0 the distribution of attractions is a δ-peak at this point as shown in
Fig. 2.3(a). As α increases then as shown in Fig. 2.8(b) two new stable fixed
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points A?2 and A
?
3 appear, first one and then the other. But the distribution of
attractions is still delta peaked around the original fixed point because in the
limit r → 0 the other fixed points are exponentially suppressed in 1/r: they
are in this sense metastable.
The first phase transition arises at a critical value of α, αc, where one of the
metastable point becomes stable; in Fig. 2.8 this is A?2. In this case, the at-
traction distribution is composed of two δ-peaks located at these two stable
fixed points of the single agent dynamics (see Fig. 2.3(a,b) for an example pro-
jected onto one direction in attraction space). The transition occurs because
the actions (see Sec. 2.5) for single agents to move from one stable fixed point
to the other and for the reverse move become equal.
This ensures that the fluxes of agents between the two stable fixed points are of
the same order of magnitude in both directions, and hence that the two peaks
in the attraction distribution can have comparable rather than exponentially
different weights.
As α increases further, small changes to the aggregates maintain the condi-
tion of comparable flux between the two existing stable peaks. Eventually, at
some α′c higher than αc, the third fixed point also becomes stable so that the
attraction distribution acquires three peaks.
Note that the weights of the three peaks cannot be fully determined at α = α′c:
the self-consistency for p¯(1) only gives one condition for three nonnegative peak
weights that need to sum to one, so that the problem is underconstrained.
This indicates that for nonzero r these weights would vary continuously across
a small range of α of order r.
For α > α′c, it is the turn of the central fixed point A
?
1 to become metastable;
aggregate values are determined by the equal action condition between the two
outer stable fixed points and the attraction distribution goes back to having
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only two δ-peaks. Finally at even larger α the central metastable fixed point
disappears altogether in a saddle-node bifurcation.
Game theoretical interpretation of the steady states
We now investigate the characteristics of all the steady states described above
and compare each of them to the Nash equilibria enumerated in Sec. 2.3. When
α is below the critical value αc, all the traders within one class randomise
between the two markets, going to the first market with the same probability.
This probability is σβ(A
(c)
1 − A(c)2 ) evaluated at the stable fixed points of the
single agent deterministic dynamics, which also equals p¯(c) (see Sec. 2.4.1). This
homogeneous mixed strategy profile is plotted as the single-peaked preference
distribution in Fig. 2.3.
For the opposite case of large α, α > α′c, there are within each class two sub-
populations of traders, each of which corresponds to a peak of the attraction
distribution as shown schematically in Fig. 2.3(b). Looking at Fig. 2.8(iii) and
(f), one sees that at both of these peaks, the attractions to the two markets
remain distinct for large β – the relevant fixed points are far from the 45◦
diagonal. In the limit both sub-populations will therefore play a pure strategy
as σβ(A
(c)
1 − A(c)2 ) tends to one or zero, respectively. This situation is shown
as the preference distribution in Fig. 2.3(b) with two peaks around preference
one and zero, representing two sub-populations of traders all choosing market
1 and 2 respectively. This steady state of EWA learning is therefore a heteroge-
neous pure realization of a Nash equilibrium, as the preferences of traders are
heterogeneous, with two sub-population playing different pure strategies.
While the two cases of homogeneous mixed and heterogeneous pure Nash equi-
libria are well studied in the literature [90, 15], we find a novel state for
αc < α < αc
′. Again there are within each class two sub-populations of
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traders. But now one sub-population has attractions that become equal for
large β: the corresponding fixed point lies close to the diagonal in Fig. 2.8(ii).
These traders therefore play a mixed strategy and randomise between the two
markets. Overall we have a heterogeneous mixed steady state because not all
traders play pure strategies. This is illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 2.3.
Such heterogeneous mixed strategy distributions have, to our knowledge, never
been reported in any study of aggregative games so it is fascinating that they
are accessible by EWA learning dynamics.
Overall, we have found that potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibria can be
realised as steady states of EWA learning in three different ways by appro-
priately taking the limits of perfect fictitious play α → 0 and best response
β → ∞. For small enough α < αc(β) one obtains a homogeneous mixed
equilibrium, while keeping larger α > α′c(β) gives a heterogeneous pure equi-
librium. Most interesting is the case where α is taken to zero in the “corridor”
αc < α < α
′
c, which results in a heterogeneous mixed equilibrium.
Note that the partially heterogeneous Nash equilibria (where one class of
traders splits into sub-populations while the other stays homogeneous) do not
appear in the analysis above because we restricted ourselves to studying Nash
equilibria for which the aggregates are symmetric (p¯(1) = 1− p¯(2)), thus ruling
out partially heterogeneous Nash equilibria.
We close this section by showing in Fig. 2.9 some numerical results for the
aggregate p¯(1) as a function of α, for a fixed intensity of choice β. The values
of αc and α′c are shown to indicate the transitions between the homogeneous
mixed, heterogeneous mixed and heterogeneous mixed states as α grows. Also
shown is the even larger critical value α′′c at which the “central” fixed point (see
Fig. 2.8) disappears. Note the vertical scale of the plot, which demonstrates
a key point: even though β = 1/0.11 is not yet very large, p¯(1) is already
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quite close to the value p¯(1) ≈ 0.42 for the potentially heterogeneous Nash
equilibrium as calculated using the equal payoff criterion (2.8) in Sec. 2.3.
As we have argued this agreement should get even better as β grows. Numerical
data supporting this are shown in Fig. 2.10: p¯(1) decreases towards the Nash
equilibrium value with increasing β. Also displayed are the critical values αc
and α′c, which as expected tend to zero as β grows. It is these values that were
used to produce the phase diagram in Fig. 2.5.
We note as an aside that in Fig. 2.10 the variation of p¯(1) with α is rather
steeper in the heterogeneous mixed phase (between αc and α′c) than in the
homogeneous mixed regime. This probably reflects the change in the way
the aggregates are determined in the two regimes: in the homogeneous-mixed
phase the aggregates are obtained only by the self-consistency condition for
the fixed point location, while they are fixed by the equal flux condition in the
heterogeneous mixed phase.
Test against simulations
In this section we test the theoretical predictions obtained above in the r → 0
and for infinite population size N against agent based simulations with a finite
memory (r > 0) and finite N . We are primarily interested in the steady
state of the attraction distribution of the agents, but also consider its time
evolution to this steady state. We continue to consider symmetric scenarios so
focus on the properties of agents of class 1 throughout. Depending on where
the key parameters α and β are in the phase diagram of Fig. 2.5, one expects
qualitatively different shapes for the attraction distribution resulting from the
learning dynamics. We present simulation results in each of the distinct regions
of the phase diagram in Fig. 2.5.
The first zone of interest is on the far left of the phase diagram, where α
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Figure 2.9: Fraction of traders from the first class in the first market, p¯(1)1 , for
intensity of choice β = 1/0.11, compared with the value of p¯(1) cal-
culated for the corresponding potentially heterogeneous Nash equilib-
rium (see Sec. 2.3). Note that the deviation between the two values is
small throughout. Critical values of α separating the different types
of steady states are indicated; α′′c is the value of α where the “central”
fixed point representing traders playing mixed strategies disappears.
Same system parameters as in Fig. 2.8.
is below the first segregation threshold αc. Here, in the steady state of the
learning dynamics, we observe in Fig. 2.11(c) the homogeneous distribution
of preference predicted by the theory. Looking beyond this agreement for the
steady state at the time evolution, panel 2.11(a) shows that for r = 0.005 the
transient dynamics of the aggregates is nonetheless different from the homo-
geneous population deterministic dynamics. This appears to be related to a
transient segregation effect observed in a small time window around t = 10
(Fig. 2.11(b)). This transient segregation does not occur for lower values of
r (e.g. r = 0.001), where the dynamics of the aggregates is closer to the
homogeneous population dynamics (see Fig. 2.11(a)).
When α ∈ [αc, α′c], the aggregates relax close to their value in a Nash equi-
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Figure 2.10: Fraction of players from class 1 in the first market, p¯(1), for different
values of β. The grey lines connect the values at the two critical α
(see Fig. 2.8) as a guide to the eye. System parameters as in Fig. 2.8.
Note that p¯(1) gets progressively closer to the Nash equilibrium value
≈ 0.42 as the intensity of choice β grows.
librium around which they fluctuate. Then, they escape from this state to
reach an heterogeneous pure Nash equilibrium. The time they remain close
to the Nash equilibria depends on the number of agents in the simulation as
shown in Fig. 2.13. The theory predicts a distribution composed of two peaks,
one peak corresponding to a sub-population playing mixed strategies and the
second one to a sub-population playing pure strategies. The results of our
simulation presented in Fig. 2.12(a) show a preference distributions composed
of three peaks, not two as the theory predicts. On also notices that while the
theoretical predictions for the location of the peaks are consistent with the
simulation results, the width of the peaks in the simulations is larger than
predicted. We believe this is because the theoretical predictions for the width
of the peaks make the assumption that the system is in its steady state. This
is not strictly verified here as the finite-N system is in a transient state be-
fore relaxing to a heterogeneous pure distribution of strategies. As α goes
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above the second segregation threshold, α′c, the dynamics initially continues to
show three peaks, but in qualitative agreement with the theory the size of the
central peak diminishes rapidly, becoming negligible for large enough α. The
preference distributions obtained from simulations are then consistent with the
theoretical predictions as shown in Fig 2.12(d). Moreover, the aggregates stay
close to f1 = 0.42 and never diverge to f1 = 1 or f1 = 0 (as happens for lower
values of α).
In summary, the simulations are in good qualitative accord with the predicted
sequence of steady states for increasing α: homogeneous mixed, heterogeneous
mixed (outer and central peak), heterogeneous mixed (three-peaked) and fi-
nally heterogeneous pure (two outer peaks). Corrections to the theoretical
predictions arise from the fact that some steady states have a lifetime that
only becomes infinite for N →∞, and from the use of nonzero r in the simu-
lations.
2.5 Large deviation methods
We describe in this section the large deviation methods we use to study het-
erogeneous attraction distributions in the steady state of EWA learning. As
explained in Sec. 2.4, steady state attraction distributions for small r will be
peaked around the stable fixed points of the single agent dynamics. The shape
of these peaks becomes Gaussian for r → 0, with a covariance matrix propor-
tional to r that is straightforward to determine. Much more difficult to find
are the weights of the peaks as these involve rare fluctuations of an agent mak-
ing the transition from one peak to another. In one dimension the problem is
tractable as an explicit formula for the steady state distribution of attractions
can be given [2]. In higher dimensions detailed balance [80] has a similar sim-
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Figure 2.11: EWA learning dynamics at small α = 0.01. (a) Time evolution of
p¯(1) for r = 0.005 and r = 0.001 compared to the homogeneous pop-
ulation dynamics predicted for (r → 0). (b,c) Distribution of attrac-
tion differences across traders of class 1 at two times, for r = 0.005.
Black lines are theoretical predictions based on the homogeneous
population dynamics and agree well at small r and late times t as
expected (see text). Note that for the larger r, the dynamics (a)
and the attraction distributions (b) deviate from the small-r theory,
showing a transient segregation behaviour that is the precursor of
steady state segregation (see Fig. 2.12 (d)) at larger α. The param-
eters used for those simulation are β = 1/0.11, θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.3,
p
(1)
b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2, the system is composed of 20000 traders.
plifying effect, but our single agent dynamics in the two-dimensional attraction
space (for each class of agents) does not have this property.
In our approach we consider the peak weights in an attraction distribution
as a result of the balance between transitions between the various peaks. We
therefore need to find the rates for these transitions. To do this, note from the
Kramers-Moyal expansion sketched in Sec. 2.4.2 that the single agent EWA
learning is described by a Langevin equation with noise variance O(r). For
r → 0 we are therefore looking for transition rates in a low noise limit. This
allows us to use Freidlin-Wentzell theory, which deals the with large deviations
of Langevin dynamics in exactly this limit [38].
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Freidlin-Wentzell theory
We use Freidlin-Wentzell theory in the form developed in [11, 12], which gener-
alises, the Eyring-Kramers [58] formula for the rates of noise-activated transi-
tions to non-conservative dynamics such as our EWA learning. We give a brief
summary of those aspects of Freidlin-Wentzell theory that we use in our nu-
merical application and refer to [38] for a mathematically rigorous description
and to [11] for a more statistical physics-oriented summary.
Freidlin-Wentzell theory is concerned with the transition rates between two
stable states (here A?1 and A
?
2) of a non-conservative stochastic dynamics in
the low noise limit. A general Langevin equation can be written in the form
A˙
(c)




(A(c)(t), p¯(1), p¯(2)))ξ(t) (2.20)
where ξ(t) is white noise with unit covariance matrix. The drift µ and the
covariance matrix Σ of the noise in the Langevin equation are given in Ap-
pendix 2.C for our specific case of EWA learning, where the Langevin de-
scription results from a second order Kramers-Moyal expansion (2.44). In the
generic version above we have omitted the superscript (c) indicating the class
of agents we are considering, as well as the dependence of drift and noise
covariance on the aggregates p¯(1) and p¯(2).
Associated with the Langevin dynamics is an Onsager-Machlup action S[A]














The action determines the probability of observing any path [A(t)] according
to
Γ1→2 ∼ exp(−S[A]/r) (2.22)
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where ∼ means that the equality is true up to a pre-factor (which depends on
the time discretisation used).
The main Freidlin-Wentzell result we need is that the rate Γ1→2 for a transition
from A?1 to A
?
2 (forward path) is [38, 14]
Γ1→2 ∼ exp(−S?1→2/r) (2.23)
where S?1→2 is the minimal action achievable by any paths from A?1 to A?2 in
the infinite time interval (t1, t2) = (−∞,∞). The rate Γ2→1 for the reverse
transition from A?2 to A
?
1 is similarly Γ2→1 ∼ exp(−S?2→1/r).
The attraction distributions we are after will consist of narrow (for small r)
peaks atA?1 andA
?
1. The weights ω1 and ω2 of these two peaks, which represent
the probability for an agent to be within each peak, must then be such that
forward and backward transitions balance:








This expression shows that when the forward and backward minimal actions
are not equal, then one of the two peaks will have an exponentially small
weight as r → 0. In practice this is true when the action difference inside
the exponential in (2.24) is large compared to r. If it is only of order r or
smaller, then we cannot say anything about the weights as we do not determine
prefactor in (2.24), though we would expect them to be of order unity.
Finding the minimal action path numerically
Following the method of Bunin et al. [14], we find the minimal action by dis-
cretising the path [A(t)], evaluating the action as a function of this discretised
path and then minimising with respect to the (discretised) path. The path is
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discretised into 10 equally spaced timesteps between t = 0 and t = 10; we found
this choice of parameters to be a reasonable trade-off between the precision of
our result and the complexity of minimising the discretised action.
There are other methods for finding the minimal value of the action defined in
Eq. (2.21), such as solving a Hamilton-Jacobi equation [11], but we chose to use
the path discretisation method because we found this to be more robust with
respect to changes of model parameters. The discretisation approach could
also be improved further, using for example the geometric minimum action
method [48], but we found that this was not necessary to achieve the desired
precision. We tested this e.g. by benchmarking against closed-form results that
can be obtained for α = 1 [2].
The numerical path optimisation can be simplified by restricting attention to
the activation part of the path. Generally, for a system with two stable fixed
points A?1 and A
?
2 and one saddle point A¯ between them, the optimal path
starting from A?1 will pass through the saddle point A¯ and then relax to A
?
2
following the relaxation dynamics A˙(t) = µ(A(t)), as sketched in Fig. 2.14 [38].
Eq. (2.21) shows that the relaxation dynamics does not contribute to the total
action as the integrand (the Lagrangian) vanishes identically along this section
of the path. As a consequence, the problem of finding a minimal action path
betweenA?1 andA
?
2 can be reduced to finding the minimal action path between
A?1 and A¯, i.e. from the initial fixed point to the saddle. This restriction
significantly improves the precision of the numerical path optimisation.
With the above method, we can work out the action difference between any
two fixed points of the single agent dynamics, as a function of the aggregates
p¯(1), p¯(2); only the first of these is needed for symmetric steady states. The
values of p¯(1) where the action difference between two single agent fixed points
vanishes identify the points where the steady state attraction distribution of
EWA learning can have more than one peak. Either side of these values,
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a single peak is dominant in the attraction distribution; which peak this is
changes discontinuously at a zero action difference value of p¯(1), see Fig. 2.6.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied a minimal model of agents choosing between two
double auction markets, which is a special case of a large aggregative game.
Previous work studying EWA (experience weighted attraction) learning in this
system had found segregation, where a group of identical agents becomes het-
erogeneous by separating into sub-groups adopting different behaviours. We
first asked the question of whether this phenomenon has an analogue in the
Nash equilibria of the corresponding game, where – in contrast to the EWA
dynamics – agents have full information about their expected payoffs.
In a game theoretical analysis (Sec. 2.3) we addressed this question within a
setup where there are two classes of agents that typically buy and sell, respec-
tively. We showed that two aggregate quantities, namely, the fraction of agents
from each class choosing the first market, are sufficient to assess whether a dis-
tribution of strategies, i.e. market preferences, across the agents in each class
is a Nash equilibrium or not. This allowed us to classify the Nash equilibria,
according to the type of strategies played by the agents (pure or mixed) and
according to the distribution of strategies being homogeneous (the entire class
population plays the same strategy) or heterogeneous (the population is di-
vided into subpopulations playing different strategies). The model parameters
for which each of these Nash equilibria exists are summarised in Fig. 2.4. A
key conclusion is that there are regions of heterogeneous equilibria: these are
the equilibrium analogues of dynamical segregation as observed previously.
This answer to our first question had to be qualified, however, because there
is in general an infinity of strategy distributions consistent with a given pair
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of aggregate values. The Nash equilibrium analysis can therefore only identify
equilibria as potentially heterogeneous but leaves open the nature of the actual
strategy distribution, which could be homogeneous mixed, heterogeneous pure
or heterogeneous mixed. We therefore asked a second question of whether EWA
learning can resolve this ambiguity, by identifying which Nash equilibria can
be reached dynamically. We first argued that steady states of EWA learning
should be Nash equilibria in the limit of perfect fictitious play (α → 0), long
agent memory (r → 0) and best response (β → ∞). (Sec. 2.4.1). Non-
trivially, however, this joint limit can be taken in several ways, as shown in
the phase diagram in Fig. 2.5: depending on how the point (α, 1/β) = (0, 0) is
approached, a small number of different limiting steady states of EWA learning
can result as sketched in Fig. 2.3. These include a homogeneous mixed state,
where all agents within a class randomise between markets in the same way,
and a heterogeneous pure equilibrium, where agents separate into two groups,
each choosing a market deterministically. Along with these standard types of
Nash equilibria, however, we also found a heterogeneous mixed steady state,
where the agents do split into groups but not all groups play deterministically.
In fact, at the boundary between the latter two types of steady states (denoted
α = α′c in our analysis) it is possible to generate equilibria where three groups
of agents appear within each class.
Technically what made our theoretical analysis of the heterogeneous steady
states possible was the use of Freidlin-Wentzell theory, which is the tool of
choice for studying the behavior of dynamical systems subject to weak noise,
here arising from the limit r → 0. We also compared the theoretical results to
multi-agent simulations for r > 0, finding good qualitative agreement.
While we focused our analysis on the study of the minimal model of choice
between double auction market presented in Sec. 2.2, our methods could be
applied fruitfully also to the study of EWA learning in other types of aggrega-
tive games such as the Cournot model [33]. It would be particularly interesting
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to see whether also here dynamical considerations single out particular Nash
equilibria, including ones with the novel heterogeneous mixed character that
we found in our system.
At a technical level, future work could look more closely at the limit of large
intensity of choice β required to realise Nash equilibria as dynamical steady
states. We approached this limit numerically, finding good agreement with the-
oretical predictions already for relatively modest β. An interesting challenge
would be to take the full β →∞ limit in closed form within the analysis: pre-
liminary work suggests that the large deviation analysis then becomes rather
intricate, hence we leave this aspect for future work.
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Figure 2.12: Steady state distribution of the attraction differences for r = 0.01,
and increasing values of α; the remaining parameters are as in
Fig. 2.8. When α = 0.067 (panel (b)), the theory predicts one outer
peak on the right and one inner peak corresponding to a fraction of
the population playing a mixed strategy. The simulations addition-
ally show an outer peak on the left, which arises from the fact that
the finite-N system is not in a true steady state. Panel (c) shows the
situation for α = 0.0725, which is the critical value α′c at which we
expect to see from theory three different peaks in the distribution of
attraction differences. The theoretical predictions (black curves) is a
Gaussian mixture composed of three peaks whose mean and variance
are obtained from the Kramers-Moyal expansion while their weights,
which the theory cannot predict, are fitted to the data. The peak
positions are in good agreement with theory while the simulations
overestimate the variance of the peaks, again because of transient
effects. In panel (d), for α > α′c, there is very good agreement with
theory except for a small central peak that for r → 0 is predicted to
have weight zero. This is likely to be an effect of the nonzero r = 0.01
used in the simulations.
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Figure 2.13: Time evolution of p¯(1) for α = 0.068, r = 0.005 and different numbers
of agents N . Other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.8
.
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Figure 2.14: An example of a minimal action path, from fixed pointA?1 toA
?
2. The
path starts with a “fluctuation" (or: activation) segment that ends
at the saddle point A¯ between the two fixed points. The remainder
of the path is a “relaxation” segment that follows the deterministic
dynamics and incurs zero contribution to the action.
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Appendix
2.A Formula for the payoff
To work out the average payoff of an ask (a) or bid (b) at market m, we find
first the probability for such an order to be valid:






















where the trading price pim is defined in equation (2.1).
Once an order has been validated, it needs to be matched with that of a
trader on the other side of the market. We denote the probability for this to
happen for an order of type τ at market m by M(τ,m, fm). This quantity
depends on the ratio of the number of buyers and sellers in the market, fm =
# buyers @ market m
# sellers @ market m , as follows:











where the first ratio in the minimum is that of the number of valid buy and
sell orders, always assuming large N where fluctuations of these numbers can
be neglected.
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We call 〈Sτ,m〉 the average score of an order of type τ , once it has been validated























































We can now compute the average payoff of an order of type τ at market m:
Pτ,m(fm) = V(τ,m)M(τ,m, fm)〈Sτ,m〉 (2.34)
Similarly, the average squared payoff that will appear in the second order
moment of the Kramers-Moyal expansion in App. 2.C can be expressed as
Qτ,m(fm) = V(τ,m)M(τ,m, fm)〈S2τ,m〉 (2.35)
Q(c)m (fm) = p(c)b Qb,m(fm) + (1− p(c)b )Qa,m(fm) (2.36)
The second version here is averaged over the preference for buying and selling
of an agent in class c.
2.B Phase diagram boundaries in Fig 2.4
In this section we indicate how to calculate phase boundaries in Fig. 2.4, which
shows the phase diagram for the case where the market bias and the probability
to buy are symmetric (θ1 = 1− θ2, pb .= p(1)b = 1− p(2)b ).
At this boundary, a (symmetric) potentially heterogeneous Nash equilibrium
(green triangle in Fig. 2.2) turns smoothly into a homogeneous pure equilib-
rium (blue diamond and orange square in Fig. 2.2) where the two classes of
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players choose different markets. One can therefore calculate the boundary by
establishing the zone in the phase diagram where this homogeneous Nash equi-
librium exists. For definiteness we consider the equilibrium (p¯(1), p¯(2)) = (1, 0);
the calculation for (0, 1) is completely analogous.
To get rid of the min in Eq. (2.28, 2.29) we focus in addition on the case where
market 1 is saturated with sellers:
f1V(b, 1)
V(a, 1) < 1 (2.37)
As a consequence the min term disappears from the market conditions:
M(b, 1, fm) =M(a, 2, f1) = 1 (2.38)
M(a, 1, fm) =M(b, 2, f2) = f1V(b, 1)V(a, 1) (2.39)
Here the equality between M(a, 1, f1) and M(b, 2, f2) comes from the sym-
metry of the parameters. Because (p¯(1), p¯(2)) = (1, 0), all agents from class 1
go to market 1 and so the buyer-to-seller ratios fm from (2.4a) are simple to







The payoffs at the two markets for traders from class 1 simplify accordingly:
















The factors in brackets are the matching probabilities from (2.39), from which
V(a, 1) cancels in the first equation and similarly (by symmetry) V(a, 1) =
V(b, 2) in the second.
Our assumed equilibrium (p¯(1), p¯(2)) = (1, 0) will be a Nash equilibrium if the
payoff at market 1 is higher than at market 2 for players from class 1. (By
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symmetry, the payoff relation is then reversed for players in class 2.) From the
explicit payoff expressions above, this condition can be re-arranged into
0 ≤ p2b (−〈Sa,2〉V(a, 2)− 〈Sb,1〉V(b, 1)− 〈Sa,1〉V(b, 1)− 〈Sb,2〉V(a, 2))
+ pb (〈Sb,1〉V(b, 1) + 2〈Sa,2〉V(a, 2) + 〈Sa,1〉V(b, 1)〉)− 〈Sa,2〉V(a, 2) (2.43)
For given θ1 all coefficients in this quadratic equation are known so the phase
boundaries can be obtained directly as its roots. We plotted these roots in
Fig. 2.B.1; note that the boundaries are close to linear but not exactly so. One
has to check a posteriori that the assumption (2.37) of market 1 being saturated
with sellers is valid, which rules out the bottom “cone” in the figure.
The remainder of the phase diagram in Fig. 2.4 is obtained by the analo-
gous calculation under the assumption that market 1 is saturated with buyers
rather than sellers, which yields the bottom “cone” in Fig. 2.B.1 and by finally
repeating the overall reasoning for the Nash equilibrium (p¯(1), p¯(2)) = (0, 1).
2.C Kramers-Moyal expansion
Here we provide the coefficients of the Kramers-Moyal expansion for traders
with fixed buy-sell preference, given fictitious play coefficient α and intensity
of choice β. The truncation of the Kramers-Moyal expansion at the second
order gives the Fokker-Planck equation for the time evolution of the attraction
distributions:























(c), p¯(1), p¯(2))P(A(c), t)] (2.44)
To lighten the notation we will in the following drop the superscript (c) indi-
cating the class of an agent and also suppress the dependence on the aggregates
p¯(1), p¯(2), which are in general time-dependent via Eq. (2.15).
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Figure 2.B.1: Analytic determination of boundaries for the zone where a homo-
geneous Nash equilibrium exists where players from the two classes
choose different markets. Within the blue regions the payoff in-
equality (2.8) is satisfied. The region shaded grey is ruled out by
the assumption of market 1 being saturated with sellers.
In the above expansion time has been rescaled as t = rn, where n is the number
of trading rounds. The time interval ∆t = r then features in the normalization





〈∆A〉, rΣ = 1
r
〈∆A ∆AT〉 (2.45)
where ∆A = A(n+ 1)−A(n) is the change in the agent’s attraction vector in
one training round and the T superscript indicates vector transpose. Writing
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∆A explicitly from (2.2) then gives for the drift term:
µ1(A) = [P1(f1)− A1]σβ(A1 − A2)− αA1σβ(A2 − A1) (2.46)
µ2(A) = [P2(f2)− A2]σβ(A2 − A1)− αA2σβ(A1 − A2) (2.47)
In the diffusion term Σij the second order moments of the score distribution
also feature, as follows:
Σ11(A) =
[Q1(f1)− 2A1P1(f1) + A12]σβ(A1 − A2)
+ α2A1
2σβ(A2 − A1) (2.48)
Σ22(A) =
[Q2(f2)− 2A2P2(f2) + A22]σβ(A2 − A1)
+ α2A2




+ P2(f2)A1σβ(A2 − A1)− A1A2
]
(2.50)
Σ21(A) = Σ12(A) (2.51)
2.D Fixed points of single agent dynamics
We show here generally that the single agent dynamics can have up to five
fixed points, which can be determined from a single nonlinear equation. As
before we drop the superscript (c) for the agent class. The aggregates and
hence the expected payoffs P1, P2 are fixed.
Fixed points are found from the condition that the drift (2.46,2.47) must van-
ish:
0 = (P1 − A1)σβ(A1 − A2)− αA1σβ(A2 − A1) (2.52)
0 = (P2 − A2)σβ(A2 − A1)− αA2σβ(A1 − A2) (2.53)
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Writing ∆ = A1−A2 and using σβ(A2−A1) = 1− σβ(∆), one can express A1
and A2 in terms of ∆:
A1 =
P1σβ(∆)
σβ(∆) + α[1− σβ(∆)] =
P1
1 + α exp(−β∆) (2.54)
A2 =
P2[1− σβ(∆)]
1− σβ(∆) + ασβ(∆) =
P2
1 + α exp(β∆)
(2.55)
Taking the difference gives a single equation for ∆, which takes a suggestive
form if we write α = exp(−aβ):
∆ =
P1
1 + exp(−β(∆ + a)) −
P2
1 + exp(β(∆− a)) (2.56)
The solutions of this equation, and hence the single agent fixed points, can
be obtained graphically by intersecting a straight line (the l.h.s. of Eq. (2.56))
with the function of ∆ on the r.h.s. This function has a simple shape as it
is the sum of two sigmoids, one increasing from zero to P1 around ∆ = −a
and the other increasing from −P2 to zero around ∆ = a. From the resulting
shape, shown in Fig. 2.D.1, at most five intersections with the diagonal can
occur.
We are most interested in the limit of large intensity of choice β, where the
sigmoids become step functions. For small α, i.e. large a, the only solution is
then ∆ = P1 − P2. As α is increased and hence a is decreased, the sigmoidal
steps move closer to the origin, each creating an additional pair of solutions
when a equals the relevant payoff (see Fig. 2.D.1). For large β, one therefore
has as transition from one to three (two stable, one unstable) fixed points at
α ∼ exp(−max(P1,P2)β) (2.57)
and from three to five (three stable, two unstable) fixed points at
α ∼ exp(−min(P1,P2)β) (2.58)
At finite β the fixed points are shifted away from ∆ = ±a and this would give
corrections to a of order 1/β, which would in turn determine the prefactors of
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Figure 2.D.1: Sketch of the right handside of the fixed point equation (2.56) for
∆
the above scalings. Note that as a decreases further, the two sigmoidal ramps
will eventually overlap when a is of order 1/β, signalling a transition back to
three (two stable) fixed points.
We show in Fig. 2.5 that the scaling of the above α-values, taken at equal
payoffs P1 = P2 as is relevant for Nash equilibria, also gives a good account of
the variation with β of αc and α′c. This suggests that the α-values where new
fixed points appear, and where they contribute as peaks with weights of order
unity to the steady state distribution, are relatively close, maybe only within
a constant prefactor of each other.
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CHAPTER3
Segregation across three markets
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied the effect of using fictitious play on the
phenomenon of segregation. To keep this study as simple as possible, we
limited it to two double auction markets. However, in general (see the intro-
duction of [91]) traders have more than one market at their disposal and this
feature was also present in the CAT game [16] where more than two markets
were competing to attract traders. This phenomenology is our motivation to
extend the double auction markets model from two to three markets.
A natural approach to studying the coexistence of many markets is multi-
agent simulation. Indeed, there is a large body of work that uses the JCAT
library [72] to explore competition between continuous double auction mar-
kets [17, 73, 65]. In a spirit similar to our work they use simple learning al-
gorithms such as Zero-intelligence [44] or Zero-Intelligence-Plus [27], for both
markets and traders and analyse the allocative efficiency of double auction mar-
kets when they are competing against each other. One advantage of purely
multi-agent based simulations over our methods is that additional layers of
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complexity such as adaptive markets and heterogeneous agents can be added
straightforwardly to the model; in contrast, extending the Fokker-Planck mod-
elling equation to more complex models requires a non-trivial amount of work.
We would also like to emphasise that while the market mechanisms imple-
mented in the JCAT library are continuous double auctions, ours is more
similar to a clearing house where the clearing process takes place at discrete
time steps.
To finish this short and non-exhaustive review of existing work on multiple
market coexistence, we cite the work of Alorić [1] where the weak segregation
of traders across three double auction markets is examined. However, the
absence of the minimal action framework that we implemented in the previous
chapter did not allow the study of strong segregation in the large memory limit,
and only a limited range of parameter settings was explored. This chapter aims
to fill this gap by investigating the existence or otherwise of strong segregation.
This is particularly interesting as strong segregation is by definition the only
type of segregation that persists in the large memory limit.
In Sec. 3.2 we define the extension of the double actions model of chapter 2
to the case where traders learn to choose among three markets. In Sec. 3.3
we study the appearance of segregation among three fair markets. In Sec. 3.4
we then explore several more general parameter settings: (i) two symmetric
markets with varying bias and one fair market, (ii) two symmetric markets and
a third market with varying bias, (iii) one market biased toward buyers, one
fair market and one other market with generic bias. We conclude in Sec. 3.5
and suggest possible future research directions.
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3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Learning rules
In this section, we describe our extension of the model described in Chapter 2
where the traders could choose between two markets to a model where traders
can choose between three markets. Here the mechanism of each market remains
the same as the one described in chapter 2. As in chapter 2 we consider a
population of N traders divided into two classes c ∈ {1, 2} of equal size. Each
trader learns at which market he prefers to trade by using Experience-Weighted
Attraction learning, and buys with fixed probability p(c)b depending on the class
he belongs to.
Each trader has one attraction for each market (3 in total) which he updates
at each trading step with the update rules below:
Am(n+1) =
 (1− r)Am(n) + rS(n) if the agent chose market m in round n(1− αr)Am(n) otherwise
(3.1)
The equation above is exactly Eq. (2.2) and we choose to restrict our analysis
to the case α = 1 for reasons we will explain later. Once each preference
is updated, traders use the multinomial logit function to choose their next
action:




This is a generalised version of the logit function defined in Eq. (2.3) when one
needs to choose between more than two options. In the rest of the chapter we
will write the probabilities as a function of the two score differences ∆A2 =
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A1 − A2 and ∆A3 = A1 − A3:
P(M = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−β∆A2) + exp(−β∆A3)
P(M = 2) =
1
1 + exp(β∆A2) + exp(−β∆A3 + β∆A2) (3.3)
P(M = 3) =
1
1 + exp(β∆A3) + exp(β∆A3 − β∆A2)
This means that knowing the variables ∆A2 and ∆A3 is enough for the traders
to use Eq. (3.2) to choose the market they want to trade with. Then, we
perform a Kramers-Moyal expansion of the traders learning dynamics and
obtain two Fokker-Planck equations (one for each class c ∈ {1, 2} of traders)
for the distribution of preferences differences: P(∆A(c), t):




























(c), f1, f2, f3)P(∆A(c), t)
]
(3.4)
where ∆A(c) = (∆A(c)2 ,∆A
(c)
3 ) and fm is the ratio of buyers over sellers at
market m. The expressions for the drift vector µ(c)m (∆A(c), f1, f2, f3) and the
covariance matrix Σ(c)mm′(∆A
(c), f1, f2, f3) are given in Appendix 3.A. We can
derive a Fokker Planck equation for the two score differences only and not for




3 because we restrict our analysis to traders
learning using fictitious play (α = 1). For α < 1 we would have a 3-dimensional
Fokker Planck equation instead of the simpler 2-D Fokker equation above,
which would complicate our analysis.
3.2.2 Comparison with multi-agent simulations
To get an idea of the different types of attraction distributions in this ex-
tension of the double auction markets model, we run multi-agent simulations
for various intensities of choice and market biases. We show an example of
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θ1 = 0.3, θ2 = 0.5, θ3 = 0.6, 1/β = 0.21
100
101








θ1 = 0.3, θ2 = 0.35, θ3 = 0.7, 1/β = 0.225
100
101
Figure 3.1: Log-distribution of scores of traders for parameters set as indicated in
each graph title. In (a), the population is segregated into three groups.
In (b), the distribution has two peaks: one large peak and one peak
that becomes exponentially small as the memory length decreases. In
(c), the distribution of scores has two large peaks. To obtain those
graphs, we ran simulations with r = 0.01 and N/2 = 10, 000 traders
in each class, until a steady state was reached. Traders from class 1
have preference to buy p(1)b = 0.2 and traders from class 2 have pref-
erence to buy p(2)b = 0.8. To ease the interpretation of the attraction
distributions, the (A1 − A2, A1 − A3) plane is shown subdivided into
three zones according to which market agents with the corresponding
preferences choose most of the time. The zones are coloured blue, red
and green for the markets 1, 2 and 3, respectively, as indicated in (a).
three qualitatively different distributions obtained for different market biases
in Fig. 3.1. Also represented is the market preferred by a trader depending on
his preferences in each of the panels of Fig. 3.1, to facilitate the interpretation
of the scores distributions. We now give a brief description of the scores distri-
butions in each of the panels and explain the difference between (i) strong seg-
regation, which persists in the large memory limit, and (ii) weak segregation,
which disappear in the large memory limit. In panel (a) of Fig. 3.1, one sees
that the distribution of scores has three peaks, all of which have a size of order
O(1) and correspond to traders who choose to trade mainly at a single market.
In other words, the population splits into three subpopulations of traders that
are “attached” to one market over the others. Such distributions of scores with
more than one peak with a size of order one are called strongly segregated. The
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second distribution, shown in panel (b), corresponds to a population divided
into two subpopulations with different sizes: the first subpopulation with a size
of order N goes to the second market and the second one whose size decreases
exponentially as r → 0 prefers to go to the first market. Such attraction dis-
tribution with strictly more than one peak but with only one peak having a
weight of order 1 are said to be weakly segregated. The distribution plotted in
panel (c) corresponds to a strongly segregated population part of which goes
to the second market and the rest to the first market.
From the example above we see that there is a variety of qualitatively different
structures of the attraction distributions (number of peaks, size). This gives
a first taste of the rich behaviour of steady states of the learning dynamics
for traders choosing between more than two markets (see Fig. 3.1). As in
chapter 2, we will study the emergence of segregation in the large memory
limit (r → 0) for various ranges of parameters and use our results to construct
a simple intuitive hypothesis for the possible causes of segregation.
3.3 Three fair markets
We start by looking at what happens when the three markets available are
all fair, i.e. θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 0.5. This means they set their trading price to
be exactly the mean of the average bid and the average ask. Here, we focus
on the steady state of traders’ learning dynamics without symmetry breaking
(this is the one we observe in multiagent simulations). Since the three markets
have the same bias θ, they have the same number of buyers (resp. sellers) and
because the classes have symmetric preferences to buy p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b , the
difference between the number of buyers and the number of sellers is of order
√
N , Nb = Ns + O(
√
N). As a consequence, in the large size limit, the ratio
of the number of buyers to the number of sellers in each market is equal to
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1. This simplification is the reason why we choose to start this chapter with
this simple case, which is a good way to get familiar with the phenomenon of
segregation across three double auction markets.
Since we do not need to determine the aggregates by self-consistency as was
the case in Chap. 2 we start by looking at the fixed point structure of a
single agent dynamics when the intensity of choice is small. As expected, the
only fixed point of the learning dynamics is A1 − A2 = A1 − A3 = 0 and
corresponds to a trader who chooses to randomise totally between the three
markets (see Fig. 3.2(a)). When the intensity of choice β reaches a critical
value βc = 1/0.254 three saddle node bifurcations take place simultaneously
and three pairs of stable and unstable fixed points appear (see Fig. 3.2(b)). The
reason why those three saddle node bifurcations take place at the same time is
that all the markets have the same bias θ = 0.5. In the more general case where
the three markets are different, we expect the appearance of the fixed points
to take place at different values of β. As we continue to increase the intensity
of choice there is a small range, 1/0.252 ≥ β ≥ 1/0.254, where the system
is weakly segregated because the central fixed point is stable and corresponds
to a finite peak in the distribution of preferences of traders from population 1
while the three outer meta-stable fixed points correspond to small peaks in the
attraction distribution (i.e. peaks that decay exponentially with the memory
length 1/r). Then at the second critical value of β: β′c = 1/0.252 the three
outer fixed points become stable and the system undergoes a strong segregation
transition. For any values of β above this second segregation threshold, the
system will be strongly segregated as the distribution of preferences of the
traders will have three peaks of equal weight, each of which corresponds to a
stable fixed points of the single agents dynamics (red points in Fig. 3.2(c,d)).
For 1/0.237 ≤ β ≤ 1/0.252, the distribution of preferences will still have an
additional peak at the meta-stable fixed point located in (0, 0) but the weight of
this peak will become exponentially small as the memory length increases (see
Fig. 3.2(c)). This meta-stable fixed point and the associated small peak in the
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(d)(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.2: Flow diagram and fixed points of the learning dynamics of a sin-
gle trader with p(1)b = 0.2. Below the weak segregation threshold
β = 1/0.254, the dynamics has only one fixed point which is stable
(red) (see Panel (a)). When β reaches the weak segregation threshold
βc = 1/0.254, three pairs of unstable (blue) and meta-stable (green)
fixed points appear and the system becomes weakly segregated with
one large peak which corresponds to traders randomizing between the
three markets and three small peaks each of which corresponds to
traders trading mainly at only one of the three available markets (panel
(b)). At β′c = 1/0.252, the three outer fixed points become stable and
the central one meta-stable and the system is now strongly segregated
with three peaks of equal size each of which corresponds to the strat-
egy to trade at only one of the market (panel (c)). Then as β increases,
the meta-stable fixed points becomes unstable as shown in panel (d).
Above each graph, after the value of β, we indicate in brackets the
category to which each of the fixed points structure belongs (see main
text for details).
attraction distribution then disappear for β ≥ β′′c = 1/0.237 (see Fig. 3.2(d))
When looking at the deterministic dynamics for low intensity of choice (see
Fig. 3.2(a)) it is obvious that the system is not segregated (the deterministic
dynamics have only one stable fixed point) and for large intensity of choice,
we see that the system is strongly segregated with three peaks of equal size
(see Fig. 3.2(d)). When 1/0.237 > β > 1/0.254 the fixed point structure
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values of β Category for pop.1 Category for pop.2
β ∈ (0, 1/0.254] 10 10
β ∈ [1/0.254, 1/0.252] 13 13
β ∈ [1/0.252, 1/0.237] 31 31
β > 1/0.237 30 30
Table 3.1: Zone of existence of each of the categories of scores distribution, when
traders with symmetric fixed buy/sell preferences p(1)b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2
choose between three fair markets
looks as shown in Fig. 3.2(b,c) and knowing the deterministic dynamics is
not sufficient to distinguish between stable and meta-stable fixed points. To
assess the stability or otherwise of fixed points in Fig. 3.2, we use the Freidlin-
Wentzell approach detailed in Sec. 2.5. For 1/0.237 > β > 1/0.254, as the
three markets have the same bias θ, either all the outer fixed points are stable,
or they are all meta-stable. Hence we can restrict our analysis to only one of
the outer fixed points and the central fixed point. Let us take the top right
fixed point and the central fixed point A1 − A2 = A1 − A3 = 0. We calculate
the transition rates between those two fixed points with the Freidlin-Wentzell
theory and assess the stability or otherwise of the outer fixed point. Since the
rates are exponential in the relevant action, the stable state is the one with
the larger action.
As explained in the discussion above, traders’ learning dynamics has a rich va-
riety of qualitatively different steady states. To categorise these steady states,
we will focus on the number of peaks in the attraction distribution and on
whether they persist or not in the large memory limit. As we mention in
Chap. 2 for large memory (small r), the distribution of preference differences
is composed of peaks of width proportional to the inverse memory length r.
Those can be classified into two categories: (i) the peaks whose size is of order
one (they are located on stable fixed points of the single agent dynamics) which
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we call large peaks ; (ii) the peaks whose weight decay exponentially with the
memory length 1/r which we call small peaks. In this paragraph we introduce a
classification of such distribution depending on the number of large and small
peaks. The number of small (n(c)s ) and large (n(c)L ) peaks of a class c are the
quantities we will use to categorise a attraction distribution and we will label





). For example the distribution
which corresponds to the fixed point structure in Fig. 3.2(b) is labeled (13 13)
as the distribution of attraction differences of both classes of traders has one
large peaks and three small peaks. To complete this explanation, I wrote the
category of each of the fixed points structures in Fig. 3.2 in the top right of
each plot [in brackets].
In this first analysis of segregation when traders can choose between three fair
double auction markets, we observed a rich variety of qualitatively different
preferences distributions in the steady state of the traders’ learning dynam-
ics, some of which are segregated. One question of interest is whether this
segregation comes from the fact that all the markets are identical or if this
phenomenon will persist for markets with different biases. To answer this
question, in the next section we extend our analysis to markets with different
biases.
3.4 Exploration of the parameter space:
markets with different biases
In this section, we are interested in exploring the different combinations of
markets biases θ1, θ2, θ3 and their influence on the phenomenon of segregation.
Each market bias takes values between zero and one, i.e. the parameters space
we explore is a cube with edges of length one. Of course the phenomenon
of segregation is independent under permutation of the market biases as this
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effectively just changes the labelling of the markets. We can therefore restrict
our analysis to 1/6 of the cube where θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3 and can reconstruct the
behaviour in the rest of the parameter space by symmetry. Although this
reasoning provides an intuitive explanation on how to restrict the parameter
space to study, we will not strictly respect this ordering in our parameter
exploration, in order to get simpler phase diagrams. Since phase diagrams
are easier to plot in 2-D (one dimension for the bias and one dimension for
the inverse intensity of choice) we are going to fix two of the three market
biases and vary only one of them in three different manners: (i) θ2 = 0.5 and
θ1 = 1 − θ3 and we vary θ1 as a free parameter between zero and 1/2, (ii)
θ1 = 0.3, θ2 = 0.7 and θ3 is a free parameter, (iii) θ1 = 0.3, θ2 = 0.5 and θ3 is
a free parameter that we vary between zero and one. As will become clear in
the rest of this section, the parameters studied here allow for the analysis of
properties such as the market symmetry, the “distance” between market biases
as well as the effect of market fairness on the occurrence of segregation.
3.4.1 Two symmetric markets and one fair market
In this subsection, we study segregation in a system with two symmetric mar-
kets and one fair market. As in our study of three fair markets, for simplicity,
we restrict our study to solutions that do not break the market symmetries as
they are the ones that we see in our multi-agent simulations. As in the case
of three fair markets detailed in Sec. 3.3 we will use the symmetries of the
problem to restrict the possible values of the aggregates. In particular, one
can show that the ratio of buyers over sellers in market one is the inverse of
the same ratio in market three, and that the ratio of buyers over sellers at the
fair market is unity.
One first note that when θ1 = 1− θ3 and θ2 = 0.5, for traders with symmetric
preferences to buy, the role played by market one for traders from class 1 is the
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Figure 3.3: Peak structure of the steady state distribution of traders’ preferences
when they learn to choose between three markets, two of which have
symmetric market biases θ1 = 1−θ3 and one of which is fair. The three
insets on the right show the fixed point structure for an agent from
class 1, for θ1 = 0.3 and different β as indicated in the phase diagram
by grey points. In the inset, red points correspond to a stable (large
peak) and green points to a metastable fixed point (small peak). The
color band at θ1 = 0.5 shows the type of attraction distribution when
θ1 = 0.5, i.e. when the three markets are fair (see Tab. 3.1). Note that
the zones (13 13) and (11 11) are separated by a a a small “finger” of
the (12; 12) zone that we do not display here to keep the phase diagram
clear.
same as the role played by market three for traders from class 2 and vice-versa.
As a consequence, the probability of trading at the first market for a trader
from class 1 (resp. 2) is equal to the probability of trading at the third market
for a trader of class 2 (resp. 1). Hence using the symmetry of the model, we
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can write the buyer/seller ratios in market 1 and 3 as
f1 =
P(1)(M = 1)p(1)b + P(2)(M = 1)p
(2)
b
P(1)(M = 1)(1− p(1)b ) + P(2)(M = 1)(1− p(2)b )
(3.5)
f2 =
P(1)(M = 3)p(1)b + P(2)(M = 3)p
(2)
b
P(1)(M = 3)(1− p(1)b ) + P(2)(M = 3)(1− p(2)b )
(3.6)
When substituting into these expressions the equalities P(1)(M = 1) =
P(2)(M = 3), P(2)(M = 1) = P(1)(M = 3) and remembering that p(1)b = 1−p(2)b ,
one sees that f1 = 1/f3. With the same reasoning, one can show that the ratio
of buyers over sellers at the fair market (market number two) is 1.
Let us first calculate the value of the intensity of choice at which traders start
to segregate weakly. To do so, for a given value of the free parameter θ1, we
start from low values of β and gradually increase the intensity of choice until
it reaches a critical value where the single agent dynamics has two stable fixed
points. Those values of β are shown by the upper solid line in Fig. 3.3. The
natural continuation of this analysis is to look – if it exists – for the strong
segregation threshold. While thanks to our previous analysis of symmetric
markets we know that for θ1 = 0.5 strong segregation takes place at β =
1/0.252, our numerical methods show that for markets reasonably asymmetric
i.e. θ1 < 0.48, strong segregation does not take place in the range of values
of β we look at in our phase diagram. For θ1 between 0.48 and 0.5, our
numerics suggest possible strong segregation but within the precision of our
action minimization we could not definitely conclude whether it occurs or not.
The absence of segregation for θ 6= 0.5 is the reason why the 13 and 31 zones
that exist when the three markets are fair (θ1 = 0.5) merge into a 13 zone for
values of θ1 different from 0.5. Note that the range of values of θ1 for which
this 13 solution exists is rather small (see Fig. 3.3), because the central stable
fixed point in the 13 state rapidly becomes unstable as θ decreases. In Fig. 3.3
we see that for any value of β, the majority of the traders will prefer to trade
at the fair market (market number two). However, as the intensity of choice
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increases, the two new peaks which appear correspond to going to trade at
market number one or at the market number three.
In this subsection, we discussed weak segregation across three double auction
markets when two of them are symmetric, and the third one is fair. Sur-
prisingly, apart from the particular case when the three markets are all fair,
strong segregation does not take place. This raises the question of whether
the absence of strong segregation is a general feature of traders choosing be-
tween three market, i.e. if it can arise only due to the symmetries between
the markets. This motivates the exploration of further parameter settings in
Secs. 3.4.2 and 3.4.3
3.4.2 Two symmetric markets and one biased market
In the previous section, we discussed the fact that for two symmetric markets
and one fair market only weak segregation takes place. In this part, we consider
two symmetric markets with fixed market biases: θ1 = 0.3 and θ3 = 0.7. For
these fixed parameters we show in Fig. 3.4 a phase diagram of the type of
attraction distribution as a function of the bias of the second market θ2 ∈
[0.3, 0.7].
We first note that strong segregation appears, and does so across a reasonably
broad range of market biases. Nonetheless, the range of market biases for
which strong segregation takes place (grey zone in Fig. 3.4) is limited. Indeed,
segregation occurs only for θ2 6∈ [0.45, 0.55] i.e. when the second market is
sufficiently biased. For θ2 < 0.45 (resp. θ2 > 0.55) the traders from the sec-
ond (resp. first) class strongly segregate across the two markets that maximise
average profit per trade for each class. One interesting research question for
future work is the shape of the phase diagram below the first strong segregation
threshold (grey zone in Fig. 3.4). We choose not to explore such values of β
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here as this would require the numerical solution of self-consistency conditions
for multiple aggregates in the presence of two (or more) strong segregation
peaks in the traders’ attraction distributions, and leave this question for fu-
ture work. However, it is possible to get an intuition about the shape of the
phase diagram below this threshold by extrapolating the zones of weak seg-
regation when the second market is close to fair (dotted lines in Fig. 3.4).
Another possibility to get an idea of the shape of the phase diagram is to run
multi-agent simulations and plot the distribution of scores (this is what we do
in Fig. 3.5).
Having described the range of values of θ2 for which strong segregation takes
place, we inspect more closely the range of parameters for which only weak
segregation occurs. To do so, we look at how the attraction distributions of
both classes of traders evolve at fixed θ2 = 0.47 when β increases. For values
of β small enough in relation to the agents’ preferences, they will essentially
randomise. As β increases, the traders from the two classes synchronise at
the market that is close to fair (market two) and provides a good trade-off
between profit and trading volume. Then, as β increases, small peaks arise
in the distribution of scores of each of the classes but most of the traders
remain in the fairer market. At β = 1/0.246 a peak corresponding to the
strategy “trading at the profit maximizing market” (market one, which has
θ1 = 0.3) appears in the attraction distribution of the agents from the second
class. Then at β = 1/0.228, a peak corresponding to the strategy “trading
at the profit maximizing market” (market three with θ3 = 0.7) appears in
the attraction distribution of the agents from the first class. After those two
successive appearances of weak segregation between the fair market and the
profit maximizing market for both class 1 and class 2, a new peak in the
attraction distribution – which corresponds to the strategy “trading at the
volume maximizing market” – appears successively for class 1 at β = 1/0.207
and then for class 2 at β = 1/0.198.
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Figure 3.4: Types of attraction distributions in the steady state of EWA learning
dynamics for markets with biases θ1 = 1 − θ3 = 0.3 and varying
θ2. The grey zone indicates the region in parameter space where the
distribution of scores has two peaks of large size, i.e. where strong
segregation occurs. Note that between an unsegregated region (10 10)
and a strongly segregated ((20 10) resp. (10 20)) there is always a
weakly segregated region ((11 10) resp. (10 11)) but these are mostly
too narrow to be visible in this phase diagram. There are likely to
be further phase boundaries within the strongly segregated region as
indicated by the dotted lines, but we have not calculated those in
detail. The dashed line in the centre corresponds to the dashed line
in Fig. 3.3.
Our phase diagram suggests that fairness of the second market weakens segre-
gation. However, in the phase diagram of Fig. 3.4 we checked the onset of seg-
regation only for reasonably large inverse decision strengths (i.e. 1/β > 0.19).
It is therefore still possible that strong segregation might occur at sufficiently
high intensity of choice 1/β < 0/19 even in the range θ ∈ [0.45, 0.55]. As
the intensity of choice increases, each class will first weakly segregate across
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Figure 3.5: Log-distribution of score differences of traders who choose between
three markets with market biases (θ1, θ2, θ3) = (0.3, 0.35, 0.7). The
population consists of two classes ofN/2 = 104 traders with symmetric
buy-sell preferences p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.2, inverse memory length
r = 0.01 and intensity of choice β = 1/0.21. We see that the attraction
distribution of the second population is strongly segregated so that the
state overall is of type (10 20) in our notation, as predicted in the phase
diagram of Fig. 3.4.
the second market (close to fair) and the profit maximizing market and then
weakly segregate across the three markets. On the other hand, if the second
market is not fair the population for which this market is profit-oriented will
strongly segregate between the two profit maximizing markets and the other
class will only trade at the fair market. The results of this subsection suggest
that as soon as traders have at their disposal a reasonably fair market, they
are not going to segregate and will prefer to trade with the fair market; when
they have no fair market they will always prefer the profit maximizing market.
To put it differently, we expect that the preferences of a trader among the
different types of markets are generally ordered as follows:
market close to fair > profit oriented market > volume oriented market
In the next section, we relax the assumption that two of the three available
markets are symmetric, force one of the markets to be fair and investigate the
emergence or otherwise of strong and weak segregation.
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3.4.3 Markets without symmetry
The two examples presented in subsections 3.4.2 and 3.4.1 lead to the con-
jecture that the presence of a fair market – which provides a good trade-off
between trades profit and trades volume – can suppress segregation. To con-
firm this conjecture, we consider three markets where the first one is biased
toward buyers (θ1 = 0.3) and the second one is fair (θ2 = 0.5); the bias of
the third market is the parameter we will vary. As we did in the previous
subsections, we will draw a phase diagram of the type of distribution of scores
of the traders depending on the intensity of choice β and the bias of the third
market θ3 ∈ [0, 1].
In the phase diagram in Fig. 3.6 one can see that for the range of parameters
we explore, the distributions of scores of both of the classes of traders are only
have one peak whose size is of order one, i.e. depending on the value of β and
θ3 they are unsegregated or weakly segregated with – in the latter case – one
or two small peaks. In Fig. 3.6, one sees that at fixed θ3, once the intensity
of choice goes above a certain threshold value shown by the full green line in
Fig. 3.6, a weak peak corresponding to the strategy “trading at market one”
appears in the distribution of scores of the second class of agents. Then, when β
is above the second segregation threshold (represented by the green dotted line
in Fig. 3.6), the same type of weak peak appears in the distribution of scores
of the first class of agents. The fact that the two green lines just described
are close to horizontal reflects the fact that since almost all of the population
trades at the fair market, the bias of the third market will not influence the
preference of traders. This is the reason why the critical intensity of choice at
which traders of class 1 (resp. class 2) will weakly segregate between market
1 and market 2 is almost independent on the third market’s bias. The same is
not true of the threshold for the appearance of a peak corresponding to the
strategy “trade at market 3”: the red lines in Fig. 3.6 showing this threshold
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are inclined rather than horizontal. This is the sign that the appearance of
a weak peak corresponding to the strategy “trading at market three” depends
on both the intensity of choice β and on the bias of the third market θ3. Our
numerics did not show strong segregation for inverse intensity of choice higher
than 0.17, moreover, extrapolating our current results, we do not expect strong
segregation to take place even for 1/β < 0.17.
3.5 Discussion/Conclusion
In this chapter we used the equal action formalism developed in chapter 2 to
study strong segregation of traders with fixed buy/sell preferences across three
markets. After setting out the motivation for the extension to segregation
across three markets in Sec. 3.1, we described precisely how we extend the
double auction markets model from two to three markets. Motivated by the
wide variety of structures of the attraction distributions that one observes in
multi-agent simulations, we explored in Secs. 3.3 and 3.4 different combinations
of market biases and their influence on the phenomenon of segregation. First,
in Sec. 3.3, we studied segregation across three fair markets, i.e. with θ1 = θ2 =
θ3 = 0.5; this is the only set of market biases for which we found segregation
of both of classes of traders into three groups. In Sec. 3.4 we explored different
market configuration to get an intuition of the factors that drive segregation.
This enabled us to identify two principal causes of segregation (i) the closeness
between the markets, (ii) the average volume of trade and profit earned in this
market. The closeness between two markets is going to enhance segregation
because traders are more likely to split across two markets if they cannot tell
them apart. This effect is visible in Sec. 3.4.3 where the strong and weak
segregation thresholds are the highest when the second market and the fair
market have the same bias. The ordering of the appearance of the peaks in
the traders’ scores distribution suggests – as we pointed out in Sec. 3.4.2 – that
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Figure 3.6: Peak structure of the different attraction distributions when θ1 = 0.3,
θ2 = 0.5, p
(1)
b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.2. We label each zone by two sequences
of numbers: the top one corresponds to class one and the bottom one
to class 2. The red number correspond to the favourite market in
the large peak of the attraction distribution and the black one to the
favourite market in the weak peaks of the attraction distribution. For
example the bottom zone 12323 corresponds to a (12 11) distribution of
scores where both of the classes have one main peak at the fair market
(market two), class one has two weak peaks at market two and market
three and class two has a single weak peak at market three.
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traders will have preference for markets that provide a good balance between
volume of trades and profit of trades, then as the intensity of choice decreases
they will go first to the one which maximises their profit and then subsequently
to the one which maximises their volume of trades.
We examined the existence of strong segregation only for moderate intensities
of choice i.e. 1/β > 0.2. The reason for this restriction is that the minimal
action algorithms sometimes fails to find a physical minimal action path for
large β. For this reason working on the robustness and accuracy of the action
minimization algorithm would be an obvious continuation of this work. We
could for example use the geometric minimum action method [48] in which the
limit t1 → ∞ and t2 → ∞ is assumed. This makes it possible to write the
action of a path as an integral over a normalised arc-length φ ∈ [0, 1] rather
than an integral over a time t ∈ [−∞,∞].
A further natural extension of this work would be to increase the number of
markets. Such an extension is likely to be challenging for two reasons: (i) the
parameter space of market biases would be of dimension n (ii) minimal action
paths would have to be found in a space of attraction differences of dimension
n − 1. On the plus side, tackling these issues would enable one to check how
general the results we obtained for segregation across two markets are.
Finally, it would also be interesting to find a robust way to assess whether
a distribution of scores is segregated or otherwise from simulation data to
locate more precisely the strong segregation region in Fig. 3.6. The Binder
cumulant [6] fails to predict segregation when the peaks of the attraction dis-
tribution do not have the same size. Alternatively, to assess the bimodality of
the scores distributions one can use Hartigan’s DIP test [47], which uses the
distance between the distribution of scores and the “best fitting” unimodal dis-
tribution to assess the unimodality of the attraction distribution or otherwise.
The drawback of this test compared to the Binder cumulant is that it only
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gives information about the shape of the distribution when traders have finite
memory but its predictions do not generalise to the limit r → 0, which is the




In this appendix we give the expression of the drift and covariance matrix
which appear in the Kramer-Moyals expansion in Eq. (3.4). The step by step
method we use for the full derivations of the drift and covariance matrix are




(c), f1, f2, f3) =
(






(c), f1, f2, f3) =
(
P(c)1 (f1)P(M = 1)− P(c)3 (f3)P(M = 3)
)
−∆A(c)3 (3.8)
P(c)m (fm) is the average payoff of a trader from class c at marker m and
P(M = m) is the probability to trade at market m which depends on the
scores differences vector ∆A(c) defined in Eq. (3.3). We drop the dependence
on the score differences deliberately to lighten the notations. In order to check
the validity of our calculations we compared the dynamics of the aggregate f1
during a multiagent simulation with the evolution of the aggregates under the
homogeneous population dynamics as which is detailed in Sec. 2.4.2 both of
which are consistent with each other as shown in Fig. 3.A.1. We now look at
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Figure 3.A.1: Comparison between the time series of the aggregates at the first
market during a multiagents simulations (r = 0.01 and 104 agents
in each class) and their evolution under the homogeneous popu-
lation dynamics. The parameters for the plots in this figure are
(θ1, θ2, θ3) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.8), β = 1/0.3 and p
(1)
b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2
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P(M = 2)P(c)2 (f2)− P(M = 1)P(c)1 (f1)
)
+ P(M = 1)Q(c)1 (f1) + ∆A(c)2 ∆A(c)3 (3.12)
where Q(c)m (fm) is defined in Eq. (2.36)
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Varying memory and decision strength
4.1 Introduction
In Chap. 2 and 3 we made the assumption that the traders discounted the
payoffs of past trades at the same rate r. Although this assumption made
our analysis clearer, it ignores the diversity of traders’ objectives. In practice,
traders have access to different pieces of information, have different expec-
tations, and can have different interpretations of shared information that is
widely available. For example, the time scale over which investors expect to
make a profit is much larger than the timescale over which speculators expect
to make a profit. This chapter aims to present a simple extension of the model
defined in Chap. 2 which takes into account heterogeneity in the behaviour of
traders.
The consequences of heterogeneity in the information received by traders is a
widely discussed topic. For example, in Ref. [98], subtitled “The luck of the
uninformed”, Toth et al. study the dynamics of traders with different informa-
tion levels who learn to trade in a double auction market. Surprisingly in such
settings, the profit of traders doesn’t always increase with their information
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level. Bloembergen et al. explain in [8]: “One possible theory explaining this
phenomenon is that more information helps during trends, whereas limited
knowledge may be erroneous when the trend reverses; uninformed traders are
safe from these systematic mistakes”. The study of the dynamics of traders
with heterogeneous memory playing the minority game has also attracted at-
tention from physicists [106, 52]. For example, [52] reports enhanced winnings
for traders with long memory in a population where the memory length of play-
ers is heterogeneous. Our aim is to investigate the robustness of segregation
to the introduction of heterogeneities in both the memory and the intensity of
choice of traders.
This chapter is organised as follows: in Sec. 4.2 we introduce the theoretical
formalism we use in order to study the co-learning between fast and slow
traders. In Sec. 4.3 we apply the theory developed in Sec. 4.2 to investigate
the influence of heterogeneity of traders on the phenomenon of segregation.
4.2 Dynamics of the slow and fast traders
In the examples we consider in the next section, part of the population has
an inverse memory length r  1 and another part of the population has an
inverse memory length r = 1. A quick look at the EWA learning update
rules (see Eq. (2.2)), shows that to change its preference toward a market by a
quantity of order O(1), a trader with inverse memory length r = 0.01 will need
O(1/r) = O(100) rounds while a trader with finite memory will only need O(1)
rounds. This timescale separation between the dynamics of those two types of
traders is the reason why we choose to call the traders with an inverse memory
r = 1 fast traders and the traders with an inverse memory r = 0.01 slow
traders. As a consequence of this timescale separation, the slow traders will
be seen as static by the fast traders, which will simplify our analysis. The
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market mechanisms and the learning dynamics of the traders are exactly the
same as in Chap. 2; the fictitious play parameter α is set to 1 throughout
this chapter. This choice simplifies the equations obtained from the Kramers-
Moyal expansion for the dynamics of the slow traders. To study the dynamics
of fast and slow traders, we will need to use two different methods. On the one
hand, the natural way to describe the dynamics of slow traders is to perform
a Kramers-Moyal expansion similar to the one we did in Apps. 2.C, Sec. 3.A
and Sec. 5.C.1. On the other hand, the memory length of fast traders is not
small r = 1 and this rules out using a Kramers-Moyal expansion (which relies
on the smallness of r) to derive a Fokker-Planck equation for the dynamics of
fast traders. Fortunately the short memory case r = 1 can be analysed directly
because the traders’ preferences become instantaneously determined by their
payoffs, as we now show.
4.2.1 Update equations for fast traders
When looking at the expression of the preferences update rules in Eq. (2.2)
for fast traders (r = 1) who use fictitious play (α = 1), one sees that they
become:
Am(n+ 1) =
 S(n) if the trader chose market m in round n0 otherwise (4.1)
Here S(n) is the score the trader earned at time n and traders use the logit
rule described in Eq. (2.3) to choose the next market they will trade with.
In the rest of this subsection, we will derive the probability to trade at the
first market step by step. First, from the description of the trading process in
Sec. 2.2 we can calculate the probability density function of the profit S of a
trader who places an order to buy (τ = a) or sell (τ = b) at market m is:
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P(S | τ,M = m) =V(τ,m)M(τ,m, fm) 1√
2piσ




+ δ(S) (1− V(τ,m)M(τ,m, fm)) (4.2)
Therefore, for a trader that has preference to buy pb, the probability to get a
profit S when trading at market m is:
P(S |M = m) = pbP(S | b,M = m) + (1− pb)P(S | a,M = m) (4.3)
In the expressions above, V(τ,m) andM(a,m, fm) are respectively the prob-
ability to send a valid order and the probability for the validated order to be
matched so that a trade can take place (see Appendix 2.A). Also θ(·) is the
Heaviside function which is 0 if its argument is negative and 1 otherwise and
δ(·) is the Dirac δ-function. Let us consider P(M = m,n |M = m,n−1, fm, pb)
which is “the probability that a trader with preferences to buy pb goes to mar-
ket m at time step t, knowing that he went to the same market m at time
step n− 1 and that the ratio of buyers over sellers in this market was fm”. For
readability we shorten this by P(m→ m, fm, pb):
P(m→ m, fm, pb) =
∫




















Since after having traded at market m, the preferences of a trader are given
by Eq. (4.1), we deduce that the probability for a trader to trade at market
m knowing that s/he previously traded at market m and achieved profit S is
given by P(M = m,n |M = m,n− 1, S) = 1
1+exp(−βS) . If we denote by m
† the
opposite market to m (i.e. m† = 1 if m = 2 and m† = 2 if m = 1) then the
probability to go from market m at time step n− 1 to market m† at time step
n is:
P(m→ m†, fm, pb) = 1− P(m→ m, fm, pb) (4.5)
113
4 Varying memory and decision strength
We then deduce from the law of large numbers that in the large population
limit, p¯(c)(n), the fraction of fast traders from class c going to market 1 at time
step n can be calculated from the following recursive equation:
p¯(c)(n) = P(1→ 1, f1, p(c)b )p¯(c)(n− 1) + P(2→ 1, f2, p(c)b )(1− p¯(c)(n− 1))
(4.6)
This equation still involves the ratio of buyers over sellers in market m, fm,
which depends on the distribution of both fast and slow traders across both
markets.
4.2.2 Distribution of the scores of the slow traders
When one performs a Kramers-Moyal expansion of the slow traders’ master
equation truncated at the second order, one sees that the dynamics of the
distribution of difference ∆A = A1 − A2 between the scores at market 1 and
market 2 is:
∂tP(∆A(c), t) = −∂∆A(c)
[







Σ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2)P(∆A(c), t)
]
(4.7)
where the expressions of µ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2) and Σ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2) are given in
Appendix 4.A. Note that the dynamics of the slow and fast traders are coupled
by the values of the aggregates f1 and f2. Moreover, it will be useful for the
rest of this section to note that the stationary solution of the Fokker-Planck














where the sign ∝ means that the equation above is true up to a normalization
constant. With the equation for the dynamics of both fast traders and slow
traders (4.6),(4.7) it only remains to find the aggregates f1 and f2 to calculate
the distribution of scores in the whole population. To find the value of the
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aggregates, we use an iterative approach. We start with an initial guess for the
aggregate from which we calculate the number of fast and slow traders in each
markets with the total number of slow (resp. fast) traders being constant. We
use those results to get a new estimate of the market conditions (using some
damping to ensure convergence). We stop the procedure when the market
conditions have converged.
4.2.3 Deterministic dynamics for the slow traders
In this chapter, to determine the behaviour of traders, we rely on the homo-
geneous population dynamics of slow traders. Thanks to the fact that the
relaxation time of slow traders is much longer than the relaxation time of
fast traders, the fluctuations in their preferences are very small. In the limit
r → 0 they can be neglected and we can write the following equation for the










where the aggregates fm(∆A(1),∆A(2)), m ∈ {1, 2} are the ratios of buyers
over sellers at market m. To deduce the fraction of slow traders in both
markets we use the score differences, and to deduce the fraction of fast traders
in both markets we use the fixed point equation (4.6). Thanks to the timescale
difference between the fast traders and the slow traders, we do not need to take
into account the time needed by the fast traders to relax to the fixed point of
Eq. (4.6) which is confirmed by the consistency between the simulation results
and our analytics shown in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between the Fokker Planck distribution obtained with the
fixed point method described in Sec. 4.2.2 and multiagent simulations.
The preferences to buy of the traders in the two classes are p(1)b =
1− p(2)b = 0.2, the market biases are θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3, the forgetting
rate is r = 0.05 and half of the traders are fast. The number of
traders (including both fast and slow traders) is 104 in the multiagent
simulation.
4.2.4 Onset of strong segregation
In the above setup of a system of fast and slow traders, the notion of segregation
– as a separation of a population into subgroups that have different preferences
over long timescales – clearly makes sense only for the slow traders. To assess
the existence of weak segregation among these traders, as in Chap. 2 and 3,
one just needs to count the number of peaks in the distribution of scores
i.e. the number of fixed points of the single traders’ dynamics. For strong
segregation however, we need to know for each of the fixed points whether it
corresponds to a peak of order 1 or to an exponentially small peak. To assess
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whether the system is strongly segregated or otherwise, we need to calculate
the action difference between the two (or more) fixed points of the dynamics as
explained in Fig. 2.6. Luckily for a one-dimensional Langevin dynamics such
as the one modelled in Eq. (4.7) the minimal action path can be calculated
analytically. This means that considering the stable fixed points of the single
traders’ dynamics ∆A?1 and ∆A?2, the conditions that the action difference






dy = 0 (4.10)
where we have dropped the (c) superscript indicating the class to lighten the
notation. Using the equation above, we find the strong segregation temper-
ature by plotting the action difference between the fixed points of the single
trader dynamics when the system is weakly segregated. When the quantity
∆A1→2 is equal to zero, this means we are at the strong segregation thresh-
old.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Heterogeneity in memory
To get an intuition for the influence of memory heterogeneity on the sponta-
neous emergence of segregated preferences, we looked at the variations of the
segregation thresholds (both strong and weak) with the fraction of traders who
only remember the last trading round (r = 1). In Fig. 4.1 we plot the segre-
gation thresholds for the slow traders i.e. r  1. We observe that the critical
inverse intensity of choice 1/βc of both the strong and weak segregation thresh-
olds decreases with the fraction of slow traders. This is certainly due to the
slow traders taking advantage of the fast traders. As a consequence, they earn
more profit at their profit oriented market and will prefer to trade there (see
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Figure 4.1: Segregation thresholds for the slow traders as a function of the fraction
f of slow traders when the fast traders have the same intensity of choice
as the slow traders. Market biases: θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3 and symmetric
probabilities to buy p(1)b = 1− p(2)b .
Fig. 4.3). We also observe in Fig. 4.1 that when the fraction of slow traders is
close to zero, the strong segregation threshold becomes small and has a strong
dependence on f . Quantitatively, Fig. 4.1 shows that adding fast traders de-
creases the strong segregation threshold quite drastically, from 1/βc ≈ 0.28 for
a population consisting exclusively of slow traders, to 1/βc ≈ 0.15 when the
population contains only 20% of slow traders. This is not the case for weak
segregation for which the segregation threshold only changes from 1/βc ≈ 0.28
when the population has only slow traders to 1/βc ≈ 0.259 when the popula-
tion is composed of 10% of slow traders and 90% of fast traders.
The above observations can be explained by the fact that, to strongly segregate,
traders have to self-organise in such a way that the buyers/sellers ratio in each
market verifies self-consistency conditions similar to those in Chap. 2. But
when the fraction of slow traders is decreased, the range of aggregates that
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Figure 4.2: Buyers/sellers ratio which can be reached by the slow traders if they
self-organise when the total population has a fraction f of slow traders,
and a fraction 1 − f of fast traders that have an intensity of choice
β = 0, i.e. choose market 1 exactly half of the time. As expected, as
the fraction of slow traders decreases, the zone of “available” market
condition gets smaller and smaller. The traders’ probabilities to buy
and the market biases are the same as in Fig. 4.1
can be reached gets smaller because the influence of self-organisation of the
slow traders on the buyers/sellers ratio in the markets decreases. We show
this in Fig. 4.2 where the possible buyer/seller ratios in each of the markets
are plotted for different fractions of slow traders.
Another point of interest is how the preference distribution changes as the
fraction of slow traders varies. To answer this question, we plotted in Fig. 4.3
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50% of slow agents
20% of slow agents
Figure 4.3: Distribution of the preferences of the slow traders for different frac-
tions of fast traders in the population, as obtained from numerical
simulations. We can see that as the fraction of fast traders increases,
the number of slow traders with a preference for the profit oriented
market increases. The other parameters are the same as in Fig. 4.1.
the distribution of the preferences of the slow traders in the steady state of their
learning dynamics. We observe that as the fraction of slow traders decreases,
i.e. the fraction of fast traders increases, there are more and more traders with
negative preferences (they prefer to trade at the profit oriented market). This
is a sign that the slow traders are taking advantage of the fast traders which
enables them to trade more often at their profit oriented market.
We now look at how the thresholds shown in Fig. 4.1 vary depending on the
market biases and the probability to buy of the traders p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b . In
Fig. 4.4(a,b) we show the segregation thresholds for a population composed of
only slow traders, a population formed of half slow and half fast traders and
a population composed of 20% of slow traders and 80% of fast traders. For
this range of parameters, we observe that the segregation thresholds decrease
with the fraction of slow traders. We also observe in Fig. 4.4(a,b) that the
effect of the variation of both the market biases and the probabilities to buy
120
4 Varying memory and decision strength





























b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2
Figure 4.4: Thresholds for both strong (full line) and weak (dashed line) segrega-
tion as a function of p(1)b = 1− p(2)b (left panel) and θ1 = 1− θ2 (right
panel).
is larger on the strong segregation threshold than on the weak segregation
threshold. This suggests that the effects described in the previous paragraph
for θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.3 and p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b should generalise to other values of
θ1 = 1−θ2 and p(1)b = 1−p(2)b . Moreover, extrapolating in Fig. 4.4(b) to θ1 = 0.5
suggests – and this is confirmed by our numerics – that for two fair markets
when θ1 = θ2 = 0.5, the fraction of fast traders does not affect the segregation
thresholds. The reason behind this is the symmetry of the markets. Indeed, in
such a case, slow and fast traders both go to the first and the second market
with probability one half each. This keeps the ratio of buyers over sellers to
1 in each market, independently of the intensity of choice of the fast and slow
traders and the fraction of fast traders. As one then moves away from the case
of two fair markets, by decreasing θ1 = 1− θ2, the effect of the fast traders on
the segregation of the slow traders is continuously increasing.
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50% of slow traders
20% of slow traders
Figure 4.5: Strong (full line) and weak (dashed lines) segregation thresholds for
the slow traders depending on the intensity of choice of the fast traders,
βfast, for classes with two different fractions of slow traders as shown.
The thin lines indicate for one case the strong segregation thresholds in
the two limits where the fast traders best respond to their preferences
(βfast =∞) and where they choose randomly (βfast = 0). In the plots,
the probabilities to buy of traders are p(1)b = 1 − p(2)b = 0.2 and the
market biases are θ1 = 1 − θ2 = 0.3. The grey line corresponds to
βfast = βslow and its intersection with the strong and weak segregation
curves gives the segregation thresholds shown in Fig. 4.1 for p(1)b = 0.2.
4.3.2 Heterogeneity in the intensities of choice and
memory length
To complete this initial analysis we investigate, in Fig. 4.5, how the segregation
threshold varies when not just the memory length but also the intensity of
choice of the fast traders is different from that of the slow traders. The first
comment to make is that the segregation threshold increases with the inverse
intensity of choice of the fast traders 1/βfast. We also see that while changes
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Figure 4.6: The strong (full line) and weak (dashed line) segregation thresholds
when all the traders in the first class are fast and all the traders in
the second class are slow. We consider both the case of fast and slow
traders having the same intensity of choice βfast = βslow (blue curve)
and the case where the fast traders have a zero intensity of choice
βfast = 0 i.e. they choose their next market randomly. The segregation
thresholds for a system with the same number of fast traders with
βfast = βslow evenly distributed between classes, and for a system with
only slow traders, are shown for comparison.
in the intensity of choice of the fast traders have almost no influence on the
weak segregation threshold, their influence on the strong segregation threshold
is much more substantial. This is in line with our previous observations that
the presence of the fast traders has more influence on the strong than on the
weak segregation.
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Figure 4.7: Inverse intensity of choice at which weak (left panel) and strong (right
panel) segregation is observed for the first time, as a function of the
fraction of slow traders in both of each class c, f (c)slow. The parameters
used for this plot are θ1 = 1− θ2 = 0.3 and p(1)b = 1− p(2)b = 0.2. The
white squares on the right indicate parameter values where we could
not calculate the strong segregation temperature.
4.3.3 Heterogeneity among the classes of traders
In the previous subsection, we observed that adding the same number of fast
traders in both classes decreases the segregation thresholds of the slow traders.
In this subsection, we want to check if this phenomenon persists when the
fractions of slow traders in class 1 and class 2 are different. We first look at the
extreme case when all the traders in the first class are fast and all the traders
in the second class are slow. To do so, in Fig. 4.6 we plot both the strong
and weak segregation thresholds for this scenario. In order to understand the
influence of the distribution of the slow traders among the classes, we also
plot the segregation thresholds when there is the same overall fraction of fast
traders in the population (50%) and they are evenly distributed in the two
classes. The first thing we note is that when class one is composed of only fast
traders and class two is composed of only slow traders, both the strong and
weak segregation thresholds are lower than when there are 50% of slow traders
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in each class. This suggests that an imbalance in the fraction of slow traders
between the two classes impedes segregation. In fact, for the parameters we
use in Fig. 4.6, once the puying probability p(1)b of class 1 is larger than ≈ 0.25,
strong segregation no longer takes place at any intensity of choice of the slow
traders. As is shown in Fig. 4.6 this is a phenomenon which we observe only
for much higher values of p(1)b when both classes contain 50% of fast traders.
To summarise the results of this discussion, not just the total fraction of fast
traders but also the distribution of fast traders among the two classes has to
be taken into account to understand segregation behaviour.
The findings of the previous paragraph make one wonder about the variations
of the segregation thresholds with the fraction of traders in both the first and
second classes. We show some results for this in Fig. 4.7. Since the market
biases as well as the probability of buying of the traders are symmetric, the
density plots of Fig. 4.7 are symmetric under interchange of f (1)slow and f
(2)
slow.
From those plots, we can identify two factors that influence segregation: (i)
the difference between the fraction of fast traders in class 1 and in class 2,
which tend to decrease the segregation thresholds and (ii) the overall fraction
of fast traders in the whole population, which tends to decrease the segregation
thresholds as well.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the persistence of segregation in a population
where the intensity of choice, as well as the memory of the traders, are het-
erogeneous. After having introduced in Sec. 4.1 our motivation, which is to
take into account information heterogeneity in our model, we discussed how
we model such heterogeneity in Sec. 4.2. Then, we explored the consequences
of various sources of heterogeneity in Sec. 4.3, proceeding in three stages. In
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Sec. 4.3.1 we observed that adding the same fraction of traders with short
memory in each class decreases the segregation thresholds for the traders with
a long memory (see Fig. 4.5). We saw in particular that the variations with
respect to the fraction of fast traders added are much larger for the strong than
for the weak segregation threshold. In Sec. 4.3.2 we investigated the effects
of adding heterogeneity in the intensity of choice and observed that a larger
intensity of choice for fast traders decreases the segregation thresholds of slow
traders. In Sec. 4.3.3 we explored how the segregation thresholds vary when
the fraction of traders with short memory is different within the two classes.
While showing some non-trivial structure, the results conform to the general
trend that adding traders with short memory tends to lower the segregation
thresholds (see Fig. 4.1). We argued that this is because the addition of fast
traders reduces the range of possible market conditions that slow traders can
reach by self-organising (see Fig. 4.2). The fact that the effect described above
is much stronger for strong rather than for weak segregation (it can even make
strong segregation disappear as observed in Fig. 4.4) confirms this intuition.
A natural continuation of this work would be to add even more sources of het-
erogeneity in the population of traders. For example, in the model we studied,
we only considered the effect of traders with two different memory lengths while
one could think of adding even more different values of the memory length.
Then, it would be interesting to check if the non-monotonicity of the payoffs
with respect to the information of traders observed by Toth et al. in [98] also
takes place for a population composed of traders with several different memory
lengths. It would also be appealing to see if the phenomenon of segregation
persists when traders learn their favorite market with a different algorithm.
Some suggestions for alternative learning dynamics can be found in [22, 40].
Another interesting extension of this work would be to add more heterogeneity
in the buying probabilities of the traders. In the models presented in Chap. 2
and 3 as well as this chapter we only considered a population divided into two
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classes of equal size, each of which has a specific probability to buy pb. It
would be interesting to see what happens when the probability to buy for each
trader is fixed randomly from some nontrivial distribution at the beginning of




4.A Coefficients of the Kramers-Moyal
expansion
In this appendix, we give the expression of the dirft and variance which appear
in the Kramer–Moyals expansion in Eq. (4.7)
∂tP(∆A(c), t) = −∂∆A(c)
[







Σ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2)P(∆A(c), t)
]
(4.11)
µ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2) = P(c)1 (f1)σβ(∆A(c))− P(c)2 (f2)σβ(−∆A(c))−∆A(c) (4.12)
Σ(c)(∆A(c), f1, f2) =
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Stochastic evolution in populations of
ideas
In the previous chapters, we focused on the effects of the stochasticity of payoffs
on the convergence of EWA learning in a large game. To simplify our analysis
we neglected the stochasticity coming from the finite size of the populations
(we assumed that the aggregates do not fluctuate). However, as pointed out
in Ref. [35], finite size effects can impact learning of agents significantly. To
investigate to which extent finite size effects affect the learning dynamics of
agents, in this chapter we consider a simple model of players learning how
to play a 2 × 2 normal form game using a slightly modified version of EWA
learning.
5.1 Introduction
The study of games in non-cooperative game theory has traditionally fo-
cused on the analysis of their equilibrium points, in particular the celebrated
Nash equilibria [69, 68] already encountered in the Chap. 2 of this thesis (see
Eqns. (2.7a, 2.7b)). These are the points in strategy space that fully ratio-
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nal players choose, based on full information of the game and assuming that
their opponents act fully rationally as well. At a Nash point no player can in-
crease their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy. These ideas provide
a natural first approach to the analysis of games, and they are mathematically
convenient as they do not involve any actual dynamics. On the other hand
the scope of such equilibrium concepts is naturally limited. Indeed, in the
former chapters, we observed that the dynamics of players learning to play a
simple game could be captured by the Nash equilibrium only in some specific
cases (see Sec. 2.4.1). This is confirmed by behavioural economics experiments
which show that real-world players do not behave fully rationally in repeated
games, and suggest that inductive learning from past experience may be a
better model than the assumption of full rationality [19, 18].
In many models of dynamic learning, players do not find the mutually optimal
strategy immediately; in fact they potentially never do. Instead they initially
try out the different actions available to them, and attempt to learn from past
experience. Players assess the success or otherwise of individual strategies
and then choose those that worked well in the past. Their opponents adapt
as well, and strategies that may have performed well previously can become
less successful when the opponents’ propensities have changed. This generates
a coupled dynamics between the players, and it is not clear a-priori if and
when such dynamics converge to Nash points. Indeed, work on games of low
and high complexity has suggested that learning may result in chaotic motion
[42, 93, 13, 87], in some cases with very high dimensional attractors. Situations
in which systems of this type settle down to unique well-defined fixed points
then seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
Learning and adaptation based on past experience can be interpreted as an
evolutionary process of ‘ideas’ in the minds of the players. Börgers and Sarin,
for example, write [10] ‘Decision makers are usually not completely committed
to just one set of ideas [...]. Rather [...] several possible ways of behaving are
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present in their minds simultaneously. Which of these predominate, and which
are given less attention, depends on the experiences of the individual. The
change which the “population of ideas” in the decision maker’s mind undergoes
may be analogous to biological evolution.’ Similar approaches have also been
used in models of language evolution; see e.g. Blythe et al [9]. In the context
of a game the evolutionary process in a population of ideas broadly works as
follows: each player carries in his or her mind a mixed populations of ideas.
These represent the different actions (pure strategies) he or she can take in
the game. Different ideas will be present in the player’s mind in different pro-
portions. At each instance of the game each player pulls out one idea (action)
out of their mind at random, and uses it in the game. The ideas that are
more frequent in the player’s mind will be used more often than those which
are present less in the population. The composition of the player’s mind thus
represents their mixed strategy. Over time the player learns from past expe-
rience, and the population of ideas in their mind undergoes an evolutionary
process: less successful ideas are displaced by more successful strategies. This
is illustrated in Fig. 5.1, and akin to well-known birth-death processes in evo-
lutionary dynamics [100]. It is hence no surprise that the equations governing
multi-player learning can be very similar to those used to model evolutionary
dynamics [10, 88].
Most existing analogies between learning and evolutionary dynamics are at
the level of deterministic differential equations though, formally describing the
dynamics of infinite populations. At the same time, evolutionary dynamics
in finite populations shows several phenomena that arise solely from intrinsic
stochasticity. These effects include noise-driven fixation and extinction, which
are not captured by deterministic approaches. A substantial amount of work
is available on the dynamics of stochastic birth-death processes, including an
analytical formalism to compute fixation probabilities and the times to fixation,
see for example [75, 4, 3, 100].
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the evolutionary process that occurs in a population of
ideas: two ideas in the mind of player A are selected (
⊙
and©) as in-
dicated by the rectangle on the right. Both ideas play against the same
randomly chosen adversary idea (here ) in the population of ideas of
player B and the relevant payoffs are recorded, here denoted a⊙ and
a©. Idea© is switched to
⊙
with probability g(a⊙, a©) depend-
ing on these payoffs. An analogous process occurs in the population of
ideas of player B. The non-negative function g(·, ·) is increasing in the
first argument, and decreasing in the second. It defines the mechanics
of the evolutionary process. See also the text in Secs. 5.3.3 and 5.4.1
for further details.
The main purpose of the present chapter is to develop a microscopic represen-
tation of reinforcement learning as a stochastic evolutionary process in a finite
population of ideas. Ideas in this description are members of a finite popula-
tions, and undergo a birth-death process. This approach allows us to establish
the analogy between learning and evolution at the level of stochastic population
dynamics. More specifically we will define the transition rates of a birth-death
process in a population of ideas, such that the deterministic description in the
limit of infinite populations reproduces the so-called Sato-Crutchfield differen-
tial equations [88, 86]. We show that the notion of reproductive fitness needs
to be augmented by an entropic restoring force to capture weak decision prefer-
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Notation in this chapter Notation in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4
x mixed strategy p
i market chosen τ
Q attraction A
pi average score S¯
A, B class label c
α forgetting rate r
Γ/α = λ−1 intensity of choice β
Table 5.1: Comparison of the notation of this chapter with the notation of
Chaps. 2, 3 and 4. See Sec. 5.2.2 for an exhaustive discussion.
ences and/or memory loss in game learning. These restoring forces play a role
similar to that of mutation in evolutionary dynamics. Crucially, however, the
birth-death dynamics in finite populations of ideas has absorbing states so that
ideas can go extinct or reach fixation. This marks a key difference compared
to mutation-selection dynamics, where there are no absorbing states.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 5.2 we briefly
summarize the mathematics of the standard replicator dynamics and of the
reinforcement learning dynamics we use as a basis for the evolution of ideas.
In Sec. 5.3 we then introduce the birth-death process for finite populations of
ideas, and we study its properties for simple symmetric games. In Sec. 5.4
we extend the analysis to two-player learning in asymmetric games. Finally in
Sec. 5.5 we collect our conclusions and present an outlook towards future work.
Further technical details of our analysis can be found in the Appendices. Note
that in order to study the finite size effects described above in full generality,
we decided to use notational conventions that differ from the previous chapters.
We describe the new notation in more detail in Sec. 5.2.2 and summarise it in
Tab. 5.1.
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5.2 Deterministic evolutionary dynamics and
adaptive learning
5.2.1 Evolutionary dynamics and replicator equations
5.2.1.1 Single-population replicator equations
The evolutionary dynamics of interacting individuals in infinite populations is
frequently described by replicator [97] or replicator-mutator equations. These
are deterministic ordinary differential equations. We focus on a population of
individuals of S different types, i = 1, . . . , S, and write xi(t) for the fraction of
individuals of type i in the population at time t, and x = (x1, . . . , xS). At all
times
∑
i xi(t) = 1. We assume that individuals interact in a symmetric two-
player normal form game [50]. This is specified by a payoff matrix A = (aij).
The entry aij is the payoff to an individual of type i in an interaction with an
individual of type j. The setup of a symmetric game is not to be confused with
a game for which the payoff matrix is symmetric, i.e. its own transpose.
The average payoff per game to an individual of type i in a population of
composition x is given by pii(x) =
∑
j aijxj. In order to keep the notation
compact, we will omit the argument x in the following. The standard replicator
equations are then given by [50]
x˙i = xi(pii − pi), (5.1)
with pi =
∑
j xjpij. These dynamics can be derived from a birth-death process
in the limit of an infinite population. This will be discussed in more detail
below.
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5.2.1.2 Two-population replicator dynamics
The case of asymmetric games refers to situations in which different individuals
take on different roles, e.g. male and female in Dawkin’s battle of the sexes
[34], or buyers and sellers in a stock market. In this case individuals belonging
to different populations. In two-population replicator systems the fitness of
individuals in population A is determined by their interaction with individuals
in population B, and vice versa. Selection and evolution then occur within











i − piB), (5.2b)
where xAi is the frequency with which individuals of type i occur in population
A, and xBi the frequency with which the i-th type occurs in population B. It is
important to note that the label i in either population is a simple numbering of
pure strategies, e.g. in Dawkin’s battle of the sexes i = 1, 2 in the populations
of males may refer to ‘faithful’ and ‘philanderer’, and in the population of
females the same labels may refer to ‘coy’ and ‘fast’ [34, 99].
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5.2.2 Discrete-time Sato-Crutchfield learning
Following [86, 88] we consider two players, labelled A and B repeatedly play-
ing an asymmetric game with payoff matrices A (B) for player A (B). For
simplicity, we will assume that both players have the same number S of ac-
tions available, but the extension to the more general case is straightforward
[86]. Hence A and B will be S × S matrices, with entries denoted aij and
bji, i, j = 1, . . . , S. As implied in (5.3a) and (5.3b) above, aij is the payoff to
player A if she chooses action i while player B plays action j; bji is the payoff
to player B in this situation.
At each instance of the game, each player µ ∈ {A,B} will choose one action. In
order to monitor the relative success of the different actions, each player holds
an ‘attraction’ for each action. We will write Qµi (t) for the attraction player
µ has for action i at time t. Sato-Crutchfield learning assumes a soft-max (or
logit) rule to convert a set of attractions Qµ1 , . . . , Q
µ







The parameter Γ ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice as in [42, 49, 19].
When Γ = 0 attractions play no role and players choose their actions with
equal probability. In the limit Γ→∞ players play a pure strategy that always
chooses the action with the highest attraction.
In [86, 88] the preferences for the different actions are updated in discrete
time. It is also assumed that a large (formally infinite) number of rounds
of the game is played in between such updates, and that player A observes
player B’s actions and vice versa. Each agent then has full knowledge of the
other agent’s mixed strategy. This is a simplification of the model, which
was made for convenience in [86] and results in a full deterministic dynamics.
The learning dynamics remains stochastic if the number of observations made
between updates is finite [41, 82].
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Proceeding on the basis of a deterministic dynamics, Sato-Crutchfield learning
takes the form










The parameter α describes geometric discounting over time. For α = 0 the
players have full memory of the past, and the attraction Qµi (t) represents the
total payoff player µ ∈ {A,B} would have achieved up to time t given the
other player’s actions, and if µ had always used action i. For positive values
of α more recent rounds contribute more to the attraction than iterations of
the game in the distant past. The parameter α is restricted to the range
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The learning rule in Eq. (5.6) is a form of EWA learning as used in previous
chapters, but with two differences. Firstly, the payoffs on the r.h.s. are the
expected payoffs – given the strategies used by the players – so the learning
rule implicitly assumes that these are known without stochasticity and for all
actions i. In the market choice game, on the other hand, the learning dynamics
was driven by stochastic payoffs and these were known only for the currently
chosen action. We will see below how in the population dynamics view the
deterministic payoffs arise from averaging over the stochastic payoffs received
in games among randomly chosen members of the population. Similarly, this
averaging guarantees that the payoffs are known for all actions (except if there
are no individuals at all that play a certain action, in which case this action is
extinct and its payoff no longer relevant).
The second difference is in the parameterization of the learning rule in
Eq. (5.6), for which we followed standard notation for Sato-Crutchfield learn-
ing here. To see the relation to the form of EWA learning studied in previous
chapters (see e.g. Eqns. (2.2, 2.3)), consider Eq. (5.6). We relabel i → m
(action = market chosen), t → n (discrete time = trading rounds) and call
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the expected payoff on the r.h.s. Pm as in earlier chapters. If we then also





i , leaving the agent index on Am implicit, Eq. (5.6) becomes
after multiplication by r
Am(n+ 1) = (1− r)Am(n) + rPm (5.7)
This is identical to Eq. (2.2) except for the two changes discussed above, i.e.
replacing stochastic payoffs by expected payoffs and assuming known payoffs
for all actions. We conclude that α here plays the role of the learning rate r
used in previous chapters.
To see the analogous correspondence for Γ, note that from the rescaling be-
tween Am and QAi , the link in Eq. (5.4) from attractions to strategies is gov-
erned by exp(ΓQAi ) = exp((Γ/α)Am). This is identical to the exponentials in
Eq. (2.3) if one identifies
β = Γ/α (5.8)
Note that the inverse of this parameter is defined as λ below. Consistent
with the intuition that β corresponds to an inverse temperature, λ = β−1 is
a temperature-like parameter of Sato-Crutchfield learning that multiplies the
entropic contributions to the learning dynamics.
5.2.3 Continuous-time limit and modified replicator
equations
Combining Eqs. (5.4, 5.5, 5.6) one finds
xµi (t+ 1) =
[xµi (t)]








In order to derive a continuous-time limit we formally rescale the time step
of learning to be ∆t (so that t + 1 on the LHS of Eq. (5.9) becomes t + ∆t).
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We also rescale the model parameters and write α∆t instead of α, and Γ∆t






















where λ = α/Γ. The first term on the right-hand side is the expression
known from the standard multi-population replicator dynamics in Eq. (5.2a)
and (5.2b). The term proportional to λ exerts a force towards a uniformly
mixed strategy, xµi = 1/S. This ‘entropic’ force will be strong when either the
intensity of choice is low (players tend to choose their actions at random), or
when memory loss is quick (propensities do not become sufficiently different
to discriminate effectively between actions).
We conclude this section by two brief, but consequential observations. First,
the flow of the replicator Eqs. (5.2a) and (5.2b) can be towards stable fixed
points at which one or several of the actions are not played (i.e. xµi = 0). This
cannot occur in the Sato-Crutchfield equations when λ > 0. Any attracting
fixed points must be in the interior of strategy space. Secondly we note that the














by introducing a modified fitness as
fµi = pi
µ
i − λ lnxµi . (5.12)
This will be the starting point for our construction of an individual-based
model for the evolution of a population of ideas.
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5.3 Stochastic dynamics in finite populations:
the case of symmetric games
5.3.1 Birth-death dynamics
To briefly recall the main features of simple birth death processes [100, 75] we
consider a population ofN individuals, each of which can be of one of two types,
i = 1, 2. We write n for the number of individuals of type 1; the remaining
N − n individuals are of type 2. Evolution proceeds in this population via a
continuous-time Markov process with transition rates T+n from state n to state
n+1, and T−n from state n to state n−1. In the context of evolutionary games









where pi1 = [a11n + a12(N − n)]/N is the fitness of an individual of type 1 in
the population, with an analogous expression for pi2. The rates scale linearly
with the population size N – this is a standard choice [100, 7], which implies
that time is effectively measured in units of generations. From these rates
a deterministic dynamics is obtained in the limit N → ∞ [100]. For large
(formally infinite) populations and writing x = n/N , one finds
x˙ = x(1− x) [g(pi1, pi2)− g(pi2, pi1)] . (5.14)
A commonly used choice for the function g(·, ·) is the so-called linear pairwise




[1 + Γ(pi1 − pi2)] (5.15)
where the parameter Γ ≥ 0 is chosen small enough to ensure that g ≥ 0 for
all x. The duplicate use of Γ is intentional, as will become clear shortly. With
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the above choice of g one obtains
x˙ = Γx(1− x) (pi1 − pi2) , (5.16)
Modulo the constant pre-factor Γ this is easily shown to be the replicator
equation (5.1) with S = 2.
5.3.2 Interpretation of fitness in the linear pairwise
comparison process
We digress briefly in this subsection to discuss how individuals in the above
birth-death dynamics have access to their fitness, i.e. their average payoff.
A common interpretation of fitness functions of the type pii =
∑
j aijxj requires
a fast interaction time scale on which individuals face each other in the game
[41, 82, 83]. The evolutionary dynamics is assumed to be a (much) slower
process; it can therefore draw on knowledge of pii as defined above.
One particular advantage of the linear pairwise comparison process (5.15) is
that it does not require such a separation of time scales between interaction
and evolution. Instead one can construct the evolutionary process as follows:
for any (potential) birth-death event an ordered triplet of individuals from
the population is picked (with replacement). We refer to the individuals in
this triplet as “primary”, “secondary” and “adversary”, and denote their types
by i1, i2, ia. Once a triplet has been picked, the primary and secondary
individual both play against the adversary and receive payoffs ai1ia and ai2ia ,
respectively. The secondary individual (i2) is then replaced by an individual
of the primary type (i1) – a combined death-birth event – with probability
g(ai1ia , ai2,ia); otherwise the system is left unchanged. For the choice of g as in
Eq. (5.15) the Markov chain governing this process is then that described by
the rates in Eq. (5.13a, 5.13b). This is easily demonstrated for S = 2. With
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[n1g(a11, a21) + n2g(a12, a22)]. (5.17)
The term in square brackets effectively averages over the choice of adversary.
Using the specific form of the linear pairwise comparison process in Eq. (5.15),



















which demonstrates the equivalence.
5.3.3 Birth-death dynamics in a finite population of
ideas
We now construct an individual-based representation of Sato-Crutchfield dy-







− λ ln ni
N
, (5.19)
which can be seen as ‘entropically’ penalizing ideas that occur very frequently,











with g as defined in Eq. (5.15). This is a representation of Sato-Crutchfield
learning in the sense that it leads to the dynamics
x˙ = Γx(f1 − f) = Γx(pi1 − pi)− Γλx (lnx+ s) , (5.21)
in the limit of infinite populations. We have written s = − [x lnx+ (1− x) ln(1− x)],
and f = xf1 + (1 − x)f2. Our main focus from now on will be the behaviour
of this birth-death process in finite populations.
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The parameters Γ and λ need to be chosen such that all transition rates T±n
are non-negative. Written out explicitly the transition rates in Eq. (5.20),













where ∆pi = pi1 − pi2. Thus, we require
Γ
∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln nN − n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (5.23)
for all n = 1, . . . , N − 1. At fixed Γ, this imposes a constraint λ < λc, where
λc = O(1/ lnN) is weakly dependent on population size; see the appendices for
details. Alternatively, one could choose a manifestly positive function g(·, ·),
such as g(f1, f2) = [1+exp(−2Γ(f1−f2))]−1. The resulting dynamics is known
as the Fermi process [7, 3]. While the fixed points of the resulting deterministic
dynamics are the same as for the linear comparison process, the dynamics
themselves are quantitatively different from Sato-Crutchfield dynamics. We
therefore do not pursue this route.
The expressions in Eq. (5.22) imply T+n = T
−
N = 0, keeping in mind that
limn→0 n lnn = 0. The states n = 0 and n = N are therefore absorb-
ing. Accordingly, the birth-death dynamics in the population of ideas shows
fluctuation-induced extinction of ideas (or equivalently fixation). In the re-
mainder of this section we study these fixation phenomena in the context of
simple 2× 2 games.
5.3.4 Application to symmetric two-player two-strategy
games
We focus on three common types of games that cover the qualitatively distinct
deterministic flow patterns available under replicator dynamics. The corre-
sponding payoff matrices are given in Fig. 5.1, along with illustrations of the
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Figure 5.1: Payoff matrices A of the three main types of two-strategy two-player
symmetric games, and their flow diagrams in x ∈ [0, 1] under replicator
dynamics.
respective replicator flow (λ = 0). The points x = 0 and x = 1 are fixed points
for all games for all values of λ.
Note that it is only asymmetric games as defined in Sec. 5.2.1.2 for which
the deterministic dynamics has a natural interpretation in terms of Sato-
Crutchfield learning for a two-player game. Our study of symmetric games,
where the only notion of game play is in the pairwise interaction of the individ-
uals in a population – rather than between two distinct populations represent-
ing players in the sense of Sato-Crutchfield – is primarily a warm-up. It will
help us identify some important mechanisms of the fixation dynamics, such as
deterministic relaxation and activation, that will be helpful in our analysis of
asymmetric games in Sec. 5.4.
Co-existence games. The boundary fixed points (x = 0, x = 1) are unstable
for co-existence games under replicator flow, and there is a stable interior fixed
point x? where both types of ideas coexist. The memory-loss term in the Sato-
Crutchfield equation (λ > 0) does not change the qualitative features of the
flow; its main effect is to move the stable fixed point closer the centre of the
state space, as shown in Fig. 5.2(a). For very quick memory loss (λ  1)
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Co-existence game: (a) Location of fixed points of single-population
Sato-Crutchfield learning, Eq. (5.21). (b) Mean fixation time as a
function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at initial
condition n = 100. The line is obtained using the known closed-form
solution for simple birth-death processes, see e.g. [100]. Intensity of
choice is Γ = 0.1.
the fitness fi of either type of individual is entirely dominated by the entropic
term, and both types of individuals are present with equal frequency.
The path to fixation in finite population coexistence games consists of two
parts: (i) an initial relaxation to the vicinity of the interior fixed point; (ii) ac-
tivation to one of the two absorbing states, driven by fluctuations; see also the
appendices for further discussion. Eyring-Kramers theory [46, 37, 58] indicates
that the typical time required for such an activation event grows exponentially
with the height of the relevant activation barrier, and with the inverse variance
of the noise, N . The height of the activation barrier is affected by the restoring
force of the entropic term. Accordingly, the fixation time shown in Fig. 5.2(b)
shows a strong dependence of fixation times on the model parameter λ at fixed
N . The functional form is approximately exponential, suggesting a linear in-
crease in the activation barrier with λ. This is intuitively plausible in the limit
of large λ: the entropic term will dominate the dynamics, and it is linear in
λ.
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Dominance games. In this type of game one idea is dominant, and always
has a higher payoff than the other type of idea. The replicator flow has con-
stant sign; for the choice of payoff matrix in Fig. 5.1(b) it has an unstable
fixed point at x = 0, and a stable fixed point at x = 1. The Sato-Crutchfield
dynamics at λ > 0 has an additional stable interior fixed point x?, which ap-
proaches unity as λ → 0, see Fig. 5.3(a). In finite populations the dynamics
is similar to that of the coexistence game when λ > 0. After an initial re-
laxation towards the interior fixed point, noise drives the system to fixation.
Given that the fixed point is located close to x = 1 for small and moderate λ,
fixation will mostly occur at the upper absorbing boundary. As before fixation
times increase with λ but are rather shorter than in the coexistence game, see
Fig. 5.3(b). Exponential dependence of the fixation time on λ is only seen
when λ is sufficiently large so that the internal fixed point is well separated
from the absorbing states, or when the population size is large enough for the
activation barrier to show. For small and moderate values of λ the activation
barrier is too shallow relative to the noise strength for Eyring-Kramers theory
to apply.
Coordination games. In addition to the trivial fixed points at the bound-
aries, the replicator dynamics of the coordination game has an unstable interior
fixed point x?0. With memory-loss (λ > 0) the dynamics develops a more intri-
cate structure, see Fig. 5.4. At small but non-zero λ there are five fixed points.
As λ is increased, two of these fixed points merge in a saddle-node bifurcation;
we denote the corresponding value of λ by λc. For stronger memory loss there
are three fixed points, but with reversed stability compared to the situation
at λ = 0: unstable fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1, and a stable interior fixed
point whose location depends on λ.
For λ < λc and initial conditions n/N = x > x?0, i.e. above the unstable fixed
point in the lower left of Fig. 5.4(a), fixation takes place as in the dominance
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.3: Dominance game. (a) Location of fixed points of single-population
Sato-Crutchfield learning, Eq. (5.21). (b) Mean fixation time as a
function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at ini-
tial condition n = 100, comparing theory (continuous line) to direct
numerical simulations of the dynamics (markers) using the Gillespie
algorithm. Intensity of choice is Γ = 0.1. In the inset of panel (b) we
show the mean fixation time starting from n = 1000 for a population
of size 2000, where the crossover to an exponential dependence on λ
is visible at large λ.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Coordination game. (a) Location of fixed points of single-
population Sato-Crutchfield learning. (b) Mean fixation time as a
function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at initial
condition n = 100, comparing theory (continuous line) to numerical
simulations of the dynamics (markers). Intensity of choice is Γ = 0.1.
In the inset of panel (b) we show the mean fixation time starting from
n = 1000 for a population of size 2000.
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(a) (b)
n
Figure 5.5: Coordination game. (a) Mean fixation time in a finite population
(with Γ = 0.1) as a function of λ, the memory-loss parameter, and
for different initial conditions n. (b) Mean fixation time as a function
of the initial condition for two fixed values λ indicated by arrows in
(a). We show data for a larger population size N = 1000 to reveal
the non-monotonicities in λ. In (b), vertical lines indicate the initial
conditions used in (a). Also shown are the times taken under the
deterministic dynamics (dashed lines) to get from the initial condition
to within c/N of the stable fixed point; the order unity constant c is
chosen to give a good description of the actual fixation times for initial
conditions near the fixed point.
game by deterministic relaxation to the stable fixed point near x = 1, followed
by noise-driven absorption. The increase of the fixation time with λ is shown
in Fig. 5.4(b) and is qualitatively similar to the behaviour for the dominance
game as plotted in Fig. 5.3(b).
For initial conditions with x < x?0, the behaviour of the system and the re-
sulting fixation time is more intricate, as shown in Fig. 5.5. Panel (a) demon-
strates that the fixation time can now exhibit a non-monotonic dependence on
the strength of memory loss λ, provided the starting point is sufficiently close
to the location of the saddle-node bifurcation. The data in panel (b) show that
the starting point has a non-trivial influence on fixation time.
This dependence on the initial condition x for λ < λc can be understood as
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follows. If x is smaller than the unstable (interior) fixed point at the given
λ, deterministic relaxation will be to the stable fixed point at lower x, and
activation from there will accordingly be to x = 0 rather than x = 1. A more
detailed analysis for large N can be found in the appendices. This shows that
close to the bifurcation, activation towards x = 0 is slower – exponentially in
N – than across the barrier to the stable fixed point at large x, so the system
follows the latter route and eventually reaches x = 1. We emphasize that this
is a non-trivial prediction for the dynamics in finite populations; it cannot be
deduced from the deterministic Sato-Crutchfield dynamics..
Moving beyond the bifurcation (λ > λc), the situation is simpler again. For
sufficiently large N one predicts fixation by relaxation directly to the stable
fixed point close to x = 1, and activation to x = 1 from there. In Fig. 5.6(a)
one can see that the system relaxes to the stable fixed point close to x = 1
following the deterministic dynamics, then fixation occurs by activation. For
small N and close to the bifurcation threshold, the system might initially stay
in a region of relatively weak deterministic flow (see Fig. 5.6(b)). A detailed
analysis of this phenomenon is deferred to the appendices.
5.3.5 Comparison with replicator-mutator dynamics
The effect of the entropic term in the Sato-Crutchfield equations is
akin to that of mutation in evolutionary processes. Such mutation dynamics is
discussed in [57, 66], for example. Both mutation and entropic terms describe
forces that act towards the centre of strategy space and drive the population
away from states in which one species (or one idea) dominates, and we here
include a brief comparison. We choose the replicator-mutator equation of the














5 Stochastic evolution in populations of ideas
Figure 5.6: Sample trajectories of a coordination game, for different initial condi-
tions; Γ = 0.1, λ = 0.36 and N = 1000 (coloured curves). The black
curves show the trajectory for the deterministic dynamics (5.11) start-
ing from the same set of initial conditions. The trajectories follow the
deterministic dynamics fairly closely for initial conditions x = 0.5 and
0.8. For initial condition x = 0.2, fluctuations determine how fast the
system escapes from the initial region of relatively weak deterministic
flow. For initial x = 0.05, this effect is even stronger. One of the
two trajectories shown also illustrates direct activation, to fixation at
x = 0, against the deterministic flow.
where u > 0 is the mutation rate. In order to compare the effects of mutation
with those of memory loss in the learning process, we show the bifurcation dia-
grams of the replicator-mutator dynamics along with those of Sato-Crutchfield
learning in Fig. 5.7, for the three classes of symmetric games we have con-
sidered. The main difference between the two flows is that Sato-Crutchfield
dynamics has additional fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1. As these are un-
stable for λ > 0, they do not lead to qualitative differences in the long-time
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Coexistence game  Dominance game   Coordination game
Figure 5.7: Fixed point diagrams of Sato-Crutchfield (S-C) learning (5.21), (blue
and red lines), and replicator-mutator (R-M) dynamics (5.24) (black
lines) for our three types of symmetric 2 × 2 games. The full black
lines show the stable fixed points of the replicator-mutator dynamics
and the dashed line its unstable fixed points.
deterministic dynamics. However, for finite N the difference is significant:
replicator-mutator dynamics does not have absorbing states, so the question
of fixation does not arise.
5.4 Asymmetric games and multiple
populations of ideas
5.4.1 Birth-death dynamics for multiple populations of
ideas
In this section we extend the stochastic dynamics for populations of ideas to
games with multiple populations. We focus on the simplest case of two-player
two-strategy games, though the approach easily extends to more general games.
Our starting point are the Sato-Crutchfield equations (5.10), which simplify
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to










where piA1 = a11xB + a12(1 − xB), piA2 = a21xB + a22(1 − xB), with analogous
expressions for piB1 and piB2 . We have also written piA = xApiA1 + (1 − xA)piA2 ,
and sA = − [xA lnxA + (1− xA) ln(1− xA)]. Similar definitions apply to piB
and sB. The variable xA denotes the probability with which player A chooses
their action 1 and similarly for xB.
The stochastic evolutionary dynamics now occurs in two finite populations of
ideas, one for either player, each consisting of N individuals. We write n for
the number of ideas of type 1 in population A, and similarly m for the number
of ideas of type 1 in population B. The dynamics is defined by the rates for






















































The two-population birth-death dynamics has four absorbing states, (n,m) =
(0, 0), (0, N), (N, 0), (N,N) in finite populations. In the limit N → ∞ and
writing xA = n/N as well as xB = m/N , this process leads to the deterministic
two-population Sato-Crutchfield equations (5.25a) and (5.25b).
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Matching Pennies Dominance game Hyperbolic game
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.1: Two-population replicator flows for different types of 2× 2 asymmet-
ric games: (a) the Matching Pennies game is a zero-sum game; the
replicator dynamics has a conserved quantity and exhibits cyclic tra-
jectories. The game (b) has one pure-strategy fixed point while (c)
has a hyperbolic fixed point. Stable fixed points are labeled by full
dots, saddles (fixed points with one unstable and one stable direction)
by triangles, unstable fixed points (two unstable directions) by empty
dots and finally cyclic fixed points (whose Jacobian eigenvalues are
purely imaginary) by a cross.
5.4.2 Examples of two-player two-strategy asymmetric
games
We now study the corresponding fixation properties, focusing on a few key
examples of asymmetric two-player games, chosen from the different categories
of possible two-population replicator flows [50]: (i) the so-called Matching
Pennies game, also known as Dawkin’s Battle of the Sexes [34]; (ii) games in
which one player has an action that strictly dominates the alternative action;
and (iii) games in which the replicator flow has a hyperbolic interior fixed
point. The three cases are illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
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In addition to the trivial fixed points at the corners of phase space the repli-
cator dynamics (λ = 0) has the fixed point x? = (xA, xB) = (0.5, 0.5). Tra-
jectories that start elsewhere will form closed periodic orbits around the fixed
point as shown in Fig. 5.2(a). Fixation in one of the four corners in finite pop-
ulations will therefore be due to radial diffusion. Diffusion distances generally
grow as
√
Dt. As the diffusion constant is D ∼ 1/N in our case, covering a
radial distance of order unity to reach one of the two corners requires time
t ∼ N . This linear growth of fixation time with population size is shown in
Fig. 5.2(d).
The effect can be seen as an analogue of the trapping in regions of low flow
discussed in the anendices, but here the (radial) flow is zero over an extended
region rather than at a single point, causing a stronger fixation time growth
(N versus lnN) with population size.
As soon as one has nonzero memory loss λ, the point x? becomes an attractor
of the dynamics, with the whole state space as basin of attraction as shown
in Fig. 5.2(b). As before, fixation will therefore proceed along the sequence
of relaxation to this fixed point followed by activation to one of the absorbing
states. The activation phase again requires a time scaling exponentially with
the population size N . This change in scaling is clear by comparing Figs. 5.2(d)
and (e) and emphasizes that the addition of the entropic term in the fitness has
qualitative consequences for the fixation dynamics. The sample trajectories in
Fig. 5.3 further illustrate this.
When λ becomes large, the flow and hence the activation barrier becomes
proportional to λ to leading order, producing fixation times that scale expo-
nentially with λ as can be seen in Fig. 5.2(c).
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Figure 5.2: Matching Pennies game. (a,b) Flow under deterministic Sato-
Crutchfield learning for λ = 0 and λ = 0.3, respectively. Overlaid
is a heat map indicating the fixation time as a function of the starting
point (obtained from the backward master equation [74] for a system
of size N = 30); (c) Fixation time from simulations as a function of
λ, for population size N = 100 and (n,m) = (N/2, N/2) as initial
condition. Panels (d, e) show fixation time τN/2,N/2 against N for
λ = 0 and λ = 0.3, respectively. Panel (d) shows linear scaling of
fixation time with N (solid line) consistent with fixation by radial
diffusion, whereas panel (e) displays approximately exponential scaling
(see log-linear plot in inset) as fixation now requires activation against
the flow.
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..........
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Figure 5.3: Matching Pennies game. Sample trajectories in a population of
size N = 500 and with Γ = 0.1, for (a) λ = 0 and (b) λ = 0.3.
We show the distance d of (xA, xB) from the fixed point at (0.5, 0.5)
versus time t in log-linear scale, to focus on the radial motion. Note the
difference between diffusive dynamics in (a) – the dashed line shows
the expected power law 1/2 for a diffusive process – and activation in
(b). For the latter we plot the beginning of the trajectory, showing
how the system reaches a metastable steady state where it fluctuates
around the centre of the state space (d = 0), and on the right the end
of the fixation trajectory where a fluctuation takes the system to one
of the four absorbing states at time tf .
Its Sato-Crutchfield dynamics for λ = 0 has four fixed points in the corners
of the state space, one of which is stable. Fixation will then typically proceed
by deterministic relaxation to this fixed point. For infinite N this would take
infinite time as the approach to the fixed point is exponential. At finite N , one
expects that fixation takes place once this exponential approach gets within
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distance 1/N – the grid spacing in the (xA, xB)-plane – of the fixed point. The
fixation time should then scale logarithmically with N ; the data in Fig. 5.4(d)
are consistent with this.
As the memory-loss parameter λ is increased from zero, the stable fixed point
moves continuously towards the centre of the state space, with all four corners
then unstable fixed points. (There are also two additional saddle points on
the boundary near the original stable fixed point.) Fixation will take place by
relaxation followed by activation, resulting in exponential growth of fixation
times with N (Fig. 5.4(e)) and, at large λ, also with λ (Fig. 5.4(c)). The
sample trajectories in Fig. 5.5 illustrate the qualitative differences between the
fixation dynamics for λ = 0 and λ > 0.









For λ = 0, the Sato-Crutchfield dynamics has one saddle point in the interior
of the state space, two stable fixed points in two opposite corners of the state
space, and two unstable fixed points in the remaining corners; cf. Fig. 5.6.
As for the dominance game, fixation will proceed by deterministic relaxation,
leading to exponential approach to one of the two stable fixed points. Loga-
rithmic growth with N of fixation times should again result, though we have
not verified this explicitly.
Each of the two stable fixed points has its own basin of attraction. This is
a new feature compared to the dominance game. For N → ∞, the location
in strategy space where fixation occurs will be entirely determined by which
basin the system starts off in. For finite N , fluctuation effects will then make
the choice of fixation location stochastic.
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Figure 5.4: Dominance game. (a,b) Flow under deterministic Sato-Crutchfield
learning for λ = 0 and λ = 0.5, respectively. Overlaid is a heat map
indicating the mean fixation time as a function of the starting point
(obtained from the backward master equation for a system of size
N = 30); (c) Fixation time from Gillespie simulations as a function
of λ, for population size N = 100 and (n,m) = (N/2, N/2) as initial
condition. (d, e) Fixation time τN/2,N/2 against N for λ = 0 and 0.5,
respectively. The fixation time in (d) exhibits logarithmic scaling with
N resulting from the exponential approach to the stable fixed point.
The scaling of the fixation time in (e) is approximately exponential
with N because fixation involves activation.
With increasing λ, the two stable fixed points in the corners move to the inte-
rior of the state space. At a critical value λc, these two fixed points merge with
the saddle point into a single stable fixed point. (This is the consequence of
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: Dominance game. Sample trajectories in a population of size N =
500 and with Γ = 0.1, for (a) λ = 0 and (b) λ = 0.5. We show
xA against time (linear axis in (a), logarithmic axis in (b)). The full
and dashed horizontal lines show the xA-coordinate of the stable and
unstable fixed points of the deterministic dynamics, see also Fig. 5.4.
a symmetry in our payoff matrices; without this, the saddle would annihilate
with one stable fixed point and the other would survive.) The presence of this
bifurcation would suggest, by analogy with the results for the coordination
game, a non-monotonic dependence of the fixation time on λ near λc. Presum-
ably the values of N required to see this will be large again, however, and we
were unable to reach them in the two-population case with reasonable com-
putational effort. Nonetheless, Fig. 5.7 illustrates clearly that as λ varies, the
different fixed point structures of the deterministic dynamics cause qualitative
changes in the fixation trajectories.
5.5 Summary and outlook
We have interpreted learning in games as a pairwise comparison process within
a population of ideas. In the limit of large population size, the dynamics is
described by the deterministic Sato-Crutchfield equations. While these equa-
tions for learning have been widely studied, there has (to our knowledge) not
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Figure 5.6: Hyperbolic game. Flow under deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learn-
ing for λ = 0, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. Overlaid is in each panel a
heat map showing the mean fixation time as a function of starting
point in a system of size N = 30. The three chosen values of λ show
different fixed point structures as indicated by the symbols.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.7: Hyperbolic game. Sample trajectories in a population of size N =
500 and with Γ = 0.1, for (a) λ = 0, (b) 0.6 and (c) 0.8, in the same
representation as in Fig. 5.5. Panel (a) shows relaxation to the region
around the saddle point, with fluctuations then determining at which
boundary fixed point fixation occurs. The trajectories in (b) start
similarly but then are driven to one of two interior stable fixed points,
from which fixation proceeds by activation to the nearest boundary.
In (c), all trajectories go to the single interior fixed point, from which
fixation by activation occurs to one of two boundary fixed points (top
right and bottom left in right-hand panel of Fig. 5.6).
been any systematic derivation from a birth-death process in finite populations.
Such individual-based foundations are only available for simpler replicator (or
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replicator-mutator) dynamics [99, 100, 7]. We fill this gap by defining such
an individual-based process in a finite population of ideas. The construction
in Sec. 5.3.3 and 5.4.1 involves augmenting the standard fitness function by
a term proportional to the information content (− lnxi) of species i. While
the behaviour of deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learning in continuous time is
fairly similar to the outcome of replicator-mutator dynamics in infinite popu-
lations, there are marked differences between their stochastic representations
in finite systems. Mutation processes prevent fixation or extinction, but these
phenomena can and will occur in finite populations of ideas, even at non-zero
memory loss.
In order to develop some intuition for the general phenomena that can occur
in finite populations of ideas we first studied three types of symmetric games
(Sec. 5.3.4). We focused on the dependence of the fixation dynamics on the
size of the population and on the memory-loss parameter λ. In our interpre-
tation this latter parameter becomes the strength of the preference for rare
ideas. The variety of different behaviours observed could be understood by
decomposing the fixation dynamics into a sequence of elementary events, such
as relaxation to stable fixed points and activation against the deterministic
flow driven by demographic noise. We then broadened our analysis to include
asymmetric two-player games (Sec. 5.4.2). Further features of the dynamics
are then observed, such as fixation by diffusion when the relevant part of the
dynamics is not opposed by the deterministic flow.
Most of our results are obtained from direct Gillespie simulations of the
stochastic evolution of ideas, or from numerical solutions of the corresponding
backward master equation. In the case of symmetric games we have comple-
mented this with an analysis for large population size N (see Sec. 5.C of the
appendices). This allows one to identify the dominant scaling of fixation times
and reveals subtle effects that cannot be deduced from the fixed point structure
of the dynamics (Sec. 5.B of the appendices). For asymmetric games there is in
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general no mapping to noisy descent on an effective potential energy, because
of the lack of detailed balance. However, as discussed e.g. by Bouchet et al.
in [11], one should – in principle – be able to obtain fixation times for large
N by using Freidlin-Wentzell large deviation theory. This is left to future work.
We think our work will enrich the mathematical theory of learning and evolu-
tionary dynamics, providing a novel interpretation of learning in games with
imperfect memory as a pairwise matching process between ideas. Our construc-
tion places the dynamics of learning in the context of stochastic population
dynamics, and, we hope, it will encourage further studies of learning based on
the established toolbox for evolutionary dynamics in finite populations.
162
Appendix
5.A Limits on birth-death description of
Sato-Crutchfield learning
The parameters Γ and λ of the stochastic evolution of ideas we have defined
need to be chosen so that all transition rates T±n in Eq. (5.22) are non-negative.
Except in the case of pure replicator dynamics (λ = 0), this gives constraints
on the parameters that depend on population size N , though weakly. The
reason is the logarithmic term in the fitness (5.19), which can get as large as
−λ ln(1/N).
For fixed Γ the rates will only remain non-negative if λ ≤ λc. One can compute
a lower bound for λc. Firstly, all the transition rates will be positive if and
only if the constraint ∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln N − nn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1Γ (5.31)
is met for all 0 < n < N . Since the quantity ∆pi = pi1−pi2 varies linearly with
n, it is bounded by ∆pi(1) and ∆pi(N − 1). Applying the triangular inequality
to (5.31) gives:∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln N − nn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|) + λ ln(N − 1) (5.32)
As a consequence, all transition rates are positive as long as
max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|) + λ ln(N − 1) ≤ 1/Γ. This translates into
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Positive 
transition rates
Figure 5.A.1: Lower bound on λc for a coexistence game as defined in section 5.3.4,
for Γ = 0.1. The bound (black line) is inversely proportional to the






−max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|)
)
(5.33)
The right-hand side therefore provides a lower bound on the critical value λc.
This bound is plotted as a function of N in Fig. 5.A.1. While the bound
goes to zero for N →∞, the inverse logarithmic dependence means it does so
extremely slowly: the restriction on the allowed range of λ is therefore mild
even for very large population sizes (N ∼ 108 and beyond).
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5.B Non-monotonicity of the fixation time in a
coordination game
In Sec. 5.3.4, we studied fixation in a coordination game and observed that
the fixation time is non monotonic in λ close to the bifurcation threshold λc,
for small N . We will provide an explanation for this phenomenon by decom-
posing the dynamics leading to fixation into a sequence of elementary events.
When N is small enough for activation times to be only moderate, beyond
the bifurcation threshold, two additional effects come into play in addition to
the relaxation and activation processes observed for large N : (i) direct activa-
tion: when starting near x = 0, a fluctuation (activation event) can drive the
system straight to fixation at x = 0, even though the deterministic relaxation
would take it in the other direction; (ii) trapping in regions near deterministic
fixed points, where the net (deterministic) flow is low; deterministic relaxation
times can then become comparable to activation times (precisely at such a
fixed point, the deterministic relaxation time is in fact infinite as the flow
vanishes). Finite populations will stay trapped in these regions of low deter-
ministic flow for a long (but finite) time. This time will grow logarithmically
with N as explained in this appendix, Sec. 5.D. Such regions exist at and near
the bifurcation at λc, both for λ below and above λc.
The curve in Fig. 5.5(b) for λ = 0.475 shows the first effect: for small initial
values of x, fixation times are rather low, as direct activation towards x = 0 is
the dominant fixation mechanism. To the right of the maximum in the curve,
on the other hand, we have fixation predominantly at x = 1. The fixation time
here is, to a good approximation, given by the deterministic relaxation time to
the stable fixed point close to x = 1, with the final activation to x = 1 being
sufficiently fast to be sub-leading.
Accordingly, the sample trajectories in Fig. 5.6 show that the system moves
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to the stable fixed point in a close-to-deterministic fashion, with fixation at
x = 1 occurring shortly afterwards.
The second effect above contributes to the initial condition-dependence of the
fixation time in Fig. 5.5. Here we are close enough to the bifurcation to have an
extended region of low flow, causing a significant peak in the transition time
curve. The low flow also makes fluctuation effects significant as explained
above, and these cause deviations from the times predicted for purely deter-
ministic relaxation. In Fig. 5.6, the sample trajectories that start from n = 200
(x = 0.2) illustrate this effect.
Finally, the low flow also makes direct activation to x = 0 fast, giving a larger
region of initial x where this is the main fixation mechanism. As is clear from
Fig. 5.5(b), the resulting movement of the peak in the fixation time is what
causes the non-monotonic λ-dependence at fixed initial condition that is visible
in Fig. 5.5(a). We refer to one of the two sample trajectories starting from
n = 50 (x = 0.05) in Fig. 5.6 for an illustration of a direct activation event.
We note that the direct activation effects discussed above for the coordination
game do occur also for coexistence and dominance games, with the same con-
sequence that fixation times become small for initial conditions near x = 0.
These other games do not have the additional features arising from the bi-
furcation in the coordination game, however, so do not show non-monotonic
variation of the fixation time with λ.
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(iii)
(i) (iv)
Figure 5.B.1: Different types of fixation dynamics in the coordination game with
the payoff matrix of Fig. 5.1, superimposed onto the fixed point
structure of Fig. 5.4(a). For values of λ below the bifurcation
threshold, the potential formalism allows one to identify three dif-
ferent zones [(i), (iv) and (iii), with the latter covering only a very
narrow λ-range] with qualitatively different fixation dynamics; see
Fig. 5.C.2. Note that this subdivision into three zones cannot be
deduced from the deterministic Sato-Crutchfield dynamics and its
fixed point structure (Sec. 5.3.4) alone.
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5.C Activation dynamics in stochastic
evolution of ideas for symmetric games
Here, we explain how to obtain the large N -behaviour of activation times in
our stochastic evolution for a population of ideas, and discuss the consequences
for the fixation dynamics.
5.C.1 Kramers-Moyal expansion and effective potential
Our starting point is the dynamics defined by the transition rates (5.13a) and
(5.13b). We have discussed in the main text how for N → ∞ this leads
to deterministic dynamics, here – by our construction – the Sato-Crutchfield
equation (5.21). This can formally be derived from a Kramer-Moyal expansion
to lowest order. In order to capture stochastic effects, one retains the first sub-
leading order in the expansion. This is standard for evolutionary processes
[100], and leads to an Ito¯ stochastic differential equation of the form




where ξ(t) is Gaussian white noise of unit variance, 〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = δ(t− t′). For
the birth-death process discussed in Sec. 5.3 one finds
h(x) = Γx(1− x)
(









Our aim is to use Eyring-Kramers theory [46], and so we map the above dy-
namics with multiplicative noise to one with additive noise. This is standard
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The additional flow term with prefactor 1
N
arises from the x-dependence of
the original noise variance σ2(x). We will see shortly that this term can be
neglected in determining the leading (exponential in N) scaling of activation
















Now that we have a standard Langevin equation with additive noise, Eyring-
Kramers theory tells us that the time for an activated event, say from a stable
fixed point y1 to an unstable fixed point (barrier state) y2 or to a boundary,
scales as exp{NΓ[Vy(y2)−Vy(y1)]}. It follows that the O(1/N) term in Vy will
only contribute to the prefactor, which we are not considering here anyway; it
can therefore be neglected. More importantly, if we translate back from y to
x the potential takes the simple form




















and activation times scale as
τ ∼ exp{NΓ[V (x2)− V (x1)]} (5.41)
This will be the basis for our further analysis. In particular, we will exploit
that for large N , differences in activation barriers V (x2)−V (x1) translate into
exponentially different timescales, hence if there are competing processes the
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one with the smaller activation barrier occurs first (with probability one as
N →∞).
We add finally as a note of caution that the above Langevin analysis is valid
for small Γ, where the rates for a transition n→ n+ 1 and its reverse are close
to each other. Otherwise a more general approach is needed to determine
activation timescales [45].
5.C.2 Generic symmetric two-strategy games
We can write down the potential V (x) quite generically for a symmetric game
where there are two actions to choose from. Inserting the explicit form of the
payoffs (see Eq. (5.3a) and (5.3b)) into (5.40), one has, up to an umimportant
additive constant,











Here the entropy is s(x) = −x ln(x)− (1− x) ln(1− x) as before, and we have
introduced the abbreviations
v˜ =




a12 + a21 − a11 − a22
2
(5.43b)
For λ = 0 it is now easy to see the link to the three categories of symmetric
game considered in Sec. 5.3.4, bearing in mind that all stationary points of
V (x) obey h(x) = 0, hence are fixed points of the dynamics. For w > 0 and
|v| < w, V (x) has a minimum in the relevant range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and we have
a coexistence game. For w < 0 and |v| < |w|, on the other hand, V (x) has
a maximum, corresponding to a coordination game. In the remaining cases,
where |v| > |w|, V (x) is monotonic for x ∈ [0, 1], so one has a dominance
game.
170
5 Stochastic evolution in populations of ideas
To understand the effect of nonzero λ on V (x), note that the function −λs(x) is
convex. Hence for a coexistence game V (x) continues to have a single minimum
x?. A fixation trajectory will first relax to this minimum. The barrier to
activation towards x = 0 is then V (0) − V (x?), so fixation will occur there if
this is lower than the corresponding barrier V (1)−V (x?) for fixation at x = 1.
In the opposite case, i.e. for V (0) > V (1), fixation will occur at x = 1.
For a dominance game, the inclusion of the entropic term in V (x) will create
a single minimum x? for any λ > 0, because the derivative −λs′(x) diverges
to ±∞ at the two boundaries x = 0 and x = 1. The fixation dynamics then
follows the same pattern as for a coexistence game.
5.C.3 Kramer-Moyal expansion for coordination games
The remaining case of coordination games is the most interesting, as the com-
petition between the maximum in V (x) at λ = 0 and the convex entropic term
can create additional minima. We keep λ > 0 from now on and write















with v = v˜/λ, w = w˜/λ. The shape of V (x) is determined by these parameters,
while λ only affects the overall scale of the activation barriers but not their
relative size for different processes. We therefore drop the prefactor λ in the
following.
For large v and w, corresponding to small λ at fixed v˜ and w˜, the entropic term
is mostly negligible in V (x). But its diverging derivative always dominates in
V ′(x) when one is close enough to the boundaries, so must create two minima
there. We denote their positions x?1 and x?2, respectively, and that of the
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Figure 5.C.1: Graphical representation of the definitions of ∆0 = V (0) − V (xs),
∆1 = V (1)− V (xs), B0 = V (0)− V (x?1) and B1 = V (1)− V (x?2).
intermediate maximum by xs. We also introduce
∆0 = V (0)− V (xs), ∆1 = V (1)− V (xs),
B0 = V (0)− V (x?1), B1 = V (1)− V (x?2) (5.45)
as illustrated in Fig. 5.C.1. As v and w change, so will the values of these bar-
rier parameters. In particular, the signs of ∆0 and ∆1 determine qualitatively
the kind of fixation dynamics that the system will exhibit. The regime where
∆0 and ∆1 have different signs is subdivided further according to their relation
to the barriers B0 and B1. A graphical summary is given in Fig. 5.C.2 and
discussed further below. Fig. 5.C.3 shows the resulting phase diagram in the
(v, w)-plane, and summarizes to what extent fixation probabilities and fixation
times depend on initial conditions in each of the four regimes. Note that when
w gets too close to zero, or |v|/|w| becomes too large, a maximum and a mini-
mum of V (x) can merge in a bifurcation. In the single minimum regime beyond
this, the fixation dynamics becomes simple again and has the same features
as for coexistence and dominance games. The arrow in Fig. 5.C.3 shows how
the various regions of the diagram are traversed when λ is increased at fixed
v˜ and w˜, i.e. for fixed payoffs. In Fig. 5.B.1 we plot over what λ-ranges V (x)
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(i)                                                 (ii)
(iii)                               (iv)
Figure 5.C.2: Schematic of the shape of the potential V (x) in the four different
classes of coordination games. Arrows on the bottom of each panel
represent deterministic relaxation paths that occur during fixation
(full lines) as well as activated events driven by fluctuations (dashed
lines). The legends indicate whether the largeN -fixation probability
and fixation time depend on the initial position x, or are uniform
in x.
has the shapes (i), (iii) and (iv), respectively, in the specific example game
of Sec. 5.3.4. The λ-range for shape (iii) is too small to see in that figure,
however.
Fig. 5.C.2(a) shows the simplest case ∆0,∆1 < 0. Here depending on its initial
condition, the system will first relax to one of the minima of the potential, say
x?1. Then because ∆0 < 0 the barrier for activation to x = 0 is smaller than for
activation to the maximum xs. For large N – which we always assume in the
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following discussion – then with probability one the former process is the first
to happen: fixation occurs at x = 0. Similarly if the initial relaxation goes to
x?2 because the system started at x > xs, fixation will occur at x = 1. The
fixation probability at 0 is therefore a step function of the initial condition x,
dropping from one to zero at x = xs. The fixation time changes similarly with
initial condition, from exp[NΓB0] for x < xs to exp[NΓB1] for x > xs.
The opposite case of ∆0,∆1 > 0 is illustrated in Fig. 5.C.2(b). Here once the
system has landed in either of the two minima, it will be able to reach the
maximum separating these minima much faster than a boundary. As a result
the system will make many “trips” between the two minima and effectively
equilibrates across them, forgetting its initial condition. One can show that
fixation will then eventually occur as if the system only had a single potential
minimum at the lower of the two local potential minima, and will accordingly
take place at the boundary with the lower value of V .
Finally there is the case where ∆0 and ∆1 have opposite signs, e.g. ∆1 > 0,
∆0 < 0 as shown in Fig. 5.C.2(c,d). If the system starts out of x < xs, we
have the same case as (a) above: deterministic relaxation to x?1 followed by
fixation at x = 0 on a timescale set by the barrier B0. Otherwise, the system
will initially relax to x?2 and then traverse the maximum at xs: ∆1 > 0 ensures
that activation to the maximum is exponentially faster than fixation at x = 1.
After arrival at x?1 the earlier sequence of processes is followed. Because fixation
in both cases takes place at x = 0, the fixation probability is independent of
the initial condition.
Whether the fixation time has such a dependence, on the other hand, depends
on timescales. As Fig. 5.C.2(c,d) shows, the timescale for activation from x?2 to
xs is set by the barrier B1−∆1, while the timescale for fixation at x = 0 from
x?1 is set by B0. If the former is smaller than the latter, as in Fig. 5.C.2(c),
then even when the system initially relaxes to x?2, the timescale for the overall
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Figure 5.C.3: Phase diagram in the (v, w)-plane, indicating where the different
shapes of V (x) occur. These are explained in Fig. 5.C.2. The dotted
arrow shows how the phase diagram is traversed at fixed v˜ and w˜
when λ is increased.
fixation trajectory will be given by B0: it is therefore independent of the initial
condition. In the converse case of Fig. 5.C.2(d), the system will take longer to
reach fixation starting from x > xs because activation from x?2 to xs is much
slower than fixation from x?1. A typical fixation trajectory here will see the
system spend almost all of its time near x?2, before a fluctuation drives it across
xs to x?1 and from there to x = 0.
5.D Fixation in regions of small flow
Here, we explain briefly why the noise-driven escape from the low-flow region
around an unstable fixed fixed point takes a time scaling as ln(N).
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Consider the linearized dynamics of a coordination (or other) game near an
unstable fixed point. After the mapping to Langevin dynamics with additive
noise, cf. (5.38), this can be written in the form
y˙ = µ˜(y − y0) + 1√
N
ξ(t) (5.46)
with µ˜ > 0. Assuming that y(0) = y0, a straightforward calculation then shows
that the variance of y(t) is:
〈[y(t)− y0]2〉 = exp(2µ˜t)− 1
2µ˜N
(5.47)
To have ‘escape’ from the unstable fixed point this needs to be of order unity;
call this value c. Neglecting the −1 in the numerator then gives an escape
time of order t = ln(2cµ˜Nc+ 1)/(2µ˜) which for large N becomes ln(N)/(2µ˜),
establishing the promised logarithmic scaling with N . Note that while we have
estimated the time for an escape to a distance of order unity in y-space, this





6.1 Summary of the results
In this thesis we used large deviation methods to understand segregation and
fixation in game theoretical models. Chaps. 2, 4 and 3 were concerned with
the application of Freidlin-Wentzell theory to quantify the emergence of seg-
regation for traders with an infinitely long memory. Chap. 5 dealt with the
application of Kramers’ rate theory, which is a simplified version of Freidlin-
Wentzell theory for conservative dynamics, to study finite size quantities in
birth-death processes.
The aim of Chap. 2 was twofold: (i) comparing the steady state of some EWA
learning dynamics to a simple game theoretical model and (ii) studying how
the emergence of segregation is influenced by the use of fictitious play. To
fulfill aim (i) we built a simple aggregative game in Sec. 2.3, which turns
out to have an infinity of Nash equilibria. We classified each of those Nash
equilibria according to the type of strategies played by the traders (pure or
mixed). In the rest of the chapter, we then linked the Nash equilibria to the
actual long run outcome of EWA learning dynamics. We first investigated
177
6 Conclusion
the outcome of EWA learning dynamics when the fictitious play coefficient α
is zero, traders have infinite memory r → 0 and they best-respond to their
preferences (β → ∞). We found in this case that the steady state of EWA
learning is a homogeneous mixed Nash equilibrium i.e. unimodal distribution
of scores where all the traders play a mixed strategy. We then extended our
analysis and studied the long run outcome of the EWA learning dynamics when
the limits α→ 0 and β →∞ are taken simultaneously. As shown in Fig. 2.5,
depending on how the limit is taken, the corresponding long run outcome of
the EWA learning dynamics will have qualitatively different properties (see
Fig. 2.3). Those include homogeneous-mixed states where all traders within a
classe randomize in the same way as well as heterogeneous-pure states where
traders split into two groups each choosing a market deterministically. Along
with these standard types of Nash equilibria, we also found a heterogeneous
mixed steady states where traders splits into groups but not all groups play
deterministically.
In Chap. 3 we used the equal action formalism developed in Chap. 2 to study
strong segregation of traders with fixed buy/sell preferences across more than
two markets. Motivated by the wide variety of qualitatively different scores dis-
tributions that we observed in multi-agent simulation (see Fig. 3.1), in Secs. 3.3
and 3.4 we explored segregation across three markets for different ranges of pa-
rameters. Sec. 3.3 was dedicated to the analysis of segregation across three
fair markets, i.e. with θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 0.5; this is the only set of market biases
for which we found segregation of both classes of traders into three groups.
Sec. 3.4 was concerned with the exploration of different ranges of market pa-
rameters to understand the causes that drive segregation. Based on this study,
we inferred two plausible triggers for the emergence of segregation across three
markets: (i) the closeness between the markets, (ii) the average volume of trade
and the profit earned in this market.
Chap. 4 was concerned with the existence of segregation in a population where
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the intensity of choice, as well as the memory, are heterogeneous. In Sec. 4.2
we detailed our approach to model heterogeneity. The largest section of the
chapter, Sec. 4.3, was concerned with the consequences of various sources of
heterogeneity. In Sec. 4.3.1 we observed that adding the same fraction of
traders with short memory in each class decreases the segregation thresholds,
i.e. suppresses segregation, for the traders with a long memory. Specifically,
we saw that the variations with respect to the fraction of fast traders are
significantly larger for the strong than for the weak segregation threshold.
Sec. 4.3.2 investigated the effects of adding heterogeneity in the intensity of
choice and we observed that decreasing the inverse intensity of choice of fast
traders decreases the segregation threshold of slow traders. Finally, Sec. 4.3.3
explored how the segregation thresholds vary when the fraction of traders with
short memory is different within the two classes. Although the results showed
some non-trivial structure, our results were in line with the general trend
that adding traders with short memory lowers the segregation threshold (see
Fig. 4.1). We believe that this behaviour arises because adding fast traders
reduces the range of possible market conditions that slow traders can reach by
self-organising (see Fig. 4.2).
In Chap. 5 we interpreted learning as a pairwise comparison process within
populations of ideas. While for large populations, the dynamics is described by
the Sato-Crutchfield equation, there has been (to our knowledge) no systematic
derivation of the Sato-Crutchfield equation as the large size limit of a birth-
death process. Our work aimed at filling this gap by defining a birth-death
process that leads to the Sato-Crutchfield equation in the limit of a population
of large size. To do so we constructed in Sec. 5.3.3 and 5.4.1 a birth-death
process where the fitness of individuals was augmented by a term proportional
to the information content of species i (− lnxi). One of the outcomes of this
work was to show that although the replicator-mutator dynamics and the Sato-
Crutchfield dynamics have fairly similar behaviour, their stochastic extensions
have qualitatively different properties. We also investigated the finite size
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quantities of the dynamics of the population of ideas in a number of symmetric
and asymmetric games as a function of the memory-loss parameter λ.
6.2 Future work
6.2.1 Technical improvements
The robustness of the action minimization algorithm: The algorithm we
used to study strong segregation phenomena in Chaps. 2 and 3 is suitable for
our parameter regime. However, for small values of the fictitious play coef-
ficient, such as the one we were interested in in Chap. 2, the algorithm can
fail to find the minimal action path (i.e. it does not converge). This pre-
vented us from investigating very small values of the fictitious play coefficient
α. Therefore, a natural direction for future work would be to improve the
robustness of the action minimisation algorithm for small α. To do so we see
two possible directions, either (i) improving the algorithm used to minimise
the discretised minimal action path or (ii) directly solving the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation that has as its solution the minimal action path. The latter turns out
to be challenging because it requires the solution of a boundary value prob-
lem that is generally tackled with the "shooting method" [78]. However, in
preliminary numerical experiments we found that the shooting method was
not robust enough, which lead us to the use of the discretized path instead.
An alternative technique to perform the shooting method could be based on
linearising in small changes to the initial condition for the optimal path, from
which iterative corrections to these initial conditions can then be estimated.
However, this technique is still being developed and the method was not yet
robust enough to be used in the numerics for this thesis.
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Assessing the segregation via the distribution of scores: The advantage
of the action minimisation methods we deployed is that they enable one to
assess the existence, or otherwise, of segregation in the large memory limit.
However—as explained above—in certain parameter regimes, the action min-
imisation algorithm may not converge. In such situations, one can assess the
existence of segregation by looking at the distribution of scores in multi-agent
simulations. One possible measure employed by Alorić [2, 1] is the Binder
cumulant [6]. This coefficient gives helpful information about the bimodal-
ity of the score distribution when the peaks are of equal size but are of less
useful when the score distribution is composed of peaks with different size.
Alternatively, the existence of segregation can be tested using the DIP test
for unimodality [47]. DIP compares the distribution of scores with the best-
fitted uni-modal curve and returns a number between zero and one describing
the similarity of the two curves. However, we see two challenges in using the
DIP test for unimodality: (i) during our early investigation this test did not
manage to separate strong and weak segregation (ii) as opposed to the Binder
cumulant, we do not have any intuition on how the results of the DIP test
generalise in the large memory limit r → 0. Thus, it would be interesting to
develop a generalised version of the DIP test that is adapted specifically to
distributions with narrow peaks.
Asymptotics for the fixation time in populations of ideas In Chap. 5 we
calculate the fixation times for a large population of ideas undergoing a birth-
death process. We observed that the fixation time of such populations grows
exponentially with its size. It would be interesting to calculate this exponential
growth rate with the memory size for both symmetric and asymmetric games.
We have considered such an extension of our work and note the following:
• For symmetric games, one should use Kramers’ rate theory. A challenge
arises when applying this theory, however. One would need to go beyond
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the Kramers-Moyal expansion. If not, the resulting calculations would
lead to an overestimate of the exponential growth rate of the fixation
time [45, 26].
• Since the dynamics of asymmetric games is not conservative, here one
would need to use a version of Freidlin-Wentzell theory that generalizes
Kramers’ rate theory to non-conservative systems [38, 11].
6.2.2 Extensions of the model
In Chaps. 2, 3 and 4, we examined the existence or otherwise of segregation in
different variations of a minimal model of double auction markets. A logical
continuation of this work is to explore further variations of the model among
which we would suggest the following.
Adding heterogeneity in the traders’ preferences Building upon the work
of Chap. 4, we could add additional heterogeneity in the behaviour of the
traders. For example, we could consider more than two different memory
lengths within the population of traders. In such a case, we expect the analysis
of both the weak and strong segregation thresholds to be tractable as long as
the orders of magnitude of the different timescales of the dynamics of the
traders are different.
As a consequence of the large number of memory timescales, one might expect
the payoff of traders to be non-monotonic with their memory as reported by
Toth et al. in [98]. This monotonicity is related to the fact that highly informed
traders can take advantage of the less informed ones but cannot take advantage
of the uninformed traders who trade almost randomly.
Another exciting direction would be to have a population of traders that have
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different exploration/exploitation tradeoffs. A straightforward way to imple-
ment such a behaviour would be to have traders with various intensities of
choice β, building upon the model developed in Chap. 4.
Varying the learning mechanisms The automated traders set up by the
organizers of the CAT game that inspired our work learned their preferences
using numerous different learning algorithms [16]. Starting from this fact, we
believe it would be interesting to vary the learning mechanisms of the traders.
This learning dynamics can be subdivided into how the traders make two
separate choices: (i) the selection of their preferred market and (ii) the value
of the order an agent sends to the market.
In our current model, we chose to have zero intelligence traders, who do not
learn the price of the orders they send to the market. This choice was mo-
tivated by the work of Gode and Sunders [44] who regard the “Market as a
Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality”. An alternative proposed by Cliff
et al. is the Zero-Intelligence-Plus [27] learning algorithm (instead of zero in-
telligence [44]) as a potentially more accurate model traders’ behaviour. Other
possible rules for traders to set their order price can be found in [36] and [43].
One could also study the robustness of the model against variation of the
market selection strategy (reinforcement learning) our traders use. A simpli-
fied approach would be to consider market selection as a multi-armed-bandit
problem (MAB). Among the existing learning algorithms used to solve such
problems one can cite for example -greedy strategy, and regret minimiza-
tion. This list is not exhaustive and there exist many other market selection
strategies. We refer the interested reader to a comprehensive review of MAB
problems for more information [94, 22].
Another exciting direction for our study would be to implement trader-trader
interactions in our model. In the vein of [31], we could, for example, consider
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random networks of traders interacting with each other and seeing how the
connectivity of the network influences the emergence of segregation.
Varying markets mechanisms In Chaps. 2, 3 and 4, we considered a simple
model of discrete double auction markets. This made it possible to obtain
analytical solutions for the segregation threshold in the large memory limit.
However, it would be interesting to generalize our results to a wider range
of markets. We could, for example, add transaction fees as in [91] and make
the markets adaptive as in [81] or [16]. There are many other market mecha-
nisms one could explore and we suggest [71, 77] as an overview of the possible
alternative market mechanisms that one could implement.
In real double auction markets, the traders pay for the service provided by the
market. This payment can come from the bid-ask spread, from additional fees
charged for each transaction, etc. Those features are not yet implemented in
our model, and they are good candidates for further extensions of our work
as they could contribute to making the model more realistic. One could, for
example, imagine that the market charges a fixed fee for each transaction, or
a fee proportional to the profit traders make, etc.
Segregation in other aggregative games In Chap. 2, we observed segrega-
tion in a double auction market modelled as an aggregative game. We believe
it would be exciting to see whether such results can be generalized to other
types of aggregative games such as the minority game [28, 24] or the Cournot
model for an oligopoly [33]. One advantage of those games is that their sim-
plicity should make it possible to obtain analytical results for the emergence
of segregation using methods similar to those used in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4.
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